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1.1. Motivation and Purpose 
 
The history of the mankind, be it ancient or just unfolding, involves a countless number of events 
that forcefully drove people from one place to another, often across national borders. Slave 
traffic, wars and revolutions, and natural catastrophes are all examples of such dreadful events. 
Perhaps even greater numbers of people migrate across national borders for social and economic 
reasons, including a more secure job, higher pay, or family reunion. Sometimes people did not 
physically move, yet they or their environment changed such that they emerged as a new social 
group within a state. Indeed, history abounds with episodes of dissemination of religions and 
languages and changes of state borders. All these events have resulted in a world where social 
and economic interaction of minorities and majorities is the rule rather than exception. African-
Americans in the US, Turks in Germany, Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, and Muslims in 
the Netherlands are all examples of minorities in societies predominantly populated by majority 
people that are different in terms of language, religion, and other socio-cultural characteristics. 
More formally, we define minority as a particular racial, ethnic, language, or religious group of 
people who share socio-cultural characteristics such as culture, religion, language, history, 
beliefs, customs, values, and morals that make them distinct from the rest of the population – the 
majority – in their habitat. Thus, social groups formed on the basis of occupation, wealth, or 
other ordinal characteristics of this kind are not considered as minorities. While there may be 
regions where minority individuals outnumber majority individuals, minorities typically 
constitute a smaller proportion of population than majorities.  
 
Interaction between ethnic groups exhibits several puzzling phenomena that intrigue social 
scientists and economists in particular. The first such phenomenon that I investigate in this thesis 
is what I denote the scale puzzle. It involves two empirical regularities. On the one hand, 
minorities typically earn less income per capita than majorities. On the other hand, minority-
majority earnings disparity increases in the relative size of the minority in a region. The puzzling 
feature of these empirical regularities taking place at the same time is that while being a member 
of the smaller social group in a region, the minority, is disadvantageous in terms of earnings, 
minority people are relatively better off in regions where they are relatively less numerous. To 
illustrate these regularities, Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 plot Black-White and Hispanic-White ratio 
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of median earnings of full time workers against the percentages of Blacks and Hispanics, 
respectively, over 310 Californian school districts. These two figures exhibit the two 
observations involved in the scale puzzle. First, in most school districts minority workers earn 
less than majority workers. Second, the linear trendlines fitted onto the data indicate that the 
earnings gap is increasing in minority percentage.  
 
Figure 1.1: Black-White ratio of median per 
capita earnings as a function of Black 
percentage. 
Figure 1.2: Hispanic-White ratio of median per 
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Source: Census 2000 School District Tabulation (STP2), NCES, US. Source: Census 2000 School District Tabulation (STP2), NCES, US. 
 
There is a large body of more formal evidence concerning the scale puzzle. The early empirical 
studies on this topic include Blalock (1956, 1957), Heer (1959), Brown and Fuguitt (1972), and 
Frisbie and Neidert (1977). For example, Heer (1959) finds a correlation of -0.71 between the 
ratio of Black and White median per capita incomes and the percentage of Blacks. Frisbie and 
Neidert estimate the correlations between minority-majority income disparity and minority share 
in the population between 0.19 and 0.70. They go as far as to conclude that “one of the most 
consistent findings … is that socioeconomic differentials vary directly with the relative numbers 
of a minority present in a given area …”.1 More recently, in a micro-econometric study about the 
earnings of Black, Hispanic, Asian, and White men in the US, Tienda and Lii (1987) establish 
the existence of significant minority-majority income differentials and confirm that minority 
labor market percentages favor the majority while disadvantaging the minorities themselves. 
Focusing on migrants, Borjas (1987) and Chiswick and Miller (2005) show that earnings of 
                                                 
1 Frisbie and Neidert (1977), p. 1007 
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immigrants from a certain linguistic or ethnic group are decreasing in the concentration of 
similar people in the destination region. Based on these studies, the scale puzzle that (i) minority 
individuals on average earn less than majority individuals and that (ii) this earnings differential is 
increasing in minority share in population in a given region is taken as a stylized fact of 
minority-majority earnings inequality.2
 
Figure 1.3: Dissimilarity and isolation indexes 
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Source: Cutler et al. (1999), Table A.1. IDW: Index of dissimilarity at 
ward level. IDT: Index of dissimilarity at census track level. IIW: Index of 
isolation at ward level. IIT: Index of isolation at census track level. All 
unadjusted. Data of both methodologies available in 1940. 
 
The second intriguing empirical phenomenon of minority-majority social and economic 
interaction that I investigate in this thesis concerns segregation and income inequality. A major 
development in cohabitation of Blacks and Whites in the U.S. was the reversal of segregation 
trends in the late seventies and desegregation of the Black minority thereafter.3 In particular, 
while the first three quarters of the 20th century can in general be characterized by increasing 
degree of segregation, the last quarter witnessed a steady decline in the degree of segregation of 
the Black minority. This trend of desegregation after the 1970s is evidenced by e.g. Massey and 
                                                 
2 Table 3A.1 in the Appendix of Chapter 3 summarizes this evidence in greater detail. 
3 Segregation is understood as separation of people according to their social, ethnic, racial, religious, or other 
characteristics in social interaction. Some of the most visible forms of segregation are geographical segregation, as 
exhibited by e.g. racial segregation of neighborhoods, and social segregation, as found in segregated schools or 
workplaces. The segregation literature is immense, including DuBois (1899), Myrdal (1944), Taeuber and Taeuber 
(1965), Massey and Denton (1987, 1993), and Farley and Frey (1994).   
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Denton (1987), Farley and Frey (1994), and Cutler et. al (1999).4 Figure 1.3 depicts segregation 
trends for native-born Blacks. One can observe that index of dissimilarity and index of isolation5 
between native-born Blacks and Whites exhibit the same pattern: both are increasing until the 
1960-70s and exhibit a steady decline thereafter. 
 
  Figure 1.4: Relative median usual weekly 
earnings of full-time wage and salary male 
minority workers in constant (2002) dollars, 
relative to white male, 1979-2002 annual 
averages. 
Figure 1.5: Relative median usual weekly 
earnings of full-time wage and salary female 
minority workers in constant (2002) dollars, 






































































Black female Hispanic female
 
Source: Current Population Survey, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Contrary to the commonsensical understanding that desegregation and lessening of inequality 
come hand in hand, during the same period the socioeconomic gap between ethnic and racial 
groups has been widening. In particular, as demonstrated by Altonji and Blank (1998), following 
a period of catching up during the 1960s, earnings gaps among racial and ethnic groups have 
been on the rise since the mid-1970s. More specifically, while Black men reduced and Black 
women almost closed the earnings gap during the 1960s when certain laws against labor market 
discrimination were adopted,6 the relative earnings of Black men stagnated or somewhat 
deteriorated and the relative wages of Black women clearly declined since the 1970s, as 
                                                 
4 The evidence is less clear for Hispanic and Asian minorities, largely due to sizeable recent immigration. See 
Massey and Denton (1987), Frey and Farley (1996), and Cutler et al. (2005). 
5 Indexes of dissimilarity and isolation are perhaps the two most widely used measures of segregation. The former 
tells us what share of the minority (or majority) population would need to relocate for the races to be evenly 
distributed. The latter measures the exposure of minority to majority. See Taeuber and Taeuber (1965), Duncan and 
Duncan (1955), and Bell (1954). 
6 See e.g. Heckman and Payner (1989), Donohue and Heckman (1991), and Neumark and Stock (2001) 
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compared to their White counterparts. Such deterioration was even more pronounced for 
Hispanic men and women.7 Figures 1.4 and 1.5 depict trends in racial earnings inequality for 
Black and Hispanic workers vis-à-vis White workers by gender from 1979 till 2002. The general 
pattern one can observe is that the relative earnings of minority workers declined during this 
period. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the aforementioned empirical puzzles and thereby further 
our understanding of the complexities of social and economic interaction of minority and 
majority people. The insights of this thesis are also intended to facilitate development of better-
informed policies to systematically fight poverty and socio-economic deprivation, social 
exclusion, and segregation of many minorities that pose a heavy burden on racial relations. The 
premises on which the main arguments are based are elaborated in the next section.   
 
1.2. The Elements 
 
The old saying “tell me who your friends are and I tell you who you are” reflects the ancient 
wisdom that acquaintances matter. Undoubtedly, our acquaintances not only influence our social 
behavior, provide us with psychological comfort, and satiate our elementary need for social 
acceptance and recognition, but they also channel and interpret new information and knowledge 
to us. Moreover, whom we know determines what information and knowledge reaches us. 
Because information and knowledge typically have some value in the broad sense, the circle of 
persons with whom we interact affects our success in life. While this notion is at least as ancient 
as the saying mentioned above, it only slowly gained recognition of modern economists. In fact, 
it was a sociologist, Granovetter (1973, 1974), who was the first to study the role of social ties in 
accessing economic opportunities such as job openings.8 Loury in his (1977) and (1981) articles 
was probably the first modern economist to challenge the purely individualistic paradigm 
prevalent in the economic analysis of that time, investigating the effects of social context on the 
achievement of minority and nonminority youth. Bourdieu (1986) systematized various forms of 
                                                 
7 Altonji and Blank (1998), p. 3149.  
8 Of course, social interaction is the principal notion of sociology and social psychology. See Coleman (1960), 
Rapoport (1963), and Merton (1968).  
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capital and used the term social capital for the “aggregate of the actual or potential resources 
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”9 Bourdieu identified the role of social 
capital in the creation of human capital – attributes of a person, including skills, abilities, 
knowledge, and health, that are valuable on the labor market. This role was further investigated 
and formalized by Coleman (1988).  
 
It was perhaps these developments outside the domain of mainstream economics that incited 
economists to treat the consequences of the embeddedness of individuals in social relations on 
economic outcomes more systematically. Several economists started to stress the role of social 
interaction in learning and human capital acquisition. Lucas (1988) argues that human capital 
acquisition involves social interaction in social networks. Building on the ideas of Allen (1982), 
Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) and Bala and Goyal (1998) theoretically investigate the role 
of social interaction in learning about optimal actions. Several empirical studies, including 
Valente (1995), Feick and Price (1987), Gladwell (2000), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Conley 
and Udry (2002), and Munshi (2002) substantiate that social interaction facilitates diffusion of 
information and is a vehicle of human capital acquisition. These studies suggest that individual 
investment, especially in terms of time and effort, in social interaction with friends, colleagues, 
classmates, relatives, and other acquaintances facilitates human capital acquisition. As a 
corollary, an individual benefits from an additional acquaintance and, correspondingly, whenever 
she joins a social network the incumbent members benefit from her joining. Indeed, Glaeser et al. 
(2002), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), and Lazear (1999), maintain that social interaction in 
social networks often involves such positive spillover effects. 10 More formally, the first key 
premise of this thesis is that the benefits of an individual from social interaction are increasing in 
the number of people with whom this individual shares information and knowledge in social 
interaction. 
 
While people’s sets of acquaintances largely result from their choice, individuals are born into 
the social environment of their parents. This inherited social context, such as belonging to some 
                                                 
9 p. 248 
10 Inefficiencies stemming from the size of social networks, such as inefficient herding, status, and congestion, are 
certainly possible. The focus of this thesis is on the benefits from social interaction in social learning, however. 
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ethnic group, affects their preferences as concerns their acquaintances to a significant extent. For 
instance, an individual born to Chinese parents and raised in the Chinese community of New 
York can be expected to have certain preference for socializing with other Chinese individuals 
with whom she shares language and other cultural and social characteristics. More formally, 
Poole (1927) and Lazear (1999) contend that small social distance between individuals, 
including common culture and common language, facilitates their social interaction. Schelling 
(1971) argues that even mild preferences to interact with individuals from one’s own social 
group suffice to produce extensive segregation. Residential segregation of ethnic groups has 
been extensively studied and documented, including the works of DuBois (1899), Myrdal 
(1944), Massey and Denton (1987, 1993), Farley and Frey (1994), and Cutler et al. (1999). That 
individuals prefer to interact with similar people is the second key premise of this thesis.  
 
In the following section I outline the organization and depict the main arguments of this thesis, 
highlighting the role of the two key premises therein.  
 
1.3. Outline of the Thesis 
 
The economic consequences of, first, the positive role of social interaction in human capital 
acquisition and, second, segregation of social networks along ethnic, racial, religious, or 
linguistic lines is the main subject of this thesis. The analytical part of this thesis begins with 
Chapter 2, where I depict an archetypal model of minority-majority interaction in human capital 
acquisition and in the labor market. This model serves to highlight the main variables and 
arguments of the thesis in a stylized framework. Moreover, the role of local effects and social 
distance in social interaction, as well as the key relationships they generate between organization 
of social interaction, inputs, and wages, are previewed.  
 
Two fundamental relationships arise in this archetypal model. The first relationship, which I 
denote the efficiency effect, arises between relative social group sizes and their relative 
efficiencies of human capital acquisition. The efficiency effect arises as a direct consequence of 
the two key premises mentioned above. This effect favors larger social groups in terms of 
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efficiency of human capital acquisition. Intuitively, a member of a larger social group has a 
relatively large pool of members of her own social group with whom she can socially interact in 
human capital acquisition without being obstructed by social distance between members of 
different social groups. In contrast, the chance that a member of a smaller social group is 
obstructed by social distance is relatively higher, since there is only a relatively small number of 
socially similar people of his own group. Therefore, although social distance is symmetric on the 
micro level, that is, individual A is as socially distant from individual B as is individual B from 
individual A, it generates asymmetry on the aggregate level.  
 
The second relationship, denoted the substitution effect, arises between relative social group 
sizes and relative wages. The substitution effect is due to the textbook economic law that scarcer 
resources sell at higher price. It favors smaller social groups in terms of relative wage per 
efficiency unit of labor. Intuitively, due to their small relative number and thus relatively small 
supply of their type of human capital, members of a smaller social group earn higher relative 
wages than members of a larger social group. Moreover, as a result of the efficiency effect 
mentioned above, members of a smaller social group have relatively less human capital. This 
further decreases the aggregate supply of their type of human capital on the labor market, 
increasing their relative wage per efficiency unit of labor all the more. The fundamental 
prerequisite for the substitution effect to arise, however, is that there is imperfect substitutability 
between human capitals of minority and majority people, that is, that the types of human capital 
acquired by minority and majority individuals are generally different. 
 
The key insight of the next chapter is that imperfect substitutability between human capitals of 
minority and majority people is a direct consequence of local spillover effects in human capital 
acquisition and minority-majority social distances in social interaction. In Chapter 3 I establish 
that in a world where heterogeneous skills are available in skill-specific social networks the 
efficiency differentials engendered by these local effects and social distance systematically 
expose minority and majority individuals to different incentives as concerns their choice of 
skills. As a result, depending on the equilibrium organization of skill acquisition, minority and 
majority individuals have different sets of acquaintances, acquire different (combinations of) 
skills, and are imperfect substitutes on the labor market.  
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In regard of the empirical regularities depicted in Section 1.1, Chapter 3 elucidates the socio-
economic mechanisms behind the scale puzzle. In the model of Chapter 3, besides the 
abovementioned substitution effect, local spillover effects in human capital acquisition and 
minority-majority social distance give rise to the efficiency effect that disadvantages minorities 
in terms of efficiency of human capital acquisition, similarly as in Chapter 2. The conditions 
under which the efficiency and substitution effect explain the scale puzzle are established. In 
addition, this chapter offers an answer why some minorities earn more than majorities, why 
minority individuals tend to spend more time socializing in families than in schools, and why 
integration may harm minorities. 
 
The key argument of this chapter reconciles the literature represented by e.g. Benabou (1993, 
1996), Durlauf (1994, 1996), Steele (1992), Akerlof (1997), and Lundberg and Startz (1998), 
who explain earnings differences across social groups as a consequence of local spillover effects 
involved in agents’ social environment, with the scale puzzle. In particular, a standard argument 
based on local effects in human capital acquisition predicts that such local effects engender 
efficiency disadvantage of relatively small social groups. According to such argument minorities 
earn less than majorities but, contrary to empirical evidence, the earnings gap is decreasing in 
minority size. The main contribution of Chapter 3 in this respect is that it establishes that local 
spillover effects in human capital acquisition engender qualitative differentiation of minority and 
majority human capitals, which generates the substitution effect as depicted above. It is this 
substitution effect that explains why larger minorities earn relatively less than smaller ones. No 
taste-based discrimination in the labor market is necessary to obtain the results of this chapter, 
which makes the argument of this chapter an alternative to the existing Becker-type taste-based 
discrimination theories of earnings inequality. 11
 
In brief, in Chapter 3 I argue that the positive relationship between minority percentage and 
minority-majority earnings gap is a labor market phenomenon that arises as a consequence of 
                                                 
11 See Altonji and Blank (1999), pp. 3170-3176, for a discussion of these theories. Main contributions include 
Becker (1957 and 1971), Welch (1967), and Arrow (1972a, 1972b, 1973). Note also that social distance may be 
understood as a form of taste discrimination in social interaction. In any case, the mechanisms behind the key results 
of Chapter 3 are very different from those in the taste-based discrimination literature.  
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imperfect substitutability of minority and majority labor. Chapter 4 empirically investigates this 
proposition using data from the US labor market. I adopt the framework of a generalized 
Leontief production function,12 which permits estimation of cross elasticities of complementarity 
among a number of minorities.13 In addition, I estimate a model of labor market competition in 
which I assume a constant elasticity of substitution between minority and majority workers. The 
analysis rejects the null hypothesis that minority and majority labors are perfectly substitutable in 
the labor market. In particular, it is established that minority workers complement majority 
workers in production and vice versa and that the elasticity of substitution between minority and 
majority workers is finite. In effect, Chapter 4 supports the theory that minority and majority 
labors are different as concerns the type of skills they entail. Furthermore, it suggests that the 
empirical evidence that relative earnings of minority individuals decrease in the percentage of 
minority individuals in a given region is a labor market outcome.  
 
The analysis of Chapter 4 shows that imperfect substitutability is not only a characteristic of 
immigrant and native labors, as argued by e.g. Grant and Hamermesh (1981), Grossman (1982), 
and Borjas (1987), but also that labor of the White majority and the Black, Asian, and other 
minorities is imperfectly substitutable. As compared to the study of Borjas (1983), who studies 
Black, Hispanic, and White labor, this study analyses aggregated data at the levels of the school 
district and county and considers a different partition of labor supply, involving Asian, American 
Indian, and Pacific Islander communities.  
 
In the last chapter of this thesis I elucidate the two seemingly contradicting developments in the 
lives of minority and majority Americans witnessed by the last quarter of the 20th century: (i) the 
desegregation of the Black and (ii) the increasing interethnic earnings inequality. While in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 the labor market distinguished minority and majority workers, in 
Chapter 5 I adopt a different premise: labor market distinguishes segregated and integrated 
workers, regardless of their ethnicity. In this framework, I study the decision of individuals with 
whom to socially interact. Specifically, I investigate the choice of minority individuals between 
integration and segregation, that is, their decision whether to interact with both majority and 
                                                 
12 Diewert (1971) 
13 Hicks (1970) 
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minority individuals or to restrict themselves to interaction with minority people. Further, I study 
the role of the advancement of information and communication technologies (ICT) on this choice 
and clarify how it explains the empirically established regularities of increasing earnings 
inequality and desegregation.  
 
As it is the case throughout the thesis, the main argument of Chapter 5 is based on the premises 
that social interaction facilitates human capital acquisition and that individuals prefer to interact 
with similar people. Given these premises, the decision of a minority individual to integrate or 
segregate involves the efficiency aspect: segregation entails social interaction with a restricted 
number of similar people while integration allows a minority individual to socially interact with 
a relatively large number of socially distant majority people. Moreover, in this chapter an explicit 
account is taken of the premise that the composition of the set of one’s acquaintances determines 
the type of information that reaches her and thus the type of her human capital. In the context of 
Chapter 5 this premise implies that choosing between segregation and integration matters not 
only for the quantity but also the type of one’s human capital. As a first step in the argument of 
this chapter, it is established in a general equilibrium model that these premises imply a non-
degenerate equilibrium degree of segregation of the minority.   
 
ICT advancement is an important factor that affects this equilibrium. Indeed, social interaction is 
the primary vehicle through which advancement of ICT affects socio-economic outcomes. In 
particular, I argue that ICT advancement typically disproportionately increases the efficiency of 
(i) social interaction in integrated social networks and (ii) majority individuals, thereby causing 
desegregation and increasing interethnic earnings inequality at the same time. Chapter 5 thus 
resolves the second empirical puzzle of this thesis and elucidates why the concurrence of 
desegregation and increasing earnings inequality is not coincidental. Namely, it establishes that 
the ICT revolution has two faces in the context of racial relations: it contributes to desegregation 
of minority people and drives a wedge between minority and majority earnings. 
 
Furthermore, in Chapter 5 I establish that there is a threshold level of ICT below which all 
minority individuals chose segregation and above which some but not all minority individuals 
chose integration, reaping the efficiency benefits of social interaction with a relatively large 
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number of majority individuals. I argue that the reversal of the segregation trend that occurred in 
the late 1970s was a consequence of ICT’s passing this threshold level. Finally, I show that a 
substantial advancement of ICT may be necessary to cause desegregation in case of a very high 
degree of initial segregation and that ICT advancement may actually reinforce segregation of 
minorities that are particularly dissimilar to the majority. These theoretical results provide an 
explanation of why typically no desegregation occurred in extraordinarily segregated areas 14 and 
in the case of recent immigrants, 15 who are typically more dissimilar with respect to majority 
population than native-born minorities.  
 
1.4. The Contribution of the Thesis and Suggestions for Further 
Research 
 
This thesis aims at providing new insights into the complex world of social and economic 
cohabitation of different ethnic groups, minorities and majorities. Perhaps the four most 
important findings of this thesis are the following. First, differences in the type of skills and the 
quantity of human capital acquired by minority and majority people arise as a consequence of 
local spillover effects and minority-majority social distance in human capital acquisition. On that 
account, these differences are a systematic feature of minority-majority cohabitation. In 
particular, so long as minority-majority social distance remains positive such that these social 
groups are well defined, there are social and economic mechanisms that perpetuate these 
differences and their consequences, including the positive relationship between minority-
majority earnings differential and minority relative size.  
 
Second, while integration of minority people benefits everybody in terms of efficiency of human 
capital acquisition by removing the inefficiencies introduced into the exchange of ideas and 
knowledge by segregation, it may increase earnings inequality between minority and majority 
people. The reason is that the set of primary competitors of integrated minority individuals on the 
                                                 
14 As evidenced by Cutler et al. (1999) 
15 Cutler et al. (2005) provide evidence that segregation of recent immigrants has actually been increasing. They 
suggest that this finding is due to the increasing dissimilarity between recent immigrants and native-born population, 
as contrasted to earlier immigration.  
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labor market is larger than that of segregated minority individuals. Specifically, segregated 
minority individuals mainly compete with other segregated minority individuals on the labor 
market, whose number is small relative to total population. On the other hand, minority people 
who are integrated acquire skills more similar to those of majority people. Therefore, the set of 
their primary competitors involves majority individuals, whose number is relatively large. As a 
result, although integration facilitates human capital acquisition, it exposes minority individuals 
to more intense competition that lowers their wage per efficiency unit of labor. If integration 
lowers minority relative wage more than it increases its relative efficiency of human capital 
acquisition, integration widens minority-majority earnings gap.    
 
Third, empirical analysis of Chapter 4 validates the view that minority and majority labor is not 
perfectly substitutable in production. In fact, the results also indicate that minority and majority 
labor is complementary in production. If so, however, the widespread fear of majority people 
that minority workers take their jobs is groundless. In fact, there are benefits to multiethnic labor 
force in production and majority people benefit from presence of minority co-workers. 
 
Finally, this thesis explicates the benefits and costs of advancement of information and 
communication technologies. Specifically, advancement of ICT increases the efficiency of 
human capital acquisition, thereby benefiting everybody. Furthermore, it causes desegregation of 
minority individuals, since the benefits of efficiency improvement are more pronounced in 
integrated social environments. However, the effects of ICT advancement are asymmetric for 
minority and majority individuals as concerns their efficiency of human capital acquisition. In 
particular, ICT advancement favors the majority and thereby enlarges the minority-majority 
earnings gap.  
 
A number of new directions for research arise in this thesis that are worth mentioning here. First, 
it is worth studying social distance as a variable of individual choice. While many social and 
cultural characteristics are transferred from parents to children, individuals may decide to adopt 
or reject social and cultural features of other social groups and to keep or forgo some features of 
their own culture. For example, a minority individual may decide to learn the language of the 
majority, to stick to his or her religion, or to embrace minority’s social norms. This choice can be 
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expected to have important repercussions for individual success on the labor market and thus for 
earnings inequality. Moreover, social distance affects individual choices as concerns social 
interaction and is itself affected by these choices. For instance, social distance affects minority’s 
incentives to integrate and integration is likely to decrease social distance. It is therefore also 
interesting to study the dynamics of social distance in relation to the dynamics of organization of 
social interaction. 
 
Second, further empirical work is desirable. In the view that most empirical evidence about the 
empirical regularities presented in this thesis concerns the US, there is the need to investigate the 
robustness of the reported evidence using data from outside the US, including Europe.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to empirically investigate and measure the effects of ICT 
advancement on the organization of social interaction and segregation in particular.  
 
Finally, in the context of the last chapter it would be extremely interesting to investigate ICT 
advancement as an endogenous process. In particular, ICT technologies not only facilitate social 
interaction but their adoption is, as is the case for other technologies as well, a function of the 
efficiency of social interaction. This relationship is of general concern, but particular implication 
may arise in the context of minority-majority cohabitation. For example, a study of adoption of 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
In this introductory chapter I develop an archetypal model of minority-majority interaction in 
human capital acquisition and in the labor market that paves the way to the models of Chapter 3 
and Chapter 5. This model brings to light the key variables and relationships previewed in the 
introductory chapter. In particular, I highlight two key effects of the relative size of minority on 
its relative earnings. First, through the substitution effect, which is a direct consequence of the 
textbook law of diminishing marginal returns, relatively larger minorities earn relatively less per 
efficiency unit of their labor. Second, through the efficiency effect, social distances and local 
spillover effects in skill acquisition cause relatively smaller minorities to be relatively less 
efficient in human capital acquisition. As a result, relatively smaller minorities acquire relatively 
less human capital. The last sections of this chapter relate the model developed in this chapter to 
the models of Chapter 3 and 5. 
 
2.2. The Model 
2.2.1. Demand 
To start with the demand side, consider an economy populated by the continua of minority and 
majority individuals with measures I and J and elements i and j, respectively. The size of the 
economy is conveniently normalized to unity such that 1=+ JI . Social distance between 
minority and majority individuals marks the distinction between minority and majority social 
groups. Individual membership in one of the two social groups is predetermined for each 
individual. Except for group membership and social distance, all individuals are identical with 
respect to their preferences and endowments. Individual preferences are represented by a 
standard utility function  defined on individual consumptions of the consumption good, C)(⋅u k, 
where kœ{i, j}.  
 
Let the consumption good be produced by combining labor of minority and majority individuals, 
 and , respectively, according to the aggregate production function:  iH jH
( JI H,HFC = ) ,         (2.1) 
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where  and . It is assumed that this production function exhibits 
standard properties: positive marginal product of each input, concavity, and constant returns to 
scale (CRS).
diHH I iI ∫= 0 djHH
J
jJ ∫= 0
 Assuming that production takes place in a perfectly competitive industry, wages 
equal marginal productivities and thus 
IHi
FW =  and 
JHj











= .           (2.2) 
The following proposition states that if the production technology (2.1) is symmetric with respect 
to minority and majority labor inputs, the social group that supplies more labor earns a lower 
wage per unit of labor and vice versa. This is a version of the elementary economic law of 
diminishing marginal product that implies that scarcer resources sell at higher prices, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
  Proposition 1 
Whenever the CRS production technology (2.1) is symmetric such that 
 for every  and  and satisfies the properties , 
, , and 







F , š  implies Š . IH JH iW jW
Proof: 
That  for every  and  implies  whenever 
. If , 
( ) ( IJJI H,HFH,HF = ) IH JH JI HH FF =
JI HH = JI HH > 0<II H,HF  and 0<JJ H,HF  imply that JI HH < , and vice versa. à 
 
An important and natural assumption that I make is that an increase in the supply of minority 
(majority) labor depresses minority (majority) wage relatively more than it depresses majority 
(minority) wage. Specifically, I assume that cross partial elasticity of complementarity is smaller 













<          (2.3a) 
and 
                                                 
1 See Hicks (1970). The Hicks elasticity of complementarity measures the effect on the relative price of a given 
factor of production of a change in the relative quantity of that factor, holding marginal costs and the quantities of 
other factors constant. 













< .          (2.3b) 
  
Let us denote JI WWw ≡  and ji HHh ≡  and adopt the representative agent hypothesis group-
wise, such that  and IHH iI = JHH jJ = . It follows that ( )( )IIhHH JI −= 1  and one can 
rewrite the relative wages (2.2) as a function of relative labor supplies 
( I,hww = ) .          (2.4) 
In addition, let us assume that  and , and thus h as well, are independent of I. Proposition 
2 states the result that relative wages decrease in both the relative minority size I and minority-
majority ratio of per capita supply of efficient labor h.  
iH jH
 
 Proposition 2 (The substitution effect) 
Whenever the production technology (2.1) satisfies conditions (2.3a-b) and h and I are 
independent of each other, ( ) 0<∂∂ hI,hw  and ( ) 0<∂∂ II,hw . 
 Proof: 
Conditions (3a-b) imply that 
( )
































, that is, relative wage of minority individuals 
relative to the wage of majority individuals is decreasing in the supply of minority labor 
and increasing in the supply of majority labor. It follows, however, that relative wages 
are decreasing in relative labor supplies, that is, ( ) ( ) 0<∂∂ JIJI HHWW . By definition, 
( ) 0>∂∂ hHH JI  and ( ) 0>∂∂ IHH JI . It follows that, given that h and I are 
independent of each other, ( ) 0<∂∂ hI,hw  and ( ) 0<∂∂ II,hw . à 
 
Intuitively, whenever an increase in the supply of a production factor depresses its own price 
more than the price of other production factors, an increase in the relative supply of a production 
factor depresses its relative price. Proposition 2 brings to light the first of the two key 
relationships that are elaborated in Chapters 3 and 5: the substitution effect. Through this effect, 
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holding per capita supply of labor constant, relatively larger minorities suffer from the relative 
abundance of the their labor in the labor market that depresses the relative wage per unit of their 
labor. Figure 2.1 depicts the substitution effect with respect to I. The function ( )I,hw  is 
decreasing in I and, recalling the result of Proposition 1 and assuming that , attains the 












In this section I characterize the supply side of the model. Specifically, I establish the 
relationship between the share of minority (majority) individuals in the labor market and their 
supply of labor. For simplicity, let us assume that each individual is endowed with one unit of 
labor time that is inelastically supplied on the labor market. An individual can, however, choose 
to acquire human capital and thereby increase the efficiency of a unit of his or her labor in 
production. Let us define efficient labor to be the measure of labor in efficiency units that 
comprises labor time and human capital. 
 
Two assumptions concerning the supply of efficient labor are of key importance. First, there are 
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local spillover effects in human capital acquisition. In particular, an individual benefits from 
social interaction that involves sharing knowledge and ideas with other individuals. By 
assumption, these benefits are increasing in the number of individuals any given individual is 
socially interacting with. Second, social distance between minority and majority individuals 
obstructs their social interaction in human capital acquisition. For simplicity, it is also assumed 
that social interaction takes place in economy-wide social networks – social structures between 
individual actors that facilitates social interaction among their members. Thus, any given 
individual interacts, possibly indirectly, with all other individuals, that is, I  minority and  
majority individuals. To capture the role of local spillover effects and social distance in human 
capital acquisition in an easily tractable way, I let the function 
J
( )δ,J,IN  characterize the 
benefits from social interaction in human capital acquisition. The parameter δ  captures the idea 
that the benefits from social interaction with majority (minority) agents decrease in social 
distance between minority and majority individuals. Given the assumptions above, ( )δ,J,IN  is 
increasing in I and J and decreasing in d. Assumption that efficient labor is the product of labor 
time, which is fixed at unity, and human capital, individual supply of efficient labor equals: 
( ) ( )( )δ+++= 11 JNINHi         (2.5a) 
( )( ) JNINH j +++= ( )δ11 .       (2.5b)  
That social distance between members of the same social group is normalized to zero is directly 
incorporated in specifications (2.5a-b). These functions imply that an individual who does not 
learn simply supplies his or her raw unit of labor time in the labor market. The following 
proposition states that local spillover effects in human capital acquisition and social distance 
between minority and majority individuals disadvantage smaller social groups in terms of 
efficiency of human capital acquisition.  
 
 Proposition 3 (The efficiency effect) 
Given a positive social distance between minority and majority individuals δ  and that 
 is increasing in its argument, technologies (2.5a) and (2.5b) imply that ( ).N
( ) 0>∂∂ IIh  and, because JI < , ji HH < . 
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Proof: 
1=+ JI  implies that ( ) ( ) ( )( )δ+−+= 11 ININHi  and ( )( ) ( ININH j )−++= 11 δ   






















INdIdHi  which implies, noting that ( ).N  
is increasing in its argument, that ( ) ( )( )δ+−= 111SigndIdHSign i , which is positive for 
any 0>δ . Similarly ( ) ( )( )111 −+= δSigndIdHSign j , which is negative for any 0>δ . 
It follows that 0>∂∂ Ih . Now note from (2.5a) and (2.5b) that  implies 50.I = 1=h . 
Given that 0>∂∂ Ih , for 50.I <  it holds that 1<h , that is, JI <  implies ji HH < . à  
 
Proposition 3 exposes the second of the two key relationships of Chapters 3 and 5: the efficiency 
effect. Through this effect larger minorities are relatively more efficient than smaller ones in 
human capital acquisition. Intuitively, a member of a smaller social group has a relatively 
smaller pool of members of her own social group with whom she can socially interact without 
being obstructed by social distance. In effect, the chance that she is disadvantaged in social 
interaction by the inefficiencies engendered by social distance is relatively higher than that of a 
member of a relatively larger social group. Figure 2.2 depicts h as a function of I, which is 
upward sloping due to the efficiency effect and reaches unity at 50.I = . 
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2.2.3. Equilibrium 
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 depicted the properties of the relationship between minority-majority 
wage and labor ratios, w and h, and minority percentage, I, as determined by the demand and 
supply sides, respectively. In this section I turn to the equilibrium properties of these 
relationships. Since h is independent of w, as apparent from Section 2.2.2, the equilibrium 
properties of h as a function of I are fully determined by the supply side and thus matching those 
presented in Proposition 3. Therefore, in the equilibrium, ( )Ih  is increasing in I.  
 
As concerns the properties of the relationship between the minority-majority wage ratio and 
minority percentage in the equilibrium, these are determined by the supply side, as depicted in 
Proposition 2, but also by the demand side, as apparent from equation 2.4, where w is shown to 
be a function of h. We know from the demand side analysis of Section 2.2.1 that, taking h as 
independent of I,  is decreasing in each of its arguments. Section 2.2.2 tells us that h is an 
increasing function of I, however. Proposition 4 resolves the equilibrium relationship between w 
and I, establishing that Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 imply that minority-majority wage ratio 
is decreasing in minority percentage.  
( I,hw )
 
 Proposition 4 
Whenever the production technology (2.1) satisfies conditions (2.3a-b), 0>δ , and that 
 is increasing in its argument, ( ).N ( ) 0<∂∂ IIw . 
Proof: 
From Proposition 2, given the independence of h and I, conditions (2.3a-b) imply that 
( ) 0<∂∂ hI,hw  and ( ) 0<∂∂ II,hw . From Proposition 3, given 0>δ  and that ( ).N  is 
increasing in its argument, ( ) 0>∂∂ IIh . It is straightforward to see that ( ) 0<∂∂ hI,hw , 
( ) 0<∂∂ II,hw , and ( ) 0>∂∂ IIh  imply that ( )( ) ( )IwI,Ihw =  is decreasing in I. à 
 
This result is quite intuitive. Due to the substitution effect, minority-majority relative wage 
decreases in minority share. An increasing share of minority people increases their efficiency in 
human capital acquisition through the efficiency effect such that per capita supply of efficient 
labor of minority people increases relative to the per capita supply of efficient labor of majority 
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people. This increase further depresses minority-majority relative wage through the substitution 
effect. These are the fundamental relationships that determine the properties of one of the key 
variables of this thesis: the ratio of minority and majority earnings per capita, ω , which is, 
obviously, the product of w and h, that is, wh≡ω . In the following sections I preview how the 
remaining theoretical chapters of this thesis draw on these relationships. 
 
2.3. Earnings Inequality and the Substitutability of Minority and     
Majority Labor 
 
The properties of the minority-majority earnings ratio as a function of minority percentage I, 
( )Iω , are determined by the properties of the underlying functions, ( )Iw  and . Based on the 
results established in the previous sections, there are two opposing forces driving this 
relationship: the substitution and efficiency effects. In Chapter 3 I study earnings inequality in a 
greater depth and show that under some conditions these opposing effects generate patterns of 
earnings inequality consistent with the scale puzzle. Loosely speaking, these conditions need to 
secure that the substitution effect is not too strong relative to the efficiency effect such that 
minority individuals earn less than majority individuals and that it is strong enough such that 
minority-majority earnings differential is widening with minority percentage. 
( )Ih
 
The extreme case of perfect substitutability between minority and majority workers points at an 
important insight of Chapter 3. Let us first note that perfect substitutability of minority and 
majority labors implies that  in equation (2.2) and thus 
JI HH
FF = JI WW = , which in turn implies 
that ( ) ( )IhI =ω . From Proposition 3 we know, however, that ji HH <  and ( ) 0>∂∂ IIh . Thus, 
given that ( ) ( )IhI =ω , Proposition 3 implies that ( ) 1<Iω  and ( ) 0>∂∂ IIω . The latter of these 
inequalities goes against the empirical evidence involved in the scale puzzle that relatively 
smaller minorities earn relatively more. In this respect, the fundamental insight of Chapter 3 is 
that local spillover effects and minority-majority social distance lead to organization of human 
capital acquisition that causes minority and majority people to acquire different types of human 
capital. In effect, minority and majority workers are not perfectly substitutable on the labor 
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market and the substitution effect is effective. It is this effect that explains why relatively larger 
minorities earn relatively less than smaller ones.  
 
2.4. Segregation and Earnings Inequality 
 
Insofar it has been assumed that the labor market distinguishes two kinds of labor: minority and 
majority labor. Chapter 5 investigates an important departure from this assumption in order to 
study the effects of advancement of information and communication technologies on segregation 
and earnings inequality. In particular, minority individuals are permitted to integrate with 
majority individuals in social interaction such that the type of their human capital becomes 
similar to that of majority individuals. This assumption implies that social group sizes as 
distinguished by the labor market are endogenous. As a consequence, it has important 
consequences for the working of the labor market but also for the organization of human capital 
acquisition. First, by deciding to segregate or integrate, minority individuals are in essence 
choosing what kind of labor to supply and thus the wage per efficiency unit of their labor. 
Second, because segregation is a barrier to social interaction, minority individuals by choosing 
whether to integrate or not choose their efficiency of human capital acquisition. In effect, 
earnings of minority people are a function of their decision to segregate or integrate, since this 
decision affects the two determinants of their earnings: wage and human capital. Therefore, 
substitution and efficiency effects similar to those described above govern minority’s choice to 
segregate or integrate. 
 
To wit, the baseline model developed above can straightforwardly be reinterpreted to describe 
the choice of minority people to integrate or not. It suffices to redefine social groups on the labor 
market. More specifically, for the study of the choice of minority people to segregate or integrate 
the relevant social groups are, first, the group of people who are segregated and, second, the 
group of people who are integrated. In effect, there are two kinds of labor and the respective 
wages on the labor market: that of segregated minority individuals and that of majority 
individuals and those minority individuals who choose to integrate. So the production function 
(2.1) can be reinterpreted as a technology that combines labor inputs of integrated and segregated 
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individuals. Similarly as in Proposition 2, one obtains that relative wage of segregated 
individuals is decreasing in the relative number of people who choose to segregate. Hence, 
people’s switching between segregation and integration generates similar consequences for the 
distribution of earnings as the familiar substitution effect described above.  
 
As concerns the organization of social interaction and human capital acquisition, segregation is a 
barrier to social interaction and thus the choice of minority to segregate and integrate involves an 
efficiency effect similar to that discussed in previous sections. The efficiency aspect of minority 
and majority social interaction depicted above closely resembles that of segregated and 
integrated minority individuals in the present context. In particular, an increase in the number of 
people who choose to segregate benefits (harms) segregated (integrated) minority individuals in 
terms of efficiency through enlarging (diminishing) their social networks. Therefore, human 
capital of segregated minority individuals relative to that of integrated ones is increasing in the 
relative number of minority people who choose to segregate. 
 
In Chapter 5 it is shown that this framework is suitable for the study of the effects of 
advancement of information and communication technologies on the degree of segregation and 
minority-majority earnings inequality. In particular, it is shown that such improvement causes 
desegregation of minority individuals and increases interethnic earnings inequality, thereby 






















Social Interaction and the Minority-Majority 
Earnings Inequality: Why Being a Minority Hurts 






Social interaction is an important vehicle of human capital acquisition and individuals prefer to 
interact with like people. In this chapter I establish that the positive role of social interaction in 
skill acquisition and sociocultural differences between minority and majority individuals that 
hinder their social interaction disadvantage the smaller social group, the minority, in terms of 
efficiency of human capital acquisition. The key insight of this chapter is that in a world where 
heterogeneous skills are available in skill-specific social networks these efficiency differentials 
systematically expose minority and majority individuals to different incentives as concerns their 
choice of skills. As a result, depending on the equilibrium organization of skill acquisition, 
minority and majority individuals acquire different (combinations of) skills. Such differentiation 
engenders the textbook substitution effect that drives an efficiency unit of minority labor to sell 
at a relatively lower wage in a region with higher percentage of minority people. The conditions 
under which the efficiency disadvantage of the minority in social interaction and the substitution 
effect explain the empirical findings that (i) minorities typically earn less than majorities and that 
(ii) the earnings gap is increasing in the relative size of a minority in a given region are 
established. In addition, this study offers an answer why some minorities earn more than 
majorities, why minority individuals tend to spend more time socializing in families than in 
schools, and why integration may harm minorities. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Inequalities in socioeconomic conditions of Black and White Americans, Romany and White 
Europeans, and other minorities and majorities around the world are persistent and central 
features of the worldly history.1 While there are many dimensions of socioeconomic inequality, 
labor income, as one of the major measures and determinants of socioeconomic inequality, is the 
principal focus of this study. Two robust empirical findings about the distribution of income 
between minority and majority peoples pose a challenge to economic theory. On the one hand, 
minorities typically earn less income per capita than majorities. On the other hand, minority-
majority earnings disparity increases in the relative size of a minority in a region. The puzzling 
feature of these empirical regularities is that while being a member of the smaller social group in 
a region, the minority, is disadvantageous in earnings terms, minority people are relatively better 
off in regions where they are relatively less plentiful.  
 
The existence of these empirical regularities, the scale puzzle, has been corroborated in a 
sizeable empirical literature. 2 The early empirical studies on this topic include Blalock (1956, 
1957), Heer (1959), Brown and Fuguitt (1972), and Frisbie and Neidert (1977). For example, 
Heer (1959) finds a correlation of -0.71 between the ratio of Black and White median per capita 
incomes and the percentage of Blacks. Frisbie and Neidert estimate the correlations between 
minority-majority income disparity and minority share in the population between 0.19 and 0.70. 
They go as far as to conclude that “one of the most consistent findings … is that socioeconomic 
differentials vary directly with the relative numbers of a minority present in a given area …”.3 
More recently, in a micro-econometric study about the earnings of Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 
White men in the US, Tienda and Lii (1987) establish the existence of significant minority-
majority income differentials and confirm that minority labor market percentages favor the 
majority while disadvantaging the minorities themselves. Finally, focusing on migrants, Borjas 
                                                 
1 As defined in Chapter 1, minority is understood to be a particular racial, ethnic, language, religious or national 
group of individuals who share socio-cultural characteristics such as culture, religion, language, history, beliefs, 
customs, values, and morals that make them distinct from the rest of the population – the majority. In a given region, 
the minority typically constitutes the smaller part of the population than the majority, but local concentrations may 
occur. The study does not deal with social groups formed on the basis of occupation, wealth, or other ordinal 
characteristics. 
2 Table 3A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the findings of the studies listed below in a greater detail. 
3 Frisbie and Neidert (1977), p. 1007 
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(1987) and Chiswick and Miller (2005) show that earnings of immigrants from a certain 
linguistic or ethnic group are decreasing in the concentration of similar people in the destination 
region. Based on these studies, the scale puzzle that (i) minority individuals on average earn less 
than majority individuals and that (ii) this earnings differential is increasing in minority share in 
population in a given region is taken as a stylized fact of minority-majority earnings inequality.4
 
From the theoretical perspective, the scale puzzle attracted considerable attention in sociological 
literature several decades ago. Williams (1947), Allport (1954), Blalock (1967), Reich (1971), 
and Bonacich (1972, 1976) explain the scale puzzle arguing that the hostility of a superordinate 
majority against minority people is increasing in the relative size of the minority. Another strand 
of literature, represented by Glenn (1964), Spilerman and Miller (1977), and Semyonov et al. 
(1984), advocates that it is the discriminatory occupational structure that creates an environment 
in which influx of minority workers crowds out majority workers into better jobs with higher pay 
which explains the scale puzzle. 
 
Earnings inequality has always been a focal point of economics. Inspired by Becker (1957) and 
developed by Welch (1967) and Arrow (1972a, 1972b, 1973), minority-majority economic 
inequality is explored as a preference-driven phenomenon arising due to the so-called taste for 
discrimination of actors on the labor market. 5 Within this framework, the positive relationship 
between minority-majority earnings inequality and minority percentage can be explained as a 
consequence of increasing difficulty to avoid working for discriminating employers whenever 
minority percentage is high, for a given distribution of taste for discrimination among employers. 
In an approach that understands discrimination as a consequence of a specific form of 
asymmetric information in the labor market, statistical discrimination, Lundberg and Startz 
(2002) and Coate and Loury (1993), building on the groundbreaking ideas of Phelps (1972), 
Arrow (1972a, 1972b, 1973), and Aigner and Cain (1977), argue that a priori actual or perceived 
asymmetries are maintained in the equilibrium through self-fulfilling expectations. Moro and 
Norman (2004) show that in such context the welfare gain of majority individuals from 
                                                 
4 Based on this empirical evidence, the proper interpretation of the scale puzzle involves comparing one minority 
across several regions of a given country, e.g. Blacks across U.S. counties, rather than different minorities in 
different countries, e.g. Chinese in Malaysia, Jews in the U.S., and Turks in Germany. 
5 See also Darity (1982, pp. 72-75), Arrow (1998), and Loury (1998). 
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discrimination increases in minority percentage, although the overall effect of minority 
percentage on its relative earnings in their study is nonmonotonic as discrimination equilibria are 
less likely if the minority is relatively large.  
 
From what I denote the local effects perspective, researchers aim to explain quantitative 
differences in individual human capital and thus earnings across social groups as a consequence 
of local spillover effects involved in agents’ social environment. Becker and Tomes (1979) and 
Loury (1981) argue that intergenerational transfers of ability to acquire human capital sustain 
human capital variation and thereby earnings inequality across families. Shifting the focus from 
the family to the neighborhood, Benabou (1993, 1996) and Durlauf (1994, 1996) explain 
persistent income stratification by the existence of local public goods or neighborhood 
externalities. In a similar vein, Steele (1992), Akerlof (1997), and Lundberg and Startz (1998) 
explicitly account for the role of social interaction in human capital distribution and suggest that 
it is the social or psychological (dynamic) externalities in segregated neighborhoods or 
workplaces that promote social and economic inequalities. In combination with the assumption 
of inferior initial conditions of minority people, as is often the case for immigrants or (past) 
discrimination, the local effects theories systematically explain persistent minority-majority 
earnings gap.  
 
In this chapter, combining the local effects perspective with several insights about social 
interaction, I provide a novel theoretical explanation of the link between the relative size of 
minority population and its relative economic achievement, thereby explaining the scale puzzle. 
First, I establish that positive external effects in skill acquisition and sociocultural differences 
between a minority and a majority that hinder their social interaction in social networks6  
disadvantage the smaller social group, the minority, in terms of efficiency of human capital 
acquisition. As a consequence of this efficiency effect, a minority individual supplies less human 
capital and thus earns less than a majority individual, given the price of human capital. Second, 
the key insight of this chapter is that in a world where heterogeneous skills are available in skill-
specific social networks these efficiency differentials systematically expose minority and 
                                                 
6 As in the previous chapter, social network is understood to be a social structure between individual actors that 
facilitates social interaction among its members. 
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majority peoples to different incentives as concerns skill choice and, depending on the 
equilibrium organization of skill acquisition, make them acquire different (combinations of) 
skills. An important consequence of such differentiation, which has been corroborated by a 
number of studies,7 is that wages per efficiency unit of minority and majority labor typically 
differ, since these are no longer perfect substitutes. The imperfect substitutability of minority and 
majority labor in turn engenders the substitution effect, which in the present context implies that 
an efficiency unit of minority labor sells at relatively lower wage in regions where the minority is 
relatively larger.8 In effect, the efficiency and substitution effects work in opposite directions as 
concerns the relationship between minority share in the population and its relative earnings. The 
main result of this chapter is that there are equilibrium regimes of skill acquisition under which 
the efficiency and substitution effect explain the scale puzzle. I classify these equilibrium 
regimes and establish the parametric conditions that support this result. 
 
The argument proceeds as follows. In the following section I describe the social and economic 
environment of the model and elaborate on the main assumptions on which the argument is 
based. Next, I present a formal model and establish its main predictions. Finally, I discuss the 
robustness and relevance of the presented theory and conclude.    
 
3.2. The Social and Economic Environment 
3.2.1. The Main Assumptions 
This chapter draws on several insights about social embeddedness of human capital acquisition 
developed in the literature. That individuals learn from their peers, friends, and neighbors has 
been proposed by a number of scholars. 9 As Lucas (1988) points out, “human capital 
accumulation is a social activity, involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in 
                                                 
7 To wit, indicating a degree of differentiation on the labor market, Altonji and Blank (1998) report that minority 
workers are overrepresented in less skilled jobs and Blacks in the US are overrepresented in some kinds of jobs such 
as public administration. Occupational differentiation explored by e.g. Blalock (1957), Brown and Fuguitt (1972), 
and Hirschman and Wong (1984).  From the empirical perspective, Grant and Hamermesh (1981), Grossman (1982), 
Borjas (1983, 1987), and Kahanec (2005) establish imperfect substitutability of minority and majority labor.  
8 The substitution effect is a direct consequence of the textbook economic law of diminishing marginal product. 
9 Early theories about human capital include Becker (1962), Mincer (1958), and Schultz (1961). The literature on 
social embeddedness of human capital acquisition includes Rees and Schultz (1972), Loury (1977), Bourdieu 
(1986), and Coleman (1988, 1990). 
     Social Interaction and the Labor Market: Essays on Earnings Inequality, Labor Substitutability, and Segregation 34
the accumulation of physical capital.”10 Allen (1982), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), and 
Bala and Goyal (1998) investigate the role of social interaction in learning about optimal actions. 
Valente (1995), Feick and Price (1987), Gladwell (2000), and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) 
substantiate such approach and observe that social networks are an important vehicle of 
information sharing. These authors document that colleagues, friends, or neighbors share 
information about their discoveries, experiment outcomes, or search results. Conley and Udry 
(2002), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), and Munshi (2002) provide evidence that social 
interactions significantly affect farmers’ profitability upon adoption of new technologies, arguing 
that this finding implies that farmers learn about the best practices in social interaction with their 
peers and neighbors, rather than only mimicking their behavior. 
 
A number of scholars, such as Glaeser et al. (2002), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), and Lazear 
(1999), maintain that social interaction in social networks often involves positive externalities 
such that the aggregate resources of a network exceed the naïve sum of individual contributions. 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) develop a framework in which the efficiency of social learning 
improves in the number of involved individuals whenever social learning exhibits social 
memory.11 Based on this literature, I adopt the premise that the benefits from social interaction 
are increasing in the number of people involved as the first essential assumption of this chapter.12 
Namely, I assume that skill acquisition process exhibits external network effects13 that positively 
depend on the size of the social network in which the particular skill is acquired.  
 
It is natural to argue that benefits from social interaction not only depend on the number of 
individuals one interacts with but also on who these individuals are. In the context of minority-
majority social interaction, sociocultural differences between minorities and majorities are likely 
to determine the quality of social interaction in any network. To operationalize these 
sociocultural differences, in line with Poole (1927) and Lazear (1999), I define social distance to 
                                                 
10 Italics are original, p.19. 
11 Goyal (2003) surveys the literature on social learning. 
12 Inefficiencies stemming from the size of social networks, such as inefficient herding, status, and congestion, are 
certainly possible. The focus of this chapter is on the benefits from social interaction in social learning, however. 
13 Network effects arise whenever benefits from a good or service, here the service of social network in skill 
acquisition process, increase in the number of individuals already owning that good or using that service. One 
consequence of a network effect is that the use of a network service by one individual indirectly benefits others who 
use it. This side effect in a transaction is known as network externality. 
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be the measure of subjective and objective dissimilarities between social groups that hinders 
social interaction between the members of these social groups.14 The natural corollary of the 
definition of social distance above is that agent’s ability to benefit from social interaction in a 
given network negatively depends on her social distance to the other members of this network. 
Based on this, the second essential assumption of this chapter is that individual benefits from 
network effects are decreasing in interpersonal social distance. 15  
 
To complete the description of the social organization of skill acquisition, given the omnipresent 
segregation of social institutions, it is assumed that institutionally exclusive and inclusive social 
networks exist in the economy.16 Specifically, while inclusive social networks permit any 
membership, a given exclusive network only permits memberships from one social group.17 The 
prime examples of typically exclusive networks include families, kinships, social networks in 
ghettoes, religious groups, expatriate communities, radical groups, and ethnically or religiously 
exclusive schools and clubs. Most schools, student societies, workplaces, academic communities, 
and cybernetworks18 are typically inclusive. These examples suggest that exclusive and inclusive 
social networks are typically different with respect to, inter alia, their complexity, objectives, 
functions, and the strength of ethnic or religious character. Arguably, these differences transpire 
into the character of skills acquired in exclusive and inclusive networks.19 Indeed, Coleman et al. 
(1966) and Heckman (2000) discuss these two kinds of skills and stress their importance for 
                                                 
14 In contrast to Akerlof (1997), who studies endogenous social distance between homogeneous agents, I consider 
social distance between members of different social groups to be a predetermined variable that reflects the defining 
distinctiveness of social groups. 
15 Note that social distance is fully symmetric on the individual level. Assuming a priori asymmetry of sociocultural 
differences, although trivially incorporable into the argument, would be largely ad hoc and racially prejudiced. 
16 There is an enormous literature on social structure and ethnic segregation. Recent contributions include Massey 
and Denton (1993) and Farley and Frey (1994). Ethnic segregation has been documented by e.g. Farley and Frey 
(1994), Glaeser and Vigdor (2001), Reardon et al. (2000). 
17 Thus, exclusive social networks are always segregated. Inclusive social networks may be integrated as well as 
segregated; the distinction made in this chapter is that exclusiveness (inclusiveness) is understood as exogenous 
institutional constraint on network membership while segregation (integration) as endogenous variable concerning 
equilibrium organization of social interaction. 
18 Social networks in the cyber space, such as the users of the Internet. 
19 Examples of skills acquired in exclusive networks include verbal and non-verbal communication skills including 
language skills, general social knowledge and socialization skills, capability of self-motivation, but also, whenever 
they are specific for the particular social group, particular arts and crafts skills. An example of minority 
specialization in a particular craft is the specialization of different Gypsy tribes in Romania in e.g. spoon-making 
(Lingurari), bear-leading, tinkering, and blacksmithing (Ursari), mining (Rudari), and goldsmithing (Aurari) (Fraser 
(1992)). Skills acquired in typically more formal inclusive social networks involve those in e.g. mathematics, 
medicine, metal processing, machine operating, and personnel management. 
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success in life. Based on these arguments, I assume that the skills acquired in exclusive networks 
are generally different from those acquired in inclusive networks. For the sake of brevity, I let 
“exclusive” and “inclusive” denote the respective social networks and skills. 
 
3.2.2. The Driving Mechanisms: The Efficiency and Substitution Effects 
Having described the key assumptions, in this section I indicate the main mechanisms of the 
formal argument. First, through network effects, the efficiency of skill acquisition in a given 
social network is a function of its size. In any given network, due to the social distance between 
minority and majority, individuals benefit from a larger relative number of network members 
from their own social group. Moreover, if individuals from some social group choose to 
segregate, the size of their segregated social networks is limited by the size of their social group. 
Therefore, the efficiency effect favors relatively larger social groups and so offers an explanation 
of the first part of the scale puzzle: why minorities typically earn less than majorities.  
 
Second, for a member of a given social group network effects and social distances generate 
efficiency benefits to joining and investing in that social network that is chosen by the other 
members of his or her social group. These efficiency benefits induce minority and majority each 
to specialize in one, possibly different social network or, if exclusive and inclusive skills are both 
essential for an individual an their compositions are different, to invest their time differently 
between exclusive and inclusive social networks. As a result, network effects and social 
distances direct minority and majority individuals to acquire different skills or they induce them 
to acquire different combinations of skills. Such differentiation engenders the substitution effect: 
individuals who supply skills that are scarcer earn higher wage for an efficiency unit of their 
labor than those that supply more abundant skills. It follows that the substitution effect rewards 
members of smaller social groups, as the aggregate supply of their skills is relatively smaller. 20 
Consequently, the substitution effect offers an explanation of the second part of the scale puzzle: 
that smaller minorities earn relatively more than larger ones. 
 
                                                 
20 Besides the obvious reason that a smaller social group supplies lesser measure of skills on aggregate, due to the 
efficiency it also has a lower per capita supply of skills. 
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To summarize, as the relative size of a social group increases, it benefits from the efficiency 
effect while being hurt by the substitution effect in relative earnings terms and vice versa. In the 
analysis below I formally demonstrate that these two effects can produce a nonmonotonic pattern 
of inequality between social groups that is consistent with the scale puzzle.  The conditions under 
which this is the case are then established and discussed. 
 
3.3. The Model 
3.3.1. Labor Demand 
In this section, I study the demand side of the labor market where the society is divided into two 
social groups – the minority I and the majority J – and clarify the extent to which it accounts for 
the substitution and efficiency effects. Let i and j denote the respective members and I and J the 
respective measures of the continuums of minority and majority agents, where  and I adopt 
a convenient normalization that 
JI <
1=+ JI . I assume that all individuals are identical with respect 
to their preferences and endowments, group membership excepting. Individual preferences are 
represented by a standard utility function )(⋅u  that increases in individual consumption, Ck, 
where kœ{i, j}.  
 
Let the consumption good be produced by combining labor input of minority individuals, Hi, and 
majority individuals, Hj, in a perfectly competitive industry according to the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) aggregate production function  
( ) ( )( ) )/(/)(J j/)(I i djHdiHC 11010 −−− ∫+∫= ρρρρρρ       (3.1)  
with the elasticity of substitution 1>ρ . According to this specification, labor of any given type 
has decreasing marginal returns, production exhibits constant returns to scale, and no type of 
labor is essential in production. Moreover, while members of the same social group are perfectly 
substitutable in production, the elasticity of substitution between minority and majority labor ρ  
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is not a priori restricted to be finite. In particular, whenever minority and majority labor is 
perfectly substitutable, production does not distinguish between minority and majority labor.21  
Similarly to the statistical discrimination literature, I adopt the asymmetric information 
hypothesis about the labor market. In particular, I assume that while employers observe the 
aforementioned observable characteristics of social group membership of individuals22 and the 
measures of labor they supply, Hi and Hj, they are not able to directly observe the marginal 
product of labor supplied by any individual.23 From experience or statistical investigation, 
however, they understand that social group membership predicts the marginal product of 
individual labor and thus they know the expected marginal products of members of any social 
group. By corollary, employees from the same social group are not distinguishable with respect 
to their type of labor, as they do not perceptibly differ, and they always receive the same wage 
for a unit of their labor input.  
 
Given the infinitesimal measure of any individual, all prices are taken as given at the individual 
level and the production function (3.1) gives rise to individual demands for labor  
I/CWPH iCi
ρρ −=          (3.2a) 
J/CWPH jCj
ρρ −= ,         (3.2b)  
where PC is the price of consumption good C and Wi and Wj are the wages per unit of labor input 
of minority and majority individuals, respectively. As a result of the homogeneity of degree one 
of the CES production function, the sector does not generate any profits in the equilibrium and 
we can derive that . Combining the demands for H( )1/(111 ρρρ −−− += jiC WWP ) i and Hj in (3.2a-b), 














Iw ,         (3.3) 
where ji WWw ≡  and ji HHh ≡ . Equation (3.3) is the main result from studying the demand 
side of the economy. It plainly reveals the substitution effect that, given a finite r, the relative 
                                                 
21 The issue of substitutability of minority and majority labor is elaborated in the analysis of the supply side below. 
Proposition 3 implies that the production function (3.1) can be seen as a harmless simplification of a more general 
production technology with an arbitrary number of types of labor with a given elasticity of substitution. 
22 E.g. skin color, group-specific name, or accent. 
23 This assumption also implies that employers cannot remunerate a worker separately for the skills and labor time 
he or she supplies. 
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wage w is decreasing in the relative size of the social group I and its relative supply of labor h. It 
also highlights the importance of r for the substitution effect: only a finite r makes the 
substitution effect operative.  
Let us now turn to earnings as determined by the demand side. Premultiplying equation (3.3) by 
h and defining  to be the labor earnings (and the only income) of individual k, we 



























Ihhw .      (3.4) 
Observing the properties of equation (3.4), at least two conditions about the relative supply of 
labor under which equation (3.4) generates patterns of income inequality consistent with the 
scale puzzle for some I, involving regularities that ( ) 0<∂∂ IIω  and ( ) 1<Iω , can be identified. 




ρII , the efficiency effect must favor members of larger social groups so 
that  for some I and thus there exists r such that ( ) 1<Ih ( ) 1<Iω  for some I. 24 Below, I will 
show how the model satisfies this condition when taking into account the organization of supply 
of labor and skill acquisition that is characterized by network effects and social distances, as 
described above. 
 
The second condition constitutes the core of the argument. Equation (3.4) clearly reveals that 
whenever minority and majority labor is perfectly substitutable and thus ∞→ρ , equation (3.4) 
boils down to h=ω  and the substitution effect is non-operative, since wages per efficiency unit 
of labor are equal for all individuals. In such case, as established below, network effects and 
social distances still generate minority-majority earnings gap but the gap is diminishing in the 
relative size of minority, contrary to the scale puzzle. Therefore, an additional formal argument 
has to be made in order to substantiate the existence of the substitution effect. In particular, it is 
essential to establish that minority and majority labor is imperfectly substitutable; that is, that r 
is finite. In the following section I analyze the supply of labor and show how the supplies of 
minority and majority labor depend on the sizes of social groups through network effects and 
social distances. Most importantly, I establish that, under certain conditions, network effects and 
                                                 
24 That such r exists is clear from the fact that rØ¶ implies wØh. Thus, if h<1 there always exists large enough r 
such that w<1. 
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social distances determine the organization of supply of labor such that it justifies imperfect 
substitutability of minority and majority labor and thus the existence of the substitution effect. 
 
3.3.2. Labor Supply 
Individuals are each endowed with one unit of time that they divide between acquisition of 
human capital and time spent working. Human capital as well as time spent working increase the 
individual supply of efficient labor , which I conceptualize to be the measure of labor in 
efficiency units that comprises labor time and human capital. In particular, it is assumed that 
efficient labor is a composite of time-empowered exclusive and inclusive skills. Denoting 
exclusive and inclusive skills and network types 
kH
{ }n,xm∈ , respectively, I assume the constant 
elasticity of substitution technology of producing  efficiency units of labor kH
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] )/()(n,kn,kn,k)(x,kx,kx,kk LTSLTSH 111 −−− −+−= εεεεεε     (3.5) 
where Sk,m is the measure of skills of type m of agent k,  is the corresponding total time 
invested in acquiring skills and utilizing them in production, and  is the corresponding time 
spent on acquiring skills.
m,kT
m,kL
25 Accordingly, m,km,k LT −  is the time individual k allocates to utilizing 
skill m in production. The finite and positive parameter ε  denotes the elasticity of substitution 
between time-empowered exclusive and inclusive skills in production of individual efficient 
labor and reflects their imperfect substitutability. Skills are acquired according to a decreasing-
returns-to-scale technology in social networks 
( mkmkmk NLS ,,, 1+= φ ),         (3.6) 
where Nk,m is the external network effect benefit in network m enjoyed by its member k and 
( ]10,∈φ  is the measure of decreasing returns to time spent in skill acquisition. Throughout the 
chapter I assume that agents take network effects as given, given the infinitesimal measure of 
any individual. 
 
                                                 
25 This technology of producing efficient labor Hk can be, without any bearing on the argument of this chapter, 
reinterpreted as the production function of the intermediate good Hk, which is an input in the production of the 
consumption good C. 
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As discussed above, exclusive and inclusive social networks differ in terms of membership they 
permit and skills they support. Given the difference of exclusive and inclusive skills, from the 
production technology (3.5) we see that the qualitative properties of individual labor are 
determined by the combination of skills that constitute efficient labor of a worker. I 
operationalize this qualitative variation of efficient labor such that efficiency units of labor that 
consist of different (combinations of) skills are imperfect substitutes on the labor market. Thus, 
for example, if the skills of one individual are predominantly exclusive and the skills of the other 
agent are predominantly inclusive, the elasticity of substitution of labor of these two individuals 
is finite. Formally, defining n,kx,kk SSs ≡ , whenever kk ss ′≠  ( kk ss ′= ) for individuals k  and 
, the elasticity of substitution between  and  is finite (infinite). Because  is 
determined by the organization of human capital acquisition, which is endogenous in the model, 
the elasticity of substitution between minority and majority labor 
k ′ kH kH ′ ks
ρ  is in this sense endogenous 
as well.  
 
Turning to the individual problem of time allocation, individuals maximize their utility, taking 
their resource constraints, available technologies, network effects, wages per unit of their 
efficient labor26, and the price level as given. From the properties of the utility function it follows 




≡∗          (3.7) 
subject to (3.5), (3.6), and the resource constraints , , and . Solving 
the maximization problem, it is straightforward to see that individuals divide their time between 
acquisition and utilization of skills according to the rule
0, ≥mkT 0, ≥mkL 1,, ≤+ nkxk TT
27
mkmk TL ,, 1 φ
φ
+
= .         (3.8) 
Thus, agent k spends a fixed share ( )φφ +1  of the time that he allocates to skill m, , on 
acquiring this skill. The rest of this time, 
m,kT
( )φ+1m,kT , or m,km,k LT − , is spent on utilizing it. The 
                                                 
26 As a consequence of the assumption of asymmetric information in the labor market discussed above. 
27 Proof in the Appendix. 
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following proposition characterizes the solution of the maximization problem (3.7). To save on 
notation in what follows I define ( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) εεφ φφφφ )(m,km,k NN~ 11111 −++−+≡ . 
 
Proposition 1 
If ( ) φφε 1+≥ , the optimal solution to agents’ problem (3.7) arises as a corner solution 
where all the time available to an individual is spent on acquisition and utilization of the 
one skill whose acquisition is most efficient. In particular, 
( )( ) )/(n,k*kx,kn,k N~HN~N~ 11 −=⇒≥∧+≥ εεφφε       (3.9a) 
and 
( )( ) )/(x,k*kx,kn,k N~HN~N~ 11 −=⇒≤∧+≥ εεφφε .     (3.9b) 
If ( ) φφε 1+< , the interior solution ( )
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t ,        (3.11) 
giving rise to equilibrium time allocations ( )kkx,k ttT += 1  and ( )kn,k tT += 11 .   
 Proof in the Appendix. 
 
Corresponding to interior and corner solutions in Proposition 1, I define two classes of regimes, 
specialization and diversification, respectively. In particular, specialization regimes prevail if and 
only if ( ) φφε 1+≥  and diversification regimes prevail if and only if ( ) φφε 1+< .28 From 
Proposition 1 and equations (3.5), (3.6), and (3.8), under specialization the relative supply of 
labor is 
                                                 
28 In general, there may be dual regimes in which agents of one social group diversify while agents of the other 
social group specialize. Because the choice to diversify or specialize entirely depends on parameters e and f of the 
model and these are assumed to be the same for every agent in the economy, I disregard these cases here. The 
rationale for this approach is that the emphasis in this chapter is put on the question how network effects engender 
heterogeneity of human capitals of minority and majority and how this heterogeneity translates into income 
inequality when individual characteristics are the same for both social groups. 












=           (3.12) 
and, under diversification, 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )

















.    (3.13) 
As one can see, the relative supply of labor is fully determined by network effects and time 
allocation in skill acquisition.29 In the following section I specify network effects and investigate 
the allocation of individual involvements across networks under the various equilibrium regimes 
of skill acquisition. 
 
3.3.3. Network Effects 
In the skill acquisition technology (3.6), external network effects play a pivotal role in 
determining the efficiency of acquiring skills in a social network and thus the equilibrium 
allocation of individual involvements across social networks. In line with the arguments above, 
network effects that any given agent k enjoys in social network m depend on the extent of social 
interaction therein, which is measured by the total time agents spend interacting in this network. 
Consistently with the assumption about social distance, agents benefit more from interaction 
with ethnically similar agents as compared to ethnically distant agents. This effect is captured by 
the social distance parameter 0>δ . For the sake of clarity of exposition, I posit that the one-
dimensional social distance parameter completely represents the multidimensional dissimilarities 
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where the parameter ( ]1,0∈γ  captures decreasing returns to involvement of individuals in a 
given social network and Im and Jm are the numbers of, respectively, minority and majority 
                                                 
29 In particular, it does not depend on wages. The reason is that individuals take wages as given, time has no other 
value but in skill acquisition, and skill acquisition does not involve any pecuniary exchange. 
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members in network m. These numbers depend on the equilibrium organization of skill 
acquisition as discussed below.  
 
3.3.4. Equilibria 
I adopt the Nash concept of equilibrium where agents choose social networks (skills) freely and 
the equilibrium arises as the state where no agent has incentives to deviate, that is, to change his 
or her allocation of time across networks. Given this equilibrium concept, we can state the 
following general propositions about stable equilibrium regimes of skill acquisition: 
 
Proposition 2 
In any stable equilibrium, no agent is involved in more than one network of any given 
type, exclusive or inclusive.  
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3 
In any stable equilibrium, all members of a given social group choose the same 
combination of skills to acquire. 
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2 is a consequence of network effects: in a stable equilibrium, there cannot be two 
(or more) equally efficient social networks of the same type for any given individual because any 
perturbation of agents’ involvements makes one of them less efficient and causes this individual 
to abandon it. Proposition 3 is mainly due to asymmetric information in the labor market that 
implies that individuals take their wages as given with respect to their choice of skills, so this 
choice is purely driven by efficiency concerns. Similarly as in Proposition 2, no stable 
equilibrium involves two distinct equally efficient combinations of social networks. 
Consequently, given asymmetric information in the labor market, network effects and social 
distances in skill acquisition coordinate individuals such that at most two different types of labor 
are supplied – minority- and majority-specific. In this sense, as mentioned above, the production 
function (3.1) can be seen as a harmless simplification of a more general production technology 
with an arbitrary number of types of labor . kH
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3.3.4.1. Specialization 
This section studies equilibrium regimes of skill acquisition under specialization. Given 
Proposition 2 and 3, under specialization all members of a given social group choose exactly one 
and the same social network to join and thus skill to acquire. In effect, five different non-empty 
networks may arise in the economy under specialization; these are highlighted in Table 3.1. 30
 
Table 3.1: Social networks under specialization. 
Social network type Permitted membership Possible membership 
I 
Minority exclusive Minority 
Empty 
J 








It turns out that there are three stable and two conditionally stable equilibrium allocations of 
minority and majority individuals across social networks and thus skills of different types under 
specialization. I list these equilibrium allocations and investigate their stability in Proposition 4. 
Table 3.2 depicts the properties of these equilibria.   
 
Proposition 4 
Under specialization the following equilibria are always stable in the Nash sense: 
1. Each social group specializes in exclusive skills joining its exclusive network (EE) 
2. Social groups specialize in inclusive skills joining the same inclusive network (II) 
3. The minority specializes in inclusive and the majority in exclusive skills (IE) 
The following allocations 
                                                 
30 It is worthwhile to recall that whether a network is exclusive or inclusive is an institutional constraint and is not 
determined by who its members are. For example, it may happen that a school as a social network permits minority 
(and majority) people to participate, but these choose not to. The school then only has majority pupils, but it remains 
inclusive, nonetheless.  
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4. The minority specializes in exclusive and the majority in inclusive skills (EI) 
5. Social groups specialize in inclusive skills, acquiring them in two non-connected 
inclusive networks, each composed of members of only one social group (IS) 
are stable if and only if 
( )δ+≥ 21I .          (3.16) 
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
            
















EE Segregation Infinite I J 0 0 
II Integration Infinite 0 0 I J 
IE Segregation Finite 0 J I 0 
EI Segregation Finite I 0 0 J 
IS Segregation Infinite 0 0 I J 
 
The most important insight of Proposition 4 is that there are stable equilibria, EI and IE, in which 
minority and majority people choose different types of skills.31 These equilibria substantiate 
imperfect substitutability of minority and majority labor, that is, a finite r, and thus the existence 
of the substitution effect.  
 
To understand stability of specialization equilibria, one needs to recall that, due to asymmetric 
information, employers differentiate wages per unit of efficient labor across social groups but not 
within groups and that individuals cannot change their group membership. Therefore, individuals 
pick those networks to acquire skills that they are allowed to join and that offer the largest 
benefits from network effect (and thus are the most efficient for skill acquisition). In particular, 
                                                 
31 Namely, , , , and . Therefore  and , which implies 
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this implies that deviation to an empty social network32 is never beneficial and for any individual 
it is preferable to be a member of the social network consisting of the other members of her 
social group.33 This implies that the only possibly gainful and allowed deviation for an individual 
is that of switching to a non-empty inclusive social network of people from the other social 
group. In the IE equilibrium the only such possibility is a deviation of a majority individual to 
the inclusive network consisting of minority individuals. Such deviation would involve 
comparing the network benefits in the original social network, ( )( γγ φφ += 1JN IEx,j ) , to the 
network benefits obtained upon deviation, ( )( ) ( )( )γγ φφδ ++= 111 IN IEn,j . For this marginal 
deviation not to occur, the stability condition is , which yields IEn,j
IE
x,j NN ≥ ( )δ+≥ 1IJ . This 
condition is always satisfied. Consequently, the IE equilibrium is always stable. Similar 
arguments hold for the other specialization equilibria. The intuition behind the condition (3.16) is 
that in EI and IS equilibria minority individuals prefer segregated social interaction if and only if 
benefits from integration are low due to a relatively large size of the minority I or a large social 
distance δ .  
 
Relative Income under Specialization 
In this section I turn to the particular pattern of earnings inequality as predicted by the model 
under specialization equilibria. Plugging the results from equations (3.12), (3.8), and (3.4), 
specifying the network effects according to (3.14) and (3.15), and taking the network sizes from 
Table 3.2, the following result for relative earnings ensues: 
( ) ( )( )































IIr ,     (3.17) 
where the superscript r denotes the particular equilibrium; in equation (3.17) . Given 
this result, let us state one of the key propositions of this chapter. 
{ EIIEr ,∈ }
 
Proposition 5 
Under the IE equilibrium for any ( )( )( ) 1112 −+++≡′> γγφφρρ γ  there always exists a 
                                                 
32 Deviating to an empty network involves setting it up. The implicit assumption of zero set-up costs of any network 
by any individual is a harmless simplification.  
33 See also Proposition 3 and its proof. 
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range of relative minority size I such that the pattern of earnings inequality is consistent 
with the scale puzzle. There always exists sufficiently large social distance δ  such that 
the same is true for the EI equilibrium. In particular, in such range ( ) 0<∂∂ IIrω  and 
, where . ( ) 1<Irω { }IE,EIr∈
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
Thus, under the EI and IE equilibria, where minority and majority individuals acquire different 
skills and thus r is finite, the model predicts earnings inequality that is consistent with the scale 
puzzle for some range of I and large enough ρ . Intuitively, because ρ  is finite in the EI and IE 
equilibria and hence the substitution effect is operative, there exists sufficiently small I for which 
minority labor is scarce enough to make minority earn more than majority.34 On the other hand, a 
large enough ρ  ensures that the substitution effect does not completely override the efficiency 
effect and there exist some I for which minority earns less than majority. For such finite and 
sufficiently large ρ , given the continuity of ( )Iω , there must be a downward sloping segment of 
( )Iω  that is below one for some range of I. Such segment is congruent with the scale puzzle.  
 
One can easily verify that under all specialization equilibria the efficiency effect favors relatively 
larger social groups and in particular that the relative supply of labor of minority individuals is 
increasing in their share in population, that is, ( ) 0>∂∂ IIh . To wit, under the EI, IE, EE, and IS 
equilibria we obtain that ( ) ( )( )










IIh , which is increasing in I, as follows from 
the fact that the nominator is increasing in I and the denominator is decreasing in I. Similar result 
holds for the II equilibrium, where ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )










IIIh . Given that 
( ) 0>∂∂ IIh , the specialization equilibria EE, II, and IS predict that relatively larger minorities 
earn relatively more than smaller ones, formally, ( ) 0>∂∂ IIrω  for { }IS,II,EEr ∈ . To validate 
this claim, knowing that ( ) 0>∂∂ IIh , one only needs to realize that r is infinity under these 
equilibria and thus  for ( ) ( )IhI rr =ω { }IS,II,EEr ∈ . 
                                                 
34 Social distance δ  has to be large enough to make such case under the EI equilibrium stable. 
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3.3.4.2. Diversification 
In the following sections I investigate whether the scale puzzle can be theoretically explained if 
the elasticity of substitution between skills ε  is relatively small such that diversification arises. 
As argued above, diversification equilibria arise in the equilibrium if and only if the two types of 
skills are complements or poor substitutes or there is sufficient degree of decreasing returns in 
skill acquisition such that ( ) φφε 1+< . Recalling that in diversification equilibria all agents 
acquire both exclusive and inclusive skills, besides the optimality condition in equation (3.8), the 
arbitrage condition in equation (3.11) is binding as well. Because all agents of a given type 
choose the same set of networks and thus skills to acquire, as we know from Proposition 3, two 
different equilibria can arise. In the DI equilibrium social groups acquire exclusive skills in their 
group-specific social network and inclusive skills in one integrated inclusive social network 
where both social groups interact. In the DS equilibrium, on the other hand, the inclusive skills 
are acquired in two segregated minority- and majority- only inclusive social networks. In this 
sense the DI equilibrium is integrated and the DS equilibrium segregated.35 The following 
proposition discusses the stability of these equilibria; the intuition behind the condition (3.16) is 
the same as in Proposition 4 and concerns segregation of inclusive networks. 
 
Proposition 6 
The DI equilibrium of diversification is always stable. The DS equilibrium of 
diversification is stable if and only if the condition (3.16) holds.  
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
In the DI equilibrium, from Proposition 2 we know that ( )DIkDIkDIx,k ttT += 1  and ( )DIkDIn,k tT += 11 . 
For expositional convenience, I adopt here the network effects specifications 
( )( )γδδ ++= 1mmmmm,i JI),J,I(N  and ( )( )γδδ mmmmm,j JI),J,I(N ++= 1 , assuming that 
network effects depend on the number of network members only. This network effect 
specification and the fact that all agents join all permissible networks under diversification such 
                                                 
35 Note, however, that there is a degree of segregation in the DI equilibrium as well, as the exclusive networks are by 
definition segregated. 
     Social Interaction and the Labor Market: Essays on Earnings Inequality, Labor Substitutability, and Segregation 50
that , γIN DIx,i = ( ) ( )( )γδ+−+= 11 IIN DIn,i , ( )γIN DIx,j −= 1 , and ( ) ( )( )γδ IIN DIn,j −++= 11  result 
in the following specifications of relative times spent in any social networks: 
  






















It DIi        (3.18a) 
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It DIj  .      (3.18b)  
Recalling that  ,  JI < 0>δ , and ( ) φφε 1+<  under the DI equilibrium, it is straightforward to 
observe that the ratios in the parenthesis in equations (3.18a-b) are less than one. For this reason, 
the results in equations (18a-b) reveal that all people spend more time in exclusive networks than 
in inclusive ones whenever 1<ε . This result arises as the consequence of skill complementarity 
that forces individuals to compensate for their lower efficiency in exclusive networks by the 
longer times spent in exclusive networks. Similarly, if 1>ε  and the DI equilibrium arises, all 
agents spend more time in inclusive networks. Noting from equation (3.8) that  where kk lt =
n,kx,kk LLl ≡ , these results also hold for times spent on skill acquisition. Finally, if the 
technology of combining skills is Cobb-Douglas and 1=ε , individuals spend equal shares of 
their time in exclusive and inclusive networks.  
 
Having computed the equilibrium time allocations for each social group, in this section I 
investigate differences in time allocations between social groups as they are closely related to the 
key question about substitutability of minority and majority labor. Proposition 7 states the first 
result in this respect: 
 
Proposition 7 
Under the DI equilibrium, minority individuals spend relatively more time in exclusive 
networks than majority individuals whenever 1<ε  such that complementarity of 






i lltt = š1. 
Proof in the Appendix.  
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These results stem from the relatively smaller efficiency of the exclusive networks of the 
minority as compared to those of the majority. As a result, if there is complementarity of skills 
such that 1<ε , as compared to the majority, minority individuals spend more time in their 
exclusive networks in order to compensate for this handicap. This finding reveals that the often-
observed lesser involvement of minorities in formal educational institutions, as compared to the 
majority population, may be explained by inferior efficiency of social interaction in minority 
exclusive networks. The opposite result holds whenever skills are substitutes such that 1<ε  and 
diversification prevails. The same intuition governs the next proposition that states a much more 
important insight; namely, that minority and majority individuals choose different combinations 
of skills in the DI equilibrium.  
 
Proposition 8 
Social groups of different sizes choose different skill compositions in the DI equilibrium, 
in particular, . DIj
DI
i ss <
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
Consequently, even though minority agents under some circumstances spend more time in their 
exclusive networks in the DI equilibrium, they unambiguously acquire relatively less exclusive 
skills than majority individuals. The key result here is that skill composition is different across 
social groups under the DI equilibrium of diversification and, therefore, the elasticity of 
substitution between labor of minority and majority individuals is finite.  
 
Let us now turn to the DS diversification equilibrium under which minority and majority 
individuals join two disconnected inclusive networks as well as their exclusive networks. Under 
this equilibrium inclusive and exclusive networks provide the same network effect benefits for 
their members, as they are of the same size and composition. It follows that people distribute 
their time evenly between exclusive and inclusive networks and, as a consequence, have the 
same shares of exclusive and inclusive skills in the labor they supply. Therefore, their labor is 
perfectly substitutable on the labor market and they earn the same wage per efficiency unit of 
their labor.  
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Relative Earnings under Diversification 
In this section I investigate relative earnings under the two diversification equilibria. Plugging 
the relative supply of labor (3.13) into (3.4), the relative income under the DI equilibrium is 
( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )















































































































Under the DI diversification equilibrium of human capital acquisition there always exists 
ρ ′′  such that for any ρρ ′′>  there always exists a range of relative minority size I such 
that the pattern of earnings inequality is consistent with the scale puzzle. In particular, in 
this range ( ) 0<∂∂ IIDIω  and ( ) 1<IDIω . 
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 9 shows that under the DI diversification equilibrium, in which minority and 
majority individuals acquire different skills and thus r is finite, the model predicts earnings 
inequality that is consistent with the scale puzzle for some range of I and large enough ρ . The 
intuition is similar to that of Proposition 5 for the specialization equilibria EI and IE. Similarly as 
in the EI and IE equilibria, small enough minorities outperform majorities in terms of earnings. 
 
Under the DS equilibrium, however, minority and majority individuals, facing identical 
efficiencies in completely segregated social networks, spend equal times in each type of 
networks and acquire the same composition of skills, . Therefore, the elasticity of 
substitution of their labor r is infinite. Using this result and the facts that individuals divide their 




γI  for 
minority individuals and  for majority individuals in any network they join, we obtain 
that  
( γI−1 )
























IIDS , or, in plain words, under the DS equilibrium minority 
individuals are always poorer than majority individuals. As it is easy to see, in conflict with the 
scale puzzle, equation (3.20) predicts that minority-majority earnings gap is decreasing in 
minority relative size. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
3.4.1. The Roles of Integration and Exclusion 
In the presented model integration has a distinct role in determining relative income of minorities 
that challenges the habitual belief that integration leads to greater equality between social groups. 
While it is true that both minority and majority individuals benefit from integration through the 
increased network effects that integration brings about, integration disfavors minority individuals 
whenever it obliterates the substitution effect, which favors smaller social groups. If the 
obliteration of the substitution effect offsets the efficiency benefits of integration, integration 
decreases the relative income of minority individuals.36 Proposition 10 below states that this is 
possible in the case of integration from the EI or IE equilibrium into the II equilibrium and that, 
in particular, integration may increase inequality.37 It is worthwhile to note that, in contrast to the 
specialization equilibria, integration produces imperfect substitutability under diversification 
equilibria and thus benefits minorities in terms of both efficiency and substitution effects. 
 
Proposition 10 
There exists I such that integration from the EI or IE equilibrium into the II equilibrium 
hurts minority individuals in terms of relative earnings, w, that is, ( ) ( )II IIr ωω >  for 
                                                 
36 Minority individuals benefit from integration relatively more than majority individuals do, as they gain access to 
social interaction with the larger pool of majority individuals as compared to the access to the smaller group of 
minority individuals gained by majority individuals. 
37 Forced integration can reduce minority earnings in absolute terms. Intuitively, this is the case whenever social 
distance is so large as to cause the efficiency benefits of integration to be smaller than its costs in terms of the 
substitution effect, e.g. when δ  is relatively large or ρ relatively small.  
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{ IEEIr ,∈ }. Whenever ρρ ′> , there exists I for which integration increases earnings 
inequality as well.  
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
Exclusion in exclusive networks has insofar been accepted in the model as an exogenous 
institutional constraint on agents’ choice. Although it is fully symmetric across social groups, it 
is sensible to put this constraint under scrutiny, as it may prevent agents from individually 
benefiting from integration.38 In particular, it is informative to answer the question whether the 
explanation of the scale puzzle developed in this chapter remains valid, or, in other words, 
whether the EI, IE and DI equilibria remain stable, if members of exclusive networks permit 
inclusion of individuals from the other social group. This is the case, if the excluded agents 
individually choose not to join exclusive networks of the other social group even if the 
institutional barriers to integrate are removed. From the proof of Proposition 4 it is clear that this 
holds whenever minority share in population or social distance is large enough such that the 
inequality (3.16) is satisfied.39 It follows that exclusive behavior is not necessary to establish the 
main results of this study. In particular, equilibria in which segregation and thus skill 
differentiation across social groups arise are possible without institutional exclusion, giving rise 
to patterns of income inequality consistent with the scale puzzle as explained above. This 
argument generalizes the argument of the chapter to societies without institutional exclusion.  
 
3.4.2. Welfare 
While the analysis thus far has focused on relative welfare40 of minority and majority 
individuals, the various equilibria that the model generates can be welfare ranked according to 
aggregate consumption C. Given that whether specialization or diversification occurs fully 
depends on parameters in the condition ( ) φφε 1+≥ , the policy maker cannot choose between 
                                                 
38 Here I consider marginal deviation from the equilibrium, in which the deviating minority individual can affect her 
efficiency of skill acquisition (network effects) but not her wage per unit of efficient labor.  
39 Note that marginal deviation to the minority exclusive network would never be beneficial for a majority 
individual. 
40 Individuals have no income but earnings and consume the same consumption good. Therefore their welfare equals 
their earnings. 
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diversification and specialization regimes. Therefore, from the policy perspective it is sensible to 
compare the efficiency of equilibria within rather than between these regimes.  
 
Proposition 11 
Under the specialization regime, the EI and IE equilibria and the EE and IS equilibria are 
equally efficient. The EI, IE, and II equilibria are more efficient than the EE and IS 
equilibria. Formally, , , and  for  and 
. Under the diversification regime, the DI equilibrium is more efficient than 
the DS equilibrium, that is, . 
IEEI CC = ISEE CC = rr CC ′> { }II,IE,EIr∈




These results are intuitive and formal proofs are omitted:  and  because all 
the parameters and inputs in (3.1) are the same under the respective equilibria. The II equilibrium 
is more efficient than the EE and IS equilibria, because (i) it generates larger inputs  
for any k and  as a consequence of larger network benefits under integration and (ii) 
production is linear in each of these equilibria. While inputs are the same under EI, IE, EE, and 
IS equilibria, specialization into different skills under the EI and IE equilibria generates extra 
surplus in the CES production function (3.1).






41 The same effect favors the DI equilibrium over 
the DS equilibrium; furthermore, under the DS equilibrium segregation reduces network benefits 
and thus diminishes labor inputs in production. 
 
The remaining issue concerns the comparison between the EI and IE equilibria on the one hand 
and the II equilibrium on the other hand. Clearly, this comparison involves weighing benefits of 
higher efficiency of skill acquisition under integration against the benefits of diversity of inputs 
in production under segregation. The two key parameters are thus the elasticity of substitution ρ  
and social distance δ . Intuitively, whenever ρ  is very large under the EI and IE equilibria, the 
benefits of diversity are negligible and thus the II equilibrium is more efficient than the EI and IE 
equilibria. On the other hand, if δ  is very large, integration offers no efficiency benefits and the 
EI and IE equilibria are preferable to the II equilibrium.  
                                                 
41 It is a well-known property of the CES function that it exhibits returns to diversity of inputs, for given input 
levels. These returns are decreasing in ρ  for ( )∞∈ ,1ρ . 
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3.4.3. The Multiplicity of Equilibria 
The model presented in this chapter classifies equilibrium regimes of human capital acquisition 
and elucidates the conditions under which they are stable. Moreover, it pinpoints those equilibria 
under which minority and majority people acquire different human capitals and identifies the 
conditions under which they give rise to patterns of earnings inequality consistent with the scale 
puzzle, which are explicated in Propositions 5 and 9. Table 3.3 below summarizes the equilibria 
of the model and highlights (bold-typed) those that are reconcilable with the scale puzzle.  
       
Table 3.3: Equilibrium regimes of skill 
acquisition. 
Stability of equilibria 
Regime type ( )δ+< 21I  ( )δ+≥ 21I  
( ) φφε 1+≥  EE, II, IE EE, II, IS, IE, EI 
( ) φφε 1+<  DI DI, DS 
 
Table 3.3 shows that the elasticity of substitution between skills in production of efficiency units 
of labor ε , the degree of decreasing returns to scale in skill acquisition f, social distance 
between minority and majority δ , and minority share in the population I determine which 
equilibria may arise in the equilibrium. In particular, the parameters ε  and f determine whether 
specialization or diversification prevails, as depicted in Proposition 2. The other two parameters, 
δ  and I, determine whether segregated equilibria EI, IS, and DS are stable. Notably, Table 3.3 
shows that the conditions ( )δ+< 21I , ( ) φφε 1+< , and ρρ ′′>  are sufficient for the patterns 
of earnings inequality to be consistent with the scale puzzle in some range of I. Whenever either 
of the conditions ( )δ+< 21I  or ( ) φφε 1+<  is not satisfied, equilibria EE, II, IS, and DS, 
which are not reconcilable with the scale puzzle, are possible. Besides these constraints, which 
equilibrium occurs in any particular case is indeterminate in the model. 
  
This indeterminacy is due to the absence of parametric restriction in the specification of the 
model, which was intentionally imposed in an attempt to foster its generality. There is, however, 
an intuitive parametric restriction that lends itself to elimination of some of the equilibria from 
consideration. In particular, recalling that exclusive skills typically involve those acquired in 
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families, kinships, and other noninstitutional social networks and inclusive skills are 
predominantly acquired in schools, universities, and workplaces, one can reasonably argue that 
exclusive and inclusive skills exhibit complementarity such that they both are involved in 
individual human capital. Indeed, Coleman et al. (1966) argue that students’ learning outcome is 
a function of family and school inputs. Heckman (2000) points out that skills acquired in 
informal, noninstitutional, sources such as families complement skills acquired in school and 
other formal institutions and thus determine success in life. If this is the case, one can impose the 
condition ( ) φφε 1+< , implying that the model only supports diversification equilibria DI and 
DS. There are two reasons to believe that the DI equilibrium is somewhat more representative of 
these two equilibria. First, the DS equilibrium is not robust with respect to coordination of 
minority individuals to join the inclusive network of majority agents.42 Second, in Western 
economies, where efforts are made to eradicate segregation in formal educational institutions, 
segregation in these institutions is less likely.       
 































                                                 
42 This straightforwardly follows from the proof of Proposition 6. Note that for similar reasons the equilibria IS and 
EI are not robust with respect to such coordination; see the proof of Proposition 4. 
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Figure 3.1 depicts the three stylized patterns of minority-majority earnings inequality as a 
function of minority percentage that the model generates. Pattern C represents the EE, II, IS, and 
DS equilibria under which only the efficiency effect is effective. Because the efficiency effect 
favors larger social groups, pattern C is below one for any 50.I <  and upward sloping. On the 
other hand, if any of the EI, IE, or, notably, DI equilibrium arises, the substitution effect that 
favors smaller social groups becomes operative. Pattern A depicts the case when ρ  is relatively 
small such that the substitution effect overrides the efficiency effect to make the minority earn 
more than the majority for any minority size. The most interesting in the context of the scale 
puzzle, however, is pattern B. It depicts the intermediate case where the substitution effect works 
in favor of smaller minorities but does not completely outweigh minorities’ efficiency 
disadvantage such that a range of I where the scale puzzle is replicated by the model, , arises. 
This is so whenever 
I∆
ρ  is large enough, as specified in Propositions 5 and 9. 
 
Given that the DI equilibrium is more representative than the DS equilibrium, the remaining 
question is whether the elasticity of substitution between minority and majority labor ρ  is high 
enough such that a plausible segment I∆ arises in the model under this equilibrium. To 
investigate this issue, I tentatively calibrate the model developed above. For this purpose, I let 
the key parameter ρ  attain the value of 25, as estimated by Kahanec (2005). As concerns the 
remaining parameters, I assume that 90.=ε , implying a degree of complementarity between 
exclusive and inclusive skills, 250.=δ , such that individual’s benefit from interaction with a 
socially distant individual is 80% of that with an akin individual, and γφ == 1 , such that skill 
acquisition exhibits constant returns to time and social interaction. 43 With these parametric 
values the model predicts the segment I∆  between 0.01% and 5.2%. This range of I covers three 
quarters of US counties with some Black population. 44 As concerns minority majority earnings 
gap, under the aforementioned parametric values the ratio of minority to majority earnings 
attains the minimal value of 0.8 in the labor market with 5.2% of minority people. In other 
words, in this labor market minority individuals earn about 20% less than majority individuals. 
                                                 
43 Constant returns are not necessary here, letting 50.=φ , 20.=γ , and holding the other parameters as above, for 
instance, results in a plausible range of  between 1.1% and 9.5%. I∆
44 Author’s computation, based on Census School District Tabulation Data, 2000, NCES. 
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These values correspond to the values of minority-majority earnings gaps found by Kahanec 
(2005). This exercise illustrates that plausible parametric values give rise to plausible predictions 




This chapter provides a novel explanation of the persistent patterns of income inequality between 
minorities and majorities. In particular, it extends the local effects literature by introducing 
heterogeneity of available skills into a model with external network effects and minority-
majority social distance in human capital acquisition. I establish that such extension provides a 
theoretical underpinning for the scale puzzle, reconciling the local effects approach with this 
empirical phenomenon. In particular, I explicate how network effects and social distances in skill 
acquisition engender the efficiency effect, directly favoring the members of larger social groups. 
Next, I establish that introducing heterogeneity of available skills into this setup gives rise to 
equilibria in which minority and majority individuals, driven by network effects, choose different 
skills or combinations of skills to acquire, thus supplying imperfectly substitutable labor on the 
labor market. As a consequence, the substitution effect emerges and, through prices of minority 
and majority labor, favors smaller social groups, which on aggregate supply less labor measured 
in efficiency units, ceteris paribus. The conditions under which the efficiency and substitution 
effects explain the scale puzzle are then established and discussed. The last section summarizes 
and classifies the outcomes of the model, offering a tool to address the various modes of 
minority-majority interaction observed in the reality. 
 
Highlighting the role of segregation, the chapter discusses the consequences of segregation on 
the efficiency of skill acquisition and relative wages. It is also shown that elimination of 
institutional exclusion in social networks does not necessarily lead to integration whenever the 
size of minority or the social distance between social groups is large enough. An interesting 
result of the model is that integration may increase as well as decrease the relative income of 
minority as compared to majority individuals. In this sense, although there are efficiency benefits 
of integration for both minority and majority individuals, integration is not necessarily a 
universal remedy against inequality between social groups. Similarly, integration may increase 
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as well as decrease overall welfare. The model also predicts that under some conditions for a 
small minority the substitution effect outweighs minority’s efficiency disadvantage such that 
minority earnings are higher than majority earnings. No discrimination on the labor market is 
necessary to obtain the results of this chapter, which makes it an alternative to the existing 
discrimination-based theories of earnings inequality. Future research in this area should include 
empirical tests and case studies, as well as investigation of the link between organization of 
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Appendix of Chapter 3 
 
Table 3A.1: The scale puzzle – empirical evidence. 
Study Data Main Findings 
Blalock (1956) 88 non-Southern and 
Southern Standard 
Metropolitan Areas 
(SMAs), (1950)  
Finds a positive correlation .42 between percent Black population and Black-White income 
differentials. Controlling for subregion, white median income, size of SMA, and percent of 
employed males in manufacturing, the correlation was reduced to nonsignificant .19. 
However, for southern SMAs the correlation was .50 and increased to .70 when the same 
controls were included. When both Southern and non-Southern SMAs were included, the 
correlation was .67 irrespective of the controls. Suggests that the marginal Black relative 
losses due to percent increase are decreasing (non-linearity) in percent Black. Suspects a 
threshold at about 10% above which correlations significant. 
Blalock (1957) Sample of 150 Southern 
US counties having at 
least 250 non-white 
households, (1950) 
Finds a positive correlation between percent Black population and income (.46) and 
educational (.68) differentials. The findings were robust with respect to the same controls as 
in Blalock (1956). Finds that in counties with low Black percentage (but not in those with 
high Black percentage where all results were non-significant) the income and educational 
gaps are disproportionaly smaller, thereby supporting the non-linearity hypothesis for the 
low end of the density continuum. No relationship is observed for occupational 
differentials. 
Heer (1959) 43 Southern Standard 
Metropolitan Areas, 
Census, (1950) 
Finds negative correlation of -.71 between percent Black and the ratio of Black median 




areas, Southern US, PH-
5 census, (1960) 
Report overrepresentation of the majority in all higher income groups (difference scores 
range between 31% and 45% when cumulative distributions are compared). Find that the 
association between percent Black and measures of racial income disparity is positive and 
ranges between .16 and .41. Moreover, they show that Black income decreases and White 
income increases with increases in percent Black. White component correlations range 






Metropolitan Areas in 
southwestern U.S. U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 
(1971, 1972)  
Report overrepresentation of the majority in all higher income groups (difference scores 
range between 7% and 20% (Mexican) and between 18% and 31% (Black) when 
cumulative distributions are compared). Finds correlations of .22 to .48 between percent 
Mexican and the Mexican-Anglo income differential for different income groups. The 
corresponding values for the Blacks range between 0.31 and 0.43. Controls included: % 
labor force in manufacturing, % labor force in services, Black median education, 1960-
1970 % change in Black population, % Mexican. Uncontrolled correlations similar. 
Confirms that the majority income is positively correlated with percent minority 
(correlations between .06 and .21) and that minority income is negatively correlated with 
percent minority (correlations between -.48 and -.22). 
Tienda and Lii 
(1987) 
5% A File, men, Public 
Use Microdata Samples, 
Census (1980) 
Confirms that minorities have lower income than majorities and that minorities lose from 
increases in their percentages, while the white majority gains.  Blacks, Hispanics, and 
Asians lose 0.7%, 0.2%, and $0.2% of their annual income, respectively, and the majority 
gains between 0.0-0.5% with every percentage increase of the respective minority density. 
These results are net of some observable individual characteristics and working time 
measures. Minority losses from their percentages most pronounced for educated minority 
people. 
Borjas (1987) 5% A File, 18-64 years 
old non-military 
individuals working 
with pay, Public Use 
Microdata Samples, 
Census (1980) 
Shows that while native populations’ earnings are little decreased by inflow of immigrants 
of the same ethnicity (e.g. 10% increase in the supply of White immigrants decreases the 
pay of White natives by 2.5%), this inflow substantially reduces the earnings of other 
immigrants of the same ethnicity (10% increase in the number of White immigrants reduces 
the pay of white immigrants by 10.9%, the same increase of Black immigration reduces the 
pay of Black immigrants by 5.8%). 
Chiswick and 
Miller, (2005) 
US Census of 
Population (1990) 
Establish that earnings of immigrants of a given linguistic group decrease in the share of 
people of the same linguistic group in the destination region.  
 
 
Proof of Time Allocation Rule (3.8) 
Take the allocation of time {Tk,x, Tk,n} as given and rewrite the agents’ problem (3.7) as follows:  
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Plugging the technological constraints into the objective function and deriving the first order 
conditions with respect to Lk,m, the optimality conditions on time distribution between acquisition 
and utilization of skills are mkmk TL ,, 1 φ
φ
+
= . The sufficiency conditions are also satisfied, as the 
objective function is concave at the optimal allocation. à 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Substitute for Lk,m in the agent’s problem (3.7) using (3.8). In addition, substitute for Sk,m from 
the skill acquisition technology and use the definition of mkN ,
~ . Consequently, the agent’s 
problem is: 































































and, obviously, the maximum is the corner solution with the higher mkN ,
~ . 
 
Now assume ( ) φφε 1+≠ . Form the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian 




















εφ ) to obtain the first order Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for a maximum 






































































First realize that , , and that both  and  are finite, for any admissible 
parametric values on the constrained domain. The finiteness follows from the limited time 
resources and the fact that, for any admissible parametric values, the production technology of 
efficient labor does not permit infinite output with limited resources. Moreover, it is always 
possible to allocate some resources to production of efficient labor such that it is positive and 







k,x and Tk,n would have to be zero implying , which is inadmissible. Therefore, the time 
constraint is binding. 
0* =kH
 
Now let us use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to study the corner solution Tk,x = 0 and Tk,n = 1. 












knknkxkknknk HNTTHTN . Because 
both nkN ,
~  and are finite, l is finite as well. Substituting for l,  kH





















xkxk TN  is finite (and well defined). This is the case 
whenever the exponent is larger than zero, that is, whenever ( ) φφε 1+> . This condition is thus 
the necessary condition for the studied corner solution to be the maximum. By symmetry, the 
same necessary condition must hold for the corner solution Tk,n = 0 then Tk,x = 1 to be the 
maximum. 
 
If Tk,x > 0 and Tk,n > 0, in the interior solution, the first two Kuhn-Tucker conditions are equalities 
and the following result is obtained: 
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T . Using this result and the time constraint it follows that 
( )kkx,k ttT += 1  and ( )kn,k tT += 11 . 
 
Consequently, there are three possible candidates for the maximum, two corner solutions and one 
interior solution. Given the results above, evaluating the objective function at each of these 
candidates, the values of Hk at the candidate time allocations are  
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )















































































































































Now I verify the sufficient conditions for each of these candidates to be the maximum. Note that 
from the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions the time constraint is binding and therefore we can 
rewrite the agent’s problem in the following way 
 
 
































Consider the new objective function on the constrained domain. Differentiate the objective 
function to obtain 
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( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )













































































































Now it is straightforward to see that 






















































and that the term on the right hand side has a positive sign for any whenever 01 >> x,kT
( ) φφεφφε 101 +>⇔>−− . Thus, the interior solution cannot be the maximum if 
( ) φφε 1+> . As argued above, the objective function is certainly continuous and bounded on 
the constrained domain. Therefore, there must exist a maximum. Having excluded the interior 
candidate, the corner solution with the higher mkN ,
~  and thus )1/(,
~ −εε
mkN  is the maximum on the 
constrained domain.  
 
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we know that if ( ) φφε 1+< , none of the corner candidates 
can be the maximum. As above, because the objective function is continuous and bounded on the 
constrained domain, there must exist a maximum. Being the only remaining possibility, the 
interior solution is the maximum and ( ) ( )( )kkkk*k t,ttHH ++= 111  whenever ( ) φφε 1+< . For 
the implication in (3.9a-b), note that ( ) 01 >−εε . This completes the proof.45  à 
 
Proof of Proposition 2  
Individuals invest their time in those social networks of a given type, exclusive or inclusive, that 
offer the largest network effects and thus are the most efficient for acquiring that type of skill. 
Assume there is an equilibrium with an individual violating the proposition thus involved in two 
networks of a given type, splitting his time between these networks. It must then be that the 
network effects in these two networks are the same for this individual; otherwise he would pick 
the one that is more efficient to spend his time. Such equilibrium is unstable, however. Given 
that network effects increase in agents’ involvements, any marginal deviation in allocation of 
agents causes the network effects between the two networks to differ and, as a consequence, the 
agent to abandon the less efficient network. Obviously, the reaction of the other individuals to 
                                                 
45 A simpler way to determine which of the three candidates is the maximum is possible, noting that ( )( )
ε
εφ 11 −+  and 
( )1−ε
ε  fully determine the properties of the maximization problem. The lengthier and more formal approach was 
adopted here. 
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such marginal deviation does not stabilize the equilibrium, as network effects are increasing in 
individual involvements. à 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Given the asymmetric information on the labor market, individuals take the wage for the unit of 
their efficient labor as given with respect to their choice of skills. Therefore, individuals pick that 
combination of social networks and thus skills that is the most efficient in production of efficient 
labor. To prove Proposition 3 by contradiction, assume there is an equilibrium with two 
individuals from a given social group that are involved in two different combinations of social 
networks. Because the two individuals are free to choose between networks, in this equilibrium it 
must be that the efficiencies of these two combinations of social networks for the two individuals 
in production of efficient labor are the same. Such equilibrium is, however, unstable. Any 
marginal deviation from the equilibrium agent involvements across these two different 
combinations of networks causes their efficiencies to differ. As a result, the agent involved in the 
less efficient set of social networks switches to the more efficient one. As above, the reaction of 
the other individuals to the marginal deviations does not stabilize the equilibrium. à 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Recall that, due to asymmetric information, employers differentiate wages per unit of efficient 
labor across social groups but not within groups and that individuals cannot change their group 
membership. Therefore, agents pick those networks to acquire skills that they are allowed to join 
and that offer the largest network effect benefits (and thus are the most efficient in skill 





































































where the superscript r œ {EE, II, EI, IE} denotes the prevailing equilibrium.  
 
As a first step, recalling Proposition 3 and its proof, note that deviation to an empty social 
network is never beneficial and for any individual it is preferable to be a member of the social 
network populated by the other members of her social group. Now let us consider deviations that 
are permitted and that involve switching to a non-empty social network, equilibrium by 
equilibrium. 
As concerns the EE equilibrium, there is no permissible deviation to a non-empty social network. 
IT is thus always stable. The same holds for the II equilibrium.  
 
Now investigate the IE equilibrium. Under this equilibrium a majority individual could switch to 
a minority inclusive network, which is non-empty. For such marginal deviation not to occur, the 
stability condition is . Now note that IEn,j
IE
x,j NN ≥ ( )( γγ φφ += 1JN IEx,j )  and 
( )( ) ( )( γγ φφδ ++= 111 IN IEn,j ) ). Thus, the stability condition is equivalent to ( δ+≥ 1IJ , which 
always holds and the IE equilibrium is always stable.  
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As concerns the EI equilibrium, the argument is similar to the one just above. The possible 
deviation now involves minority individuals who compare ( )( γγ φφ += 1IN EIx,i )  and 
( )( ) ( )( γγ φφδ ++= 11JN EIn,i ) . This yields the condition ( )δ+≥ 1JI , which holds, if the 
minority (or social distance) is large enough. 
 
Now consider the IS equilibrium. In any stable IS equilibrium it must be that agents prefer 
staying in the inclusive networks occupied by their own social group, enjoying network effects 
( )( )γγ φφ += 1IN ISn,i  and ( )( )γγ φφ += 1JN ISn,j , to deviating to the inclusive social network 
composed of the members of the other social group and obtaining network benefits 














, respectively. These conditions hold if and only if 
( δ+≥ 1JI  and ( )δ+≥ 1IJ , of which the second is always satisfied. Because 1=+ JI , 
( ) ( )δδ +≥⇔+≥ 211 IJI .  à 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 (superscripts omitted) 
Recall that . Realize that the 1=+ JI ( )Iω  curve is continuous for any  and continuous 
from the right at . The proof consists of three steps. First, note that whenever r is finite, 
0>I
0=I






. Second, realize that by symmetry ( ) 1=Iω  
at . In the last step tedious algebraic manipulations (partial differentiation of 50.I = ( )Iω  with 
respect to I, computations omitted) yield that whenever the parametric condition 
( )( ) ( ) γγ γργφφ 211 >−−+  is satisfied the ( )Iω  curve is upward sloping at 50.I = . In 
consequence, the continuous ( )Iω  curve lies above one at  and has a positive slope at the 
point 
0→I
( ) 150 =.ω  if the above parametric condition holds. As a result, under the IE equilibrium 
there always is a range of I where ( ) 1<Iω  and ( ) 0<∂∂ IIω . The same is true under the EI 
equilibrium if social distance δ  is large enough such that for some I from this range the EI 
equilibrium is stable. This is the case for any 21 −≥ Iδ  for I from such range, which is well 
defined, and for ∞→δ  in particular. Simple algebra shows that the parametric condition above 
is satisfied for all ρρ ′> , where ( )( )( ) 0112 >+++≡′ γγφφρ γ .  à 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Recall that agents always pick those networks to acquire skills that they are allowed to join and 
that offer the largest network effects and thus are the most efficient. The only possibility for an 
individual to deviate in the equilibrium where both social groups acquire inclusive skills in one 
inclusive social network is to form his own inclusive social network. Because such network 
would offer zero network benefits, as compared to positive network benefits in the integrated 
inclusive network, such deviation is never profitable and therefore the equilibrium is stable. 
 
If, on the other hand, inclusive skills are acquired in two segregated inclusive networks, for this 
equilibrium to be stable it must be that all individuals prefer staying in the inclusive networks 
occupied by their own social group, enjoying network effects  and , to 
deviating to the inclusive social network of the other social group and obtaining network benefits 
γIN DSni =,
γJN DSnj =,


























1 IJI . à 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 
 
First note that:  
( )
( ) ( )
( )

















































































































































































































































































































































This completes the proof. à 
 
Proof of Proposition 9 (superscripts omitted) 
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Lemma 1: 
There always exists  such that 0>I ( ) 1<Ih . 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 




IHIH  directly from the inequality 





















IHIH . For the case of finite δ , in the first step I prove 




IHIH  and both are well defined if 1≠ε . Using (3.5), (3.6), (3.18a-b), and 
the specifications of network effects under the DI equilibrium: 
( )














































































































































































































































































































IH .  









IH . Having these results, the condition 























21111        (3A.1) 




IHIH . Realize now that the diversification condition ( ) φφε 1+<  is 


































ε , defining three 
cases when the diversification condition is satisfied. Since the last one is excluded in the 
proposition, let us consider the first two, denoting them Case A and Case B. 
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ε . Due to the second inequality and noting that in 



























, one can take away the powers without changing 
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IHIH .  
 











ε . As in Case A, we can take away the 
powers but the direction of the inequality must be changed because of the powers are now 















































 for any finite δ  prove that 




IHIH  in Case B as well.  
 




IHIH  and ( )Ih  is continuous for any , 
there exists  such that 
0≥I
0>I ( ) ( )IHIH ji <  and thus ( ) 1<Ih  for any admissible parametric 
values. Denote   the set of all such IΓ I . 
































































n,kn,kx,kx,kk NTNTH , 
( ) ( )











= . Evidently, network effects are larger for the majority and thus 1<h  
whenever 1=ε . This completes the proof of Lemma 1. 





















































I  is 
a decreasing continuous function of r for any ( )500 .,I ∈ , there always exists r large enough 
such that ( ) 1<Iω  for some II Γ∈ . In particular, it can be shown that for any 
Social Interaction and the Minority-Majority Earnings Inequality: Why Being a Minority Hurts but Being a Big Minority Hurts More      71












ρρ  it holds that ( ) 1<Iω  for some II Γ∈ .  
Straightforwardly, ρ ′′  is well defined for any ( )10,I ∈  and is positive and finite. 
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 5, ( )Iω  is continuous for all ( )10,I ∈ , approaches infinity 
as I approaches zero, and ( ) 1=Iω  for 50.I = . Adding the fact that for ρρ ′′> , there is I such 
that ( ) 1<Iω  suffices to ensure that there always is a range of I where ( ) 1<Iω  and 
( ) 0<∂∂ IIω . This completes the proof. à 
 
Proof of Proposition 10 
Because  and there always exists I such that ( ) 1<IIIω ( ) ( ) 1>= II IEEI ωω  (c.f. Proof of 
Proposition 5), it must be that ( ) ( ) ( )III IIIEEI ωωω >=  for some I. This proves the first part. 
Moreover, if ( )( )( ) 1112 −+++≡′> γγφφρρ γ  there exists I such that . In 
addition, there also exists I such that 
( ) ( ) 1<= II IEEI ωω
( ) ( ) 1== II IEEI ωω . Since the functions  and ( )IEIω ( )IEIω  
are continuous and because  for all I whenever ( ) 1<IIIω 0>δ , there exists I such that 























































A significant body of empirical literature finds that minority-majority earnings 
differential is an increasing function of minority relative size. Some authors argue that 
this finding is a result of labor market competition among minority and majority 
individuals, but the direct empirical evidence on the substitutability of minority and 
majority labor is inconclusive. This chapter investigates the nature of such competition 
using 2000 U.S. Census-based data. In the framework of generalized Leontief production 
function, the analysis reveals complementarity of minority and majority labor in 
production. Imperfect substitutability of minority and majority labor is confirmed in the 
framework of constant elasticity of substitution production function. These findings 
support the theories that explain the positive relationship between minority-majority 
earnings differential and minority share as a labor market outcome. The estimated size of 
the effects suggests that their importance should be viewed in the context of long-run 
migration trends that result in large variety of minority concentration across local labor 
markets.  
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4.1. Introduction 
 
The notion that minority people take jobs from majority people is widely considered as 
true by majority people. Yet, minority people often provide specific skills that are highly 
valued by the larger society. Black basketball magicians amuse the whole world. Gypsy 
violinists are in high demand in some parts of Europe. Ethnic restaurants operated by 
minority people have become a part of our gastronomical culture. Taking a more general 
view, there is empirical evidence that Blacks in the US are overrepresented in some jobs 
such as public administration. From a less encouraging perspective, minority workers are 
often found in less skilled jobs.1 Similar concentration of minority people in certain kinds 
of education and differences in investment in education between minority and majority 
people are a persistent feature of many educational systems.2 These observations suggest 
that minority people have different human capital and concentrate in different jobs than 
majority people. Whether these employment and educational regularities result from 
historical reasons and socio-cultural differences,3 organization of social interaction in 
human capital acquisition,4 or constraints imposed upon minority people by the society5, 
they suggest that minority and majority labor is not perfectly substitutable in the labor 
market. In that case, however, the fiercest competitors of a majority individual in the 
labor market are other majority individuals and, similarly, minority individuals 
predominantly compete for jobs held by other minority individuals. 
 
Labor market competition between minority and majority people is not only of popular 
interest but also has important consequences for the distribution of income. In particular, 
if minority and majority labor is complementary in production, an increase in the relative 
number of minority workers increases the marginal product of majority workers and vice 
versa. As a result, assuming that changes in marginal products are reflected in wages, 
relative earnings of minority workers vis-à-vis majority workers decrease in the relative 
                                                 
1 Altonji and Blank (1998), p. 3153. 
2 See e.g. Chiswick (1988). 
3 See Hofstede (1980) and Borjas (1994). 
4 See Kahanec (2004). 
5 The literature on the role of discrimination on economic outcomes includes Becker (1957) and Arrow 
(1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1998). 
The Substitutability of Minority and Majority Labor    75
number of minority workers, ceteris paribus. Similarly, if minority and majority workers 
are substitutes rather than complements, an increase in the relative number of minority 
workers increases their wages vis-à-vis majority workers. For these distributional 
consequences of imperfect substitutability of minority and majority labor, it is important 
to understand the nature of substitutability of minority and majority labor in the labor 
market. 
 
Several studies investigate the substitutability of minority and majority labor. Grant and 
Hamermesh (1981) study the substitutability of youths, White women, White men, Black 
adults, and capital in production, estimating a translog econometric model over 67 
standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). They find that Black adults are 
substitutes for White men and complements to White women and youths in production, 
although the statistical significance of the relationships of complementarity is low. In a 
similar framework, Grossman (1982) studies the substitutability of natives and 
immigrants in production to find that both foreign-born workers and second-generation 
native workers are substitutes for native workers. Borjas (1983) utilized Diewert’s  
(1971) generalized Leontief approximation to a production function to study 
substitutability of Black, Hispanic, and White male workers. Borjas suggests that Black 
male workers may be substitutes for White male workers and finds evidence for 
complementarity between Hispanic and White male workers. Using a similar 
methodology, Borjas (1987) investigates the substitutability of White, Black, Hispanic, 
and Asian male workers by immigrant status over 84 SMSAs. In this study he finds that 
all immigrant groups are substitutes for native whites; however, this evidence is not 
robust with respect to endogeneity of supply of labor. Furthermore, he finds that Black 
natives are substitutes for White natives, but does not find such evidence for Hispanic 
and Asian natives.  
 
These studies are summarized in Table 4.1. Apparently, the evidence is not conclusive as 
concerns the substitutability of minority and majority labor. Several results point at 
substitutability, but some suggest that minority and majority workers are complements. 
While the variance of results does not permit sensible generalizations as concerns the 
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exact magnitudes or signs of estimated elasticities, the general observation is that the 
reported elasticities are low and thus that the substitutability of minority and majority 
labor is relatively high. This result suggests that changes in minority concentration in a 
labor market as resulting from migration over a short-run have relatively small effects on 
wages and earnings. However, long run migration patterns may result in large variation 
of minority concentration across labor markets. To wit, in the US, the percentage of 
Blacks is about 33 times larger in the 75th percentile than in the 25th percentile school 
district. 6 Similarly, there are about 10 times more Asians and 22 times more Hispanic per 
one hundred inhabitants in the respective 75th and 25th percentile school districts. In this 
context, the effects of even a relatively high substitutability of minority and majority 
labor may result in substantial variation of distribution of wages, as will be illustrated 
below.   
 





Estimated elasticities of factor prices: 
The change in the wage of A with respect to 
the change in the quantity of labor B 
Separability 





Translog 1/1000 Public Use 
Sample of the 1970 US 
Census 
Black to White female: 0.0203 
Black to White male: -0.0536** 
White female to Black: 0.0119 




Translog 1970 US Census Second generation immigrants to natives: -0.39** 
Foreign-born immigrants to natives: -0.16** 
Natives to second generation immigrants: -0.15** 






1976 Survey of Income 
and Education, 5/100 
Sample, US Census 
Bureau. 
$ Black to White: 0.0026/-0.0639** 






1980 5/100 A Sample, 
US Census 
† Black immigrants to White Natives: -0.001**/-0.001 
† Hispanic immigrants to White Natives: -0.002**/0.002 
† Asian immigrants to White Natives: -0.002**/-0.003 
# Black natives to White natives: -1158.6** 
# Hispanic natives to White natives: -98.5 
# Asian natives to White natives: -120.0 




the capital input.  
Note: ** Significant at 0.01 significance level, * Significant at 0.05 Significance level.  
$ Elasticities of complementarity: The change in the relative wage of A with respect to the relative change in the quantity of B, holding the 
marginal costs and quantities of other factors constant. OLS/IV estimates 
# Technology parameters. Negative (positive) sign implies substitutability (complementarity) of inputs. 
† OLS/IV estimate. 
 
In the light of these studies, it is interesting to note that there is robust empirical evidence, 
including the studies by Blalock (1956, 1957), Heer (1959), Brown and Fuguitt (1972), 
                                                 
6 Percentiles in this section refer to ranking of school districts according to Black percentage. 
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Frisbie and Neidert (1977) and Tienda and Lii (1987), that minority individuals in regions 
with a higher minority share earn relatively less than minority individuals in regions with 
a smaller minority share.7 This evidence, if it is a consequence of labor market 
competition, points at complementarity of minority and majority labor in production.  
 
The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the substitutability of minority and 
majority labor. The ambition is twofold. First, by shedding light on the nature of 
substitutability of labor of the largest minorities and the White majority in the US this 
study contributes to the substitutability debate discussed above. Second, resolving 
whether minority and majority labor is complementary or substitutable in production tells 
us whether the empirical regularity that relatively larger minorities earn less per 
efficiency unit of labor than relatively smaller ones is a labor market phenomenon. In this 
respect, this study contributes to the debate about minority-majority earnings inequality.  
 
This study is perhaps most straightforwardly comparable to Borjas (1983). It differs in 
three major aspects, however. First, in addition to the White non-Hispanic majority and 
the Black and Hispanic minorities considered by Borjas, this study accounts for three 
other major minority groups in the US: Asians, American Indians, and Pacific Islanders. 
As a result, it covers most labor input in the US labor market. Second, the baseline unit of 
observation in this study is the school district rather than the individual matched to his or 
her SMSA. In particular, the ratios of labor supplies of different ethnic groups, the key 
explanatory variable, are measured at the level of the school district in this analysis, in 
contrast to that of Borjas, who computes these ratios for SMSAs. Given the large number 
of school districts, choosing the school district as the unit of observation yields a 
relatively large variation of this key variable. 8 Third, besides the baseline model similar 
to that of Borjas, I study an alternative specification of the production function in the 
constant elasticity of substitution framework.  
 
                                                 
7 This evidence is summarized in the Appendix of Chapter 3, Table 3A.1. 
8 The key question concerning the choice of the unit of observation is what the proper geographic definition 
of the local labor market is. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the results of this study are robust in this 
respect. See the discussion in Section 4.3. 
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Previewing the main results of this study, I empirically establish that the largest US 
minorities are complementary to the White majority in production and that, as a result, 
labor market forces disadvantage large minorities in terms of their (relative) earnings per 
efficiency unit of their labor. This result appears to be robust with respect to a number of 
alternative specifications of the unit of study, sample, and production technology. To 
establish this result, I proceed in a number of steps. In the following section I develop the 
baseline analytical framework of this study. Section 4.3 provides the description of the 
data. In Section 4.4 I outline the estimation methods and establish the main results. The 
following section tests the validity of the main results with respect to some alternative 
explanations and specifications. In the final analytical section I study a single-minority 
model in the constant elasticity of substitution framework and estimate this elasticity, 
linking this chapter to the previous one more directly. Then I conclude and suggest issues 
for further research.  
 
4.2. The Model 
 
To investigate the production relationships among minorities and the majority, I assume a 
generalized Leontief production function: 
( ) 21∑∑=
j i
jiij XXC β         (4.1) 
where C stands for output, and  are, respectively, the quantities of labor inputs of 
social groups i and j in the labor market and 
iX jX
ijβ  is the technology parameter, which is 
restricted such that jiij ββ = .
9 Labor inputs i and j are complements whenever 0>ijβ  
and substitutes whenever 0<ijβ . Assuming that firms in the labor market operate in a 
perfectly competitive industry, the system of labor demands derived from the production 





ijijiii XXW ββ ,        (4.2) 
                                                 
9 Generalized Leontief production function is a second order approximation to any arbitrary production 
function and the parametric restriction should be seen as an integral part thereof.  See Diewert (1971) for a 
discussion of the properties of this production function. 
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where  is the wage of individuals from group i. This system of labor demands is 
particularly useful for empirical analysis, as it is linear in parameters 
iW
ijβ  and thus can be 
estimated by conventional least squares methods. The interpretation of ijβ  is also 
straightforward: ijβ  is positive (negative) and the wage of group i increases (decreases) 
in the number of type-j individuals per type-i individual whenever type-j and type-i 
individuals are complements (substitutes) in production. Thus, according to the system of 
labor demands (4.2), the wage of members of group i is affected by the numbers of 
members of other groups per member of group i, ij XX . 
 
A useful transformation of the coefficient ijβ  is the one that links it to the Hicks partial 
elasticity of complementarity: jiijij CCCCe = , where ii XCC ∂∂=  and 
jiij XXCC ∂∂∂=
2 .10 Namely, it can be shown that under the Generalized Leontief 
production function the elasticities of complementarity are given by: 














β  for ji = , 
where CXWs iii =  is the relative share of income accruing to labor input i. The Hicks 
elasticity of complementarity measures the effect of a change in the relative supply of 
input j on the relative price of input i, holding the quantities and marginal costs of other 







In consequence, these elasticities completely describe the changes in wages resulting 
from changes in supplies of labor inputs for any given share of income accruing to the 
respective labor input. 
 
                                                 
10 See Hicks (1970). 
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Estimation of the demand system (4.2) involves three major econometric issues. First, 
labor force is not necessarily homogenous across labor markets. Certainly, members of 
group i may earn different average wages in some regions than in others not as a result of 
regional differences in relative supplies of labor inputs, but as a result of variation of their 
average skills across regions. To solve this issue, I adopt an analogue of the technique 
customary in the literature.11 In particular, I assume that the average earnings of members 
of group i in labor market n, , depend on (i) the market-determined wage for the 
average member of group i in labor market n, , and (ii) the difference  between 
the average skill level of members of group i in labor market n and the average skill level 
of all members of group i. This difference, , is treated as a fixed effect such that, 
formally, a representative member of group i from labor market n earns wage 




n,in,in,i fWE += n,in,in,i Zf ε+= , where  is the vector of observable 
characteristics of individuals of type i in labor market n and 
n,iZ
n,iε is the respective random 
uncorrelated error. Assuming that in each labor market wages are determined according 
to the demand system (4.2), it follows that  
( ) n,in,ii
ji
n,in,jijiin,i ZXXE εβββ +++= ∑
≠
21 ,      (4.3) 
which is the specification of the system of labor demands used throughout the chapter.  
 
Second, the relative supplies of labor inputs, n,in,j XX , may be endogenous. Therefore, 
while in the baseline analysis of Section 4.4 the assumption of inelastic labor supply is 
adopted, Section 4.5.1 extends the analysis to more complex supply conditions. In 
particular, I adopt the conventional approach to this problem and address the endogeneity 
issue in the instrumental variable framework. Finally, although the focus of the analysis 
is on labor inputs, other inputs such as capital, land, and technology enter production. In 
the literature, this issue has often been neglected. Scholars who attempt to account for 
capital admit that the measures of capital that they use are unsatisfactory or of limited 
use.12 Land and technology have not been, to my knowledge, addressed in this context. 
                                                 
11 See Borjas (1983) and Borjas (1987). 
12 See e.g. Grant and Hamermesh (1981), Grossman (1982), Borjas (1983), and Borjas (1987). 
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Despite the difficulties, in Section 4.5.3 I address this issue and test the robustness of the 
predictions of this chapter using the degree of urbanization and farming as indicators of 
capital and land utilization. The analysis is based on the assumption that urbanization 
(farming) is positively (negatively) related to capital utilization and negatively 




The empirical analysis is conducted on the dataset that contains data about 14,405 school 
districts of the US, as compiled in the Census 2000 School District Tabulation (STP2) by 
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) of the US.13 The auxiliary data from 
the year 1990 are compiled from the SDDB-School District Database (NCES 95-705) as 
available at the National Bureau for Economic Research.14 This dataset contains 
economic and demographic information about the White non-Hispanic majority, hereafter 
“White,” and five minorities: (i) Black or African American, hereafter “Black”, (ii) 
American Indian or Alaska native, hereafter “American Indian,” (iii) Asian, (iv) Native 
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, hereafter “Pacific Islander,” and (v) Hispanic or 
Latino. Two points are worth mentioning in regard of this particular partition of the labor 
force. First, it covers most of the US labor force as identified in the 2000 Census.15 
Second, this partition is appropriate in the light of the main interest of this study and one 
of the main subjects of the previous two chapters: the substitutability of labor of different 
ethnic and racial groups. In particular, although further sub-partitions of workers of 
different ethnicities based on age, immigrant status, and gender certainly deserve further 
research, they are not the focus of this study. 16
 
                                                 
13 http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/c2000.asp. 
14 http://www.nber.org/sddb/. 
15 The two remaining groups not covered here are “Some other race” and “Two or more races”.  
16 The NCES dataset does not permit such sub-partitions, except for the one based on gender. See 
Grossman (1982) and Borjas (1987) for a partition based on immigrant status, Grant and Hamermesh 
(1981) and Borjas (1987) for a partition based on gender, and Grant and Hamermesh (1981) for a partition 
based on age. 
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The school district, a special purpose administration district in the US in which public 
schools are administered, was chosen as the baseline unit of observation. School districts 
reflect the organization of social and economic life of the population and thus provide a 
reasonable geographical representation of the local labor market. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to evaluate sensitivity of the results of this study with respect to the choice of 
the geographical unit of observation. The analysis that was conducted in this matter 
involved (i) aggregation of school districts into larger geographical units and (ii) 
estimation of the model only for school districts with relatively large population, thus 
similar to SMSAs. It turned out that the results reported below are robust with respect to 
each of these robustness checks.17  
 
Table 4.2: Numbers of full-time workers, by race. 
Race Min Max  Mean Median 
All races 8 2,313,825 7,768 2,325 
White 0 922,630 4,944 1,685 
Black 0 528,105 1,091 55 
American Indian 0 11,735 66 14 
Asian 0 228,700 457 24 
Pacific Islanders 0 27,815 66 10 
Hispanic or Latino 0 630,760 855 45 
Note: Computed for school districts with positive total population (14,375). Mean and median 
weighted by the respective populations of workers. 
 
For this study, the most relevant information in the NCES dataset involves earnings and 
income, educational attainment, employment status and time worked, and age structure of 
members of each racial and ethnic group mentioned above. The main statistics for the key 
variables are depicted in Tables 4.2 to 4.4. As one can see, the average school district has 
7,768 full-time workers of all races combined, while the median school district has 2,325 
full-time workers. The relatively large discrepancy is due to a number of relatively large 
districts, i.e. 113 school districts have full-time working populations above 100,000 and 6 
out of these are above 500,000, but in more than 91 percent of school districts the number 
of full-time workers is between 100 and 30,000. Table 4.2 also reveals very large 
                                                 
17 The results of this analysis are not reported. In general, the main results were the same as in the baseline 
analysis. The first robustness check involved aggregation to the county level, the second sample reduction 
such that the analysis only involved school districts with population larger than 100,000 inhabitants. 
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discrepancies between mean and median numbers of minority full-time workers, which 
suggests concentration of minorities in subsets of school districts. 
 
Table 4.3 depicts that, as concerns median earnings, each minority group earns less than 
the majority. This is also true for average earnings, with the exception of the Asian 
minority. The reason that the Asian minority on average earns more and in the median 
school district less than the White majority is also apparent in Table 4.3: the share of 
school districts with median earnings above 100,000 US dollars per year is by far the 
largest for the Asian minority. As concerns the relative standing of minorities vis-à-vis 
the majority, minority people earn between 33.9 percent less and 2.8 percent more and 
between 31.8 percent and 2.5 percent less than majority individuals, measured by mean 
and median earnings, respectively.  
 
Table 4.3: Median earnings of full time workers, by race. 
Percent of school districts 




<2,500 ¥100,000 Mean Median 
White 0.01 0.15 36,612 34,768 
Black 0.03 0.63 28,255 27,589 
American Indian 0.25 0.66 27,125 25,661 
Asian 0.14 2.15 37,660 33,900 
Pacific Islanders 0.03 0.33 29,714 28,572 
Hispanic or Latino 0.13 0.53 24,196 23,729 
Note: Computed for school districts with positive total population (14,375). Mean and median 
weighted by the respective populations of workers. In US dollars. 
 
Finally, in Table 4.4 one can observe that some of the variation of earnings is due to 
variation in educational levels. In particular, each minority has a lower educational level 
than the majority, measured by mean and median percentages of respective populations 
with graduate and undergraduate degrees. The only exception is the Asian minority, 
which attains a higher educational level than the White majority. The extraordinarily high 
educational achievement of the Asian minority appears to be the explanation of why its 
earnings more or less match the earnings of the White majority. 
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Table 4.4: Percentages of people above 25 with university 
education. 
Graduate or professional 
degree Bachelor’s degree Race 
Mean Median Mean Median 
White 10.04 8.19 17.41 16.04 
Black 4.89 4.23 9.63 8.67 
American Indian 4.59 0.00 8.31 1.97 
Asian 15.99 12.92 26.06 25.18 
Pacific Islanders 6.48 0.00 11.23 0.00 
Hispanic or Latino 3.86 3.39 7.33 6.36 
Note: Computed for school districts with positive total population (14,375). Mean and median 
weighted by respective populations. 
 
A note concerning the numbers of observations is due before I proceed to the results. 
While there are 14,375 school districts with positive total population, in the analysis 
below observations are lost due to two main reasons. First, a large number of 
observations are lost as a result of the structure of the model. Namely, estimation of a 
simultaneous equation model with several social groups implies that one can only analyze 
those school districts that contain all these social groups. Second, a relatively small 
number of observations contain missing information, which precludes their inclusion in 
the analysis. To illustrate, in the baseline model of the next section that involves the 
White majority as well as all five minorities, the first restriction reduces the number of 
school districts to 2,009. Further 66 observations are lost due to missing information, 
resulting in 1,943 observations included in the baseline model.  
 
To understand the consequences of such reductions of the sample, Table 4.5 lists the 
basic statistics of the sample of the baseline model. As one can observe comparing Table 
4.5 to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, sample reduction has a minor effect on mean and median 
earnings. The effect of sample reduction on mean and median numbers of full-time 
workers is one of a substantial increase of these numbers in the reduced sample. This is a 
natural consequence of the fact that sample reduction involved elimination of school 
districts that do not contain workers of each race, which are typically small school 
districts. Straightforward calculations show, however, that the relative numbers of 
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minority workers between the full sample and the reduced sample are much more similar 
than the absolute numbers.  
Table 4.5: Numbers and median earnings of full-time workers, by 
race. Districts with all social groups present. 
 Number of workers Median earnings 
Race Mean Median Mean Median 
White 19,623 9,700 38,312 36,562 
Black 3,848 485 28,537 27,883 
American Indian 195 74 27,746 26,516 
Asian 1,789 270 36,715 33,514 
Pacific Islanders 84 14 29,790 28,572 
Hispanic or Latino 4,420 760 24,065 23,750 
Note: Computed for the 1,949 school districts included in the analysis of Section 4.4. Mean and 
median weighted by respective populations of workers. In US dollars. 
 
Aggregation of minority groups into one (multiethnic) minority increases the likelihood 
that at least one of the aggregated minorities is present in a school district, thereby 
permitting inclusion of more school districts in the analysis. Dropping a minority from 
the analysis has similar effect. To wit, aggregation of the Asian and American Indian 
minorities and omitting the Pacific Islanders permits inclusion of 7,878 school districts. 
Aggregation of all minority groups but the Pacific Islanders permits inclusion of as many 
as 13,335 school districts.18 In Section 4.5.2 I investigate this issue further and establish 
the robustness of the results of the baseline analysis with respect to aggregation of 
minority groups.    
 
4.4. Estimation Methods and Results 
 
The NCES dataset contains the necessary information for the estimation of the 
econometric model (4.3). Labor input  is defined as the number of full-time workers 
from group i that are 15 years old and over. Correspondingly, median earnings of full-
time workers older than 15 is the baseline measure of .
n,iX
n,iE
19 The vector of observable 
                                                 
18 It turns out that these aggregations are statistically sensible. See Section 4.5.2. 
19 As an alternative specification, the analysis was redone using the weighted average of median earnings of 
full-time and part-time workers as the explained variable and the ratios of the numbers of all minority and 
majority workers as the explanatory variable. The results were very similar to those obtained for full-time 
workers.  
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characteristics  comprises educational indicators measuring the percentages of adult 
members of group i in school district n with (i) high school diploma, (ii) some college but 
no degree, (iii) associate degree, (iv) bachelor’s degree, and (v) graduate or professional 
degree.
n,iZ
20 Besides these variables, regional dummies are included in every regression 
throughout the analysis.21 The purpose of these dummy variables is to pick the effect of 
interstate variation in development, infrastructure, climate, and other factors outside the 
analyzed econometric model that possibly affect the distribution of earnings. 
 
Econometric model (4.3) is estimated using the Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUREG) estimator, simultaneously imposing cross-equation technological restrictions 
jiij ββ =  implied by the generalized Leontief technology. Table 4.6 depicts the baseline 
estimates of the technological parameters.22 The main result, showing up in colum (1), is 
that all minorities are complements to the White majority. This result is of substantial 
interest, as it supports theories of imperfect substitutability of minorities and majorities in 
the labor market. Furthermore, that minority labor complements majority labor in 
production suggests that ethnic diversity is beneficial in terms of aggregate output, ceteris 
paribus. And finally, this result is consistent with the empirical evidence of the direct 
relationship between minority-majority earnings gap and minority relative size. In 
particular, complementarity implies that an increase in the relative size of a minority 
increases majority earnings and decreases the earnings of this minority, holding the sizes 
of other minorities and the aggregate size of the economy constant. As concerns the 
technological relationships among minorities, there appears to be a significant 
complementary relationship between Pacific Islanders and Asians, but all the other 
                                                 
20 Further analysis shows that inclusion of (i) relative numbers of workers that worked full-time less than 
the whole year by weeks worked and race or (ii) variables depicting the age structure of population by race 
in the vector Zi,n does not affect the main results. 
21 These dummies represent school districts according to the US Census Bureau Classification: Mid-West 
East North, Mid-West West North, South Atlantic, South East Central, South West Central, North East 
New England, North East Mid-Atlantic, West Pacific except Hawaii, West Mountain, and Overseas 
(Hawaii and Puerto Rico). I joined  Hawaii and Puerto Rico  to construct the “Overseas” category.  
22 Technological parameters are reported only once; the restriction jiij ββ =  implies that the table of 
technological parameters is diagonally symmetric. 
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relationships are insignificant. As concerns the educational variables, they are significant 
and have expected signs and their magnitudes are ranked as expected.23  
 
Table 4.6: Baseline estimates of the technological parameters. 
 Median earnings of group i, full-time workers 
ij XX  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                         i 
     j 






White       
       
Black 192.7      
 (5.9)**      
American Indian 167.8 -77.9     
 (4.5)** (1.1)     
Asian 322.5 -179.9 1.0    
 (6.9)** (1.8) (0.0)    
Pacific Islanders 66.4 -74.8 117.2 423.8   
 (2.2)* (1.5) (0.6) (3.4)**   
Hispanic or Latino 184.3 14.8 185.5 201.8 -57.2  
 (4.3)** (0.2) (1.8) (1.5) (0.9)  
Education (Group i): 
High school 17,132 987 7,335 2,612 4,142 6,689 
 (3.9)** (0.5) (3.7)** (1.0) (2.5)* (3.7)** 
College, no degree 1,154 8,192 10,461 2,836 4,885 13,407 
 (0.3) (4.5)** (5.4)** (1.1) (3.0)** (8.1)** 
Associate degree -4,684 11,195 13,142 12,060 5,973 5,922 
 (0.7) (4.1)** (4.5)** (3.1)** (2.6)* (1.7) 
Bachelor degree 59,341 21,875 16,297 25,783 16,962 31,042 
 (17.3)** (10.6)** (6.6)** (10.8)** (8.3)** (13.6)** 
Graduate or pro- 52,308 33,044 35,111 55,415 24,445 30,779 
fessional degree (11.7)** (12.6)** (10.8)** (24.3)** (10.5)** (11.8)** 
Constant 16,472 25,009 20,080 15,397 23,006 16,918 
 (6.4)** (18.0)** (12.4)** (8.6)** (12.3)** (20.5)** 
R-squared 0.65 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.36 
Observations 1943 1943 1943 1943 1943 1943 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
 
As concerns the interpretation of the baseline results, it is instructive to derive the cross-
elasticities of complementarity  between the five minorities and the White majority. ije
                                                 
23 In further analysis the parameters with educational variables are not reported.  
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Because these elasticities depend not only on the technological parameters ijβ  but also 
on  and , a decision has to be made at what values of  and  these elasticities are 
evaluated. Means and medians are the natural evaluation points. Table 4.7 summarizes 
cross-elasticities of complementarity  and elasticities of factor prices  between 
minorities and the majority. 
iW is iW is
ije ijjes
 
 Table 4.7: Cross-elasticity of complementarity and elasticities of factor prices. 
Cross-elasticity of 
complementarity 
Elasticity of factor prices  
(Change in the wage of majority 
with respect to the quantity of 
minority labor)  
Elasticity of factor prices  
(Change in the wage of minority 
with respect to the quantity of 
majority labor) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Black 0.0097 0.0173 0.0010 0.0006 0.0070 0.0155 
American Indian 0.0388 0.0406 0.0002 0.0002 0.0280 0.0362 
Asian 0.0186 0.0323 0.0012 0.0007 0.0134 0.0288 
Pacific Islander 0.0217 0.0343 0.0001 3.4E-5 0.0156 0.0306 
Hispanic or Latino 0.0103 0.0155 0.0011 0.0007 0.0074 0.0139 
Note: Evaluated at mean and median w  and  of the sample of Table 4.6, 1943 observations. i is
 
These elasticities confirm the findings of the previous literature that although they are 
statistically significant,24 the effects are not numerically large. As a consequence, short-
run migration, which involves relatively small changes in ethnic composition of the labor 
supply in the local labor market, has relatively small effect on the relative earnings of 
different ethnic groups.25 When one compares school districts with markedly different 
ethnic composition of labor, as resulting from long-run migration patterns, the implied 
differences in earnings distributions may become substantial, however. To illustrate this, 
consider the 20th percentile school district that has 9 and the 80th percentile school district 
that has 199 Black per 1,000 White full-time workers. To estimate the difference in 
                                                 
24 Concerning the significance levels of the respective technological coefficients from Table 4.6. 
25 Given the variation of the earlier results, direct comparison is almost impossible. Among those results in 
the previous literature that establish complementarity of minority and majority labor, Borjas (1983) finds 
the elasticity of complementarity between Hispanic and White labor of about 0.0234, thus slightly higher 
than my result of 0.0155. Grant and Hamermesh (1981) establish somewhat higher elasticities of factor 
prices for the substitutability of Black workers with White female workers, but their results were not 
significant.  
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Black-White earnings differential between these school districts, let us use the estimate of 
the technological parameter from Table 4.6. In addition, assume that relative labor input 
supplies are the only determinants of earnings and that net of their influence workers earn 
the median earnings of their social group. Given these simplifications, it turns out that 
Black workers earn about 6.1 percent more (29,687 vs. 27,990 US dollars per annum) and 
White workers about 0.2 percent less (34,787 vs. 34,868 US dollars per annum) in the 
20th percentile than in the 80th percentile school district.26 This implies a substantial 
reduction of the Black-White earnings differential from 6,877 to 5,099 US dollars per 
year, that is, by about a quarter. This example illustrates that even if the effects of 
migration on earnings over the short run are perhaps numerically unimportant, long-run 
migration patterns and the resulting changes in the racial composition of labor inputs 
matter substantially for the distribution of earnings.  
 
4.5. Robustness of the Baseline Results 
4.5.1. Supply Side 
While in the previous section the assumption of inelastic labor supply was adopted, it is 
possible that labor input supplies respond to wages. People may decide to migrate for 
better jobs, to work more (or less) in response to a higher wage, or it may be that people 
with higher wages can afford better medical care and thus be absent from work less often. 
Whenever any of these possibilities is operative, labor inputs are endogenous and, as a 
result, the baseline estimates of Table 4.6 are biased. To account for the possibility of 
endogeneity of labor inputs, the instrumental variable framework is adopted in this 
section. In particular, I adopt the three-stage least square method (3SLS) to estimate the 
technological parameters of the system of demand equations involved in the econometric 
model (4.3). As above, the technological constraints jiij ββ =  are imposed.  
 
The respective ratios of values of minority populations from the year 1990 are used to 
instrument n,in,j XX . The assumption that is made here is that these past ratios are 
                                                 
26 Similar computations using the estimated elasticities of factor prices lead to a variation of even greater 
magnitude, leading to the estimates of 32.7 and 1.3 percent, respectively. 
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related to current earnings through current ratios of labor supplies, n,in,j XX , but not 
directly. The assumption that the ratios of past values of minority populations are related 
to current ratios of labor supplies is capturing the idea that past presence of a minority in 
a school district attracts immigration of similar people through social relations, that 
people have incentives to remain in the place of their birth to avoid the costs involved in 
relocation, and that larger populations contain more workers.27  
 
Table 4.8: 3SLS estimates of the technological parameters. 
 Median earnings of group i, full-time workers 
ij XX  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                         i 
     j 






White       
       
Black 195.3      
 (4.5)**      
American Indian 241.9 -122.4     
 (3.7)** (1.3)     
Asian 314.8 -327.5 185.8    
 (4.8)** (2.4)* (1.1)    
Pacific Islanders 13.6 -86.1 -7.3 206.2   
 (0.2) (1.3) (0.0) (1.1)   
Hispanic or Latino 242.4 -70.4 92.2 -121.8 -79.5  
 (4.0)** (0.7) (0.6) (0.6) (0.8)  
Constant 19,241 23,450 17,914 17,805 25,892 17,562 
 (6.6)** (15.5)** (8.4)** (8.4)** (8.1)** (18.8)** 
R-squared 0.65 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.35 
Observations 1563 1563 1563 1563 1563 1563 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
 
The most important result of this analysis, summarized in Table 4.8, is that the signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients remain very similar to those in Table 4.6.28 To wit, 
                                                 
27 The existence of such links is confirmed by the (non-reported) first-step regressions of the 3SLS analysis, 
where the sets of instruments are statistically significant in each first-step regression. Reduced-form 
estimation shows that the relationships between explained variables and the exogenous variables are 
significant and have expected signs. 
28 Note that Table 7 contains about 380 observations less than Table 5. This loss results from missing 
observations for the instruments. 
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comparing these two tables, the coefficient in column (1) for the Black minority changes 
from 192.7 to 195.3 and for the Asian minority from 322.5 to 314.8. In other words, these 
coefficients almost do not differ whether estimated using the SUREG or 3SLS method. 
Coefficients with other minorities even somewhat increase in magnitude, in favor of the 
minority-majority complementarity hypothesis. While the coefficient with Pacific 
Islanders loses significance, its sign remains positive. These results suggest that the 
possible endogeneity bias is in general insignificant and the results of the baseline 
analysis of Table 4.6 are robust in this respect. In other words, it is the demand side that 
drives the relationship between relative numbers of workers and their earnings.  
 
4.5.2. Aggregation 
As mentioned above, one of the issues with estimation of the system of demand equations 
involved in econometric model (4.3) is that the number of observations is limited by the 
restriction that only school districts that contain workers of each race can be includes in 
the analysis. In this section I investigate this issue. In general, from the previous sections 
it appears that each minority is complementary to the majority, with the exception of the 
Pacific Islander minority, which seems not have a significant effect on majority earnings. 
To evaluate the validity of these observations, I test the two hypotheses concerning 
coefficient restrictions. First, I test the hypothesis that the coefficients ijβ  for j 
representing American Indians and Asians and i representing Whites, Blacks, and 
Hispanic or Latino are equal and that the corresponding coefficients for j representing 
Pacific Islanders is zero in Table 4.6 and Table 4.8. The test of this hypothesis in the 
SUREG model of Table 4.6 yields , thus not rejecting the null hypothesis at 
0.01 confidence level. In the 3SLS model of Table 4.8, this hypothesis is not rejected at 
any conventional confidence level, yielding the test statistics . Second, 




ijβ  where i represents the White majority are equal for all minorities j 
except for the coefficient with Pacific Islanders that is zero. The test of this hypothesis in 
the model of Table 4.6 yields , which is insignificant at the 0.01 confidence 86122 .=χ
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level. Testing the same hypothesis in the model of Table 4.8 yields  which is 
insignificant at any conventional confidence level.  
5022 .=χ
 
Given these results, I impose the abovementioned parametric restrictions one by one on 
the model and treat the respective minorities as one homogeneous group in the labor 
market. Aggregation of Asians and American Indians permits inclusion of 7,878 school 
districts in the analysis, that is, almost four times as many as in the baseline model. The 
model is estimated using the Zellner’s SUREG estimator with the properly defined 
parametric constraint jiij ββ = . The results are summarized in Table 4.9. As one can 
observe, the main result remains intact: minorities are complementary to the majority in 
the labor market. The magnitudes also remain very similar to the baseline model of Table 
4.6 and the 3SLS estimates of Table 4.8. The aggregate of Asian and American Indian 
minorities is also complementary to the majority, although the magnitude of this effect 
and its significance is not very large. Interestingly, this aggregate appears to be 
complementary to the Black minority.  
 
Table 4.9: Estimates of the technological parameters. 
 Median earnings of group i, full-time workers 
ij XX  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                         i 
     j 
White Black Hispanic or 
Latino  
Asian or 
Am. Indian  
White     
     
Black 169.3    
 (8.4)**    
Hispanic or Latino 215.1 43.7   
 (9.5)** (0.9)   
Asian or Am. Indian 61.7 209.5 -73.2  
 (2.1)* (3.4)** (0.8)  
Constant 19,287 22,873 18,900 24,037 
 (18.4)** (33.9)** (39.5)** (27.5)** 
R-squared 0.70 0.27 0.28 0.30 
Observations 7878 7878 7878 7878 
Note: Aggregate represents Asians and American Indians. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
The Substitutability of Minority and Majority Labor    93
Concerning the second parametric restriction, aggregation of all minorities but Pacific 
Islanders, who are dropped, permits inclusion of as many as 13,335 school districts in the 
analysis. Using the same methodology as in the previous aggregation, the estimate of the 
technological parameter ijβ  for Whites and Non-Whites is 291.7 with the z statistics of 
12.3, which is highly significant and in the range of the values estimated in Tables 4.6 
and 4.8, where only a smaller sample of school districts was available. Given the 
similarity of the coefficients estimated in these restricted models to the baseline 
estimates, it turns out that aggregation strengthens the main prediction of the baseline 
analysis that minority and majority labor is complementary. 29 These results also suggest, 
although this deserves further research, that one should not expect markedly different 
prediction in this respect by aggregating and disaggregating minorities, for example 
Asians into Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, and other Asian ethnicities. 
 
4.5.3. Non-Labor Inputs 
As mentioned above, land, capital, and technology typically enter production, alongside 
labor. Unfortunately, it is impossible to obtain measures of technology and the measures 
of land and capital are scarce and problematic. Nevertheless, I test the robustness of the 
baseline predictions with respect to inclusion of variables measuring urbanization and 
farming intensity, which are, by assumption, correlated to capital and land use. 
Urbanization and farming intensity are measured as the shares of inhabitants of a school 
district residing in urban and farm areas, respectively. Similarly as in the case of 
educational variables, the fixed effects formalization is adopted such that a vector of 
measures of non-labor inputs is directly introduced into the econometric model (4.3). 
Again, the Zellner’s SUREG estimator is used and jiij ββ =  is imposed.  
 
                                                 
29 Given the data available, aggregation also permits 3SLS estimation with the values of the shares of 
Blacks and all other minorities together in the population from the year 1870 as instruments. This yields the 
estimate of ijβ  for Whites and Non-Whites of 363.7 with the z statistics 14.4. This result further supports 
the complementarity prediction and suggests that even if there was an endogeneity bias, it would work 
against the complementarity hypothesis and, because of this, the presented estimates of ijβ  are 
conservative in this respect. 
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Table 4.10: Non-labor inputs in production. 
 Median earnings of group i, full-time workers 
ij XX  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                         i 
     j 






White       
       
Black 164.1      
 (4.6)**      
American Indian 161.8 -72.7     
 (4.2)** (1.0)     
Asian 327.5 -139.1 46.2    
 (5.8)** (1.4) (0.4)    
Pacific Islanders 62.1 -73.6 52.7 468.0   
 (2.0)* (1.4) (0.2) (3.6)**   
Hispanic or Latino 217.2 -12.9 223.1 166.0 -33.2  
 (4.5)** (0.2) (2.1)* (1.2) (0.5)  
Non-Labor Inputs: 
Farming Intensity -25,048 42,615 -43,870 31,056 -33,007 -37,919 
 (2.52)* (2.7)** (2.30)* (1.6 (1.2) (3.2)** 
Urbanization 702 1,641 -2,437 2,869 -2,773 -413 
 (1.0) (1.5) (1.8) (2.0) (1.4) (0.5) 
Constant 15,458 23,109 22,274 12,844 25,323 17,867 
 (5.8)** (13.8)** (11.5)** (5.5)** (10.1)** (15.1)** 
R-squared 0.65 0.33 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.36 
Observations 1943 1943 1943 1943 1943 1943 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
 
Table 4.10 summarizes the results. One observes that inclusion of the two variables that 
measure farming intensity and urbanization does not change the estimates of the 
technological parameters significantly, with reference to the baseline model of Table 4.6. 
This result supports the robustness of the baseline estimates vis-à-vis presence of non-
labor inputs. Both of these variables are significant, however (even for urbanization, 
which is typically only marginally significant in each regression, exclusion is rejected). 
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4.6. Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
 
Aggregation of minorities into one category yields another interesting possibility, as 
mentioned above. Namely, it permits econometric analysis of a two-factor constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) model of labor market competition that mirrors the 
models of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.30 In this section I relate the empirical investigation of 
this chapter to the previous theoretical chapters more straightforwardly, estimating the 
key parameter thereof. In particular, in this section I estimate the elasticity of substitution 
between majority labor and the aggregate of the labor input of all minorities but Pacific 
Islanders, which was constructed in Section 4.5.2. For this purpose, assume that 
production takes place according to the CES production function: 
( ) ( )( ) )/(/)(J j/)(I i djXdiXC 11010 −−− ∫+∫= ρρρρρρ ,  
where 0>ρ  denotes the elasticity of substitution between minority and majority labor. 
Assuming a competitive labor market, from this specification it follows that 
( )ρ1ijji XXWW = .31 Taking the logarithm of both sides and assuming that all factors 
affecting relative wages in labor market n other than n,in,j XX  are fully accounted of by 
the fixed-effects approach described in Section 4.2, one obtains a CES econometric 
model:  
( ) ( ) nnninjijnjni ZXXLnEELn εγγγ +++= 1,,0,,      (4.4) 
where  is the vector of factors affecting production and relative wages in particular in 
labor market n and 
nZ
ijγ  is the elasticity parameter of our interest that has a convenient 
interpretation: it is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution ρ . 
 
Table 4.11 summarizes the results of estimation of the CES econometric model (4.4).32 
column (1) presents the OLS estimate of the coefficient ijγ  equal to 0.0387. It is 
                                                 
30 The nonlinearity of the multiple-factor CES models complicates econometric analysis such that 
conventional estimation methods are unusable. 
31 Note that this result is equivalent to the one obtained in Chapters 2 and 3; the slightly different form 
facilitates the comparison of the results of this section to those of the previous sections of this chapter. 
32 As above, coefficients with education variables and regional dummies are not reported. 
Social Interaction and the Labor Market: Essays on Earnings Inequality, Labor Substitutability, and Segregation 96
significant at any conventional significance level and its magnitude implies the elasticity 
of substitution of 25.8. To investigate the possibility of the endogeneity bias, a two-stage 
least square estimator was computed using the past values of the ratio of White and Non-
White populations as instruments from the year 1990. The results summarized in column 
(2), given their similarity to those in column (1), suggest that the possible endogeneity 
bias is not severe and that the elasticity of substitution between minority and majority 
labor is about 25.33  
 
Table 4.11: CES estimate of the elasticity of substitution. 
 Logarithm of the minority-majority ratio of 
median earnings, full time workers 
 (1) (2) 
0.0387 0.0392 Logarithm of the minority-majority ratio of full-time 
workers (16.7)** (15.3)** 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 
Observations 9042 8304 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
 
The main message of this section is that it confirms the results obtained in the generalized 
Leontief framework: minority (majority) relative wage is increasing the in relative 
number of majority (minority) workers in the local labor market. In other words, it 
corroborates the finding that minority-majority wage differential is increasing in the share 
of minority workers in production. It is difficult to compare the magnitudes of the present 
results with those of Sections 4.4 and 4.5, especially because the cross elasticities of 
substitution are not constant. One result is robust, however: a relatively large change in 
labor supplies corresponds to a relatively small change in wages.34 To conclude, the 
                                                 
33 The model was estimated also using the 1870 minority-majority population ratio as instrument, yielding 
the estimate of  equal to 0.109 with the z statistics of 7.9, implying the elasticity of substitution of 9.2. 
This result further supports that there is imperfect substitutability between minority and majority labor and 
suggest that the estimates of the elasticity of substitution of Table 4.11 are conservative. 
ijγ
34 Assuming that the minority-majority earnings differential is fully explained by minority percentage, 
computations show that according to the CES specification and the estimated elasticity coefficient of about 
0.04, minority-majority earnings differential is by about one quarter smaller in school districts with 
minority population 0.9 percent than in those with 19.9 percent of minority workers. This example suggest 
that the results of this section are comparable to those based on the Generalized Leontief production 
function, see the example at the end of section 4.4.     
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estimation of the CES model further supports the hypothesis that minority and majority 
labor is not perfectly substitutable. Furthermore, it suggests that the empirical evidence 
that it hurts to be a large minority in terms of relative earnings is, at least partly, a labor 




Using data from the US labor market, this empirical chapter sheds light on the 
substitutability of minority and majority labor. In particular, in the generalized Leontief 
framework, it is empirically established that minority and majority labor exhibit 
complementarity in production. This result suggests that the findings of the large body of 
empirical literature that observes a negative relationship between minority relative 
earnings and minority concentration is a labor market phenomenon. In particular, I argue 
that concentration of minority workers in the local labor market has a direct and causal 
negative effect on minority relative wage due to complementarity of minority and 
majority labor in production. That labor market competition between minority and 
majority workers generates a negative relationship between relative earnings of minority 
workers and their proportion in the local labor market is corroborated in the CES 
framework. 
 
Two issues should be noted concerning the results of this study. First, in the light of 
earlier studies it appears that the definition of social groups competing in the labor market 
may affect the result as concerns the estimates of the substitutability of labor. In 
particular, while this study suggests that minorities are complementary to the majority, 
other studies show that some subgroups of minority and majority populations, including 
immigrants, youths, or women, may be substitutes in production. Certainly, the particular 
partition of the labor force that one adopts is determined by the focus of the particular 
study. In any case, further research is necessary to elucidate the substitutability of labor 
of different subgroups of minority and majority people. Second, it is desirable to study 
the supply side of the labor market in a greater detail. Certainly, one would like to 
understand the factors that drive migration of minority and majority workers and thus 
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their supply across local labor markets, so that a richer account can be taken of the wage 
determination process.  
 
Based on the results of this study, it is apparent that the established labor market effects 
should be evaluated in the context of long-run rather than short-run migration. In 
particular, the estimated elasticities of complementarity (substitution) between minority 
and majority workers are relatively small and thus short-run migration should not be 
expected to affect minority-majority earnings inequality significantly. On the other hand, 
the study demonstrates that long-run migration patterns that generate substantial variation 









Two Faces of the ICT Revolution: 






Social interaction is the primary vehicle through which advancement of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) affects socio-economic outcomes. In the context of 
minority-majority relations, social distances and segregation determine the benefits 
individuals gain from social interaction and from improvement of its efficiency. In the 
general equilibrium framework, this chapter argues that ICT advancement 
disproportionately increases the efficiency of social interaction in ethnically integrated 
social networks and that of majority individuals, thereby causing desegregation and 
increasing interethnic earnings inequality at the same time. The argument thus explains 
the concurrence of two seemingly contradicting developments in the lives of Black and 
White Americans since the late 1970s – rising interethnic earnings inequality and 
desegregation of Blacks. Furthermore, I establish that there is a threshold level of ICT 
below which all minority individuals prefer segregated neighborhoods and above which 
some minority individuals choose to integrate, thereby reaping the efficiency benefits of 
social interaction with the larger society. I interpret the reversal of the segregation trend 
that occurred in the late 1970s as a consequence of advancement of ICT beyond this 
threshold level. Finally, I suggest an explanation of why typically no desegregation 
occurred in extraordinarily segregated areas and in the case of recent immigrants. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
Since the late 1970s Americans have been witnessing three major developments in their 
social and economic life. First, information and communication technologies (ICT), 
which is the umbrella term that denotes any information processing and communication 
technology, device, or application, have changed the life of the average American 
tremendously. What started as face-to-face communication in primeval ages and went 
through less and more advanced stages such as smoke and drum signals, the alphabet, 
print and reproduction technologies, and telephone, turned into a sweeping development 
during the last quarter of the 20th century. The new information and communication 
technologies that emerged and went mainstream during this so-called ICT revolution 
include advanced fax and telephony technologies, satellite communication, and computer 
and network hardware and software, such as word and table processors, e-mail, search 
engines, and Internet databases and encyclopedias. These technologies immensely 
improved technological efficiency of interpersonal communication and data processing 
and storing. In short, the ICT revolution enabled ordinary people to exchange information 
over large distances at relatively low and still decreasing costs. 
 
Another major development in the context of cohabitation of minority and majority1 
people in the U.S. was the reversal of segregation trends in the late seventies and 
desegregation of the Black minority thereafter.2 In particular, while the first three quarters 
of the 20th century can generally be characterized by increasing degree of segregation, the 
                                                 
1 Throughout this chapter, similarly as in the previous ones, minority is understood to be a particular racial, 
ethnic, language, or religious group of individuals who share socio-cultural characteristics such as culture, 
religion, language, history, beliefs, customs, values, and morals that make them distinct from the rest of the 
population – the majority. While there may be regions where the minority outnumbers the majority, that 
minorities constitute smaller proportion of population than majorities is a part of most definitions of the 
minority. This study does not deal with social groups formed on the basis of occupation, wealth, or other 
ordinal characteristics. 
2 As in the previous chapters, segregation is understood to be separation of people according to their social, 
ethnic, racial, religious, or other characteristics in social interaction. Some of the most visible forms of 
segregation are geographical segregation, as exhibited by e.g. racial segregation of neighborhoods, and 
social segregation, as found in segregated schools or workplaces. The segregation literature is immense, 
including DuBois (1899), Myrdal (1944), Taeuber and Taeuber (1965), Massey and Denton (1987, 1993), 
and Farley and Frey (1994).   
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last quarter witnessed a steady decline of segregation of the Black minority. 3 Massey and 
Denton (1987) observe some signs of desegregation of Blacks during the 1970s. Farley 
and Frey (1994) suggest that segregation between Blacks and Whites started to decline 
during the 1970s and find pervasive declines of segregation of Blacks during the 1980s. 
Cutler et al. (1999) provide evidence that segregation of Blacks in the US was increasing 
since the last decade of the 19th century until the Second World War, it consolidated and 
expanded between 1940 and 1970, and since the 1970s segregation has been steadily 
declining.4   
 
Finally, although the period after the 1970s has been characterized by desegregation, the 
socioeconomic gap between ethnic and racial groups has been widening. In particular, 
following a period of catching up during the 1960s, earnings gaps among racial and 
ethnic groups have been on the rise since the mid-1970s. While Black men reduced and 
Black women almost closed the earnings gap during the 1960s when certain 
antidiscriminatory laws were adopted,5 the relative earnings of Black men stagnated or 
somewhat deteriorated and the relative wages of Black women clearly declined since the 
1970s, as compared to their White counterparts. Such deterioration was even more 
pronounced for Hispanic men and women.6  
 
Several explanations of desegregation and increasing earnings inequality during the 
recent decades in the US have been suggested in the literature. Concerning desegregation, 
Schuman et al. (1985), Schuman and Bobo (1988), and Farley and Frey (1994) argue that 
the opposition of whites against minority neighbors has been on decline, resulting in a 
larger number of non-white settlers in “white” neighborhoods and desegregation, in turn.7 
Cutler et al. (1999) argue that it is the elimination of formal barriers to integration that 
                                                 
3 Two widely used measures of segregation are the indexes of dissimilarity and isolation. The former tells 
us what share of the minority (or majority) population would need to relocate for the races to be evenly 
distributed. The latter measures the exposure of minority to majority. See Taeuber and Taeuber (1965), 
Duncan and Duncan (1955), and Bell (1954). 
4 The evidence is less clear for the Hispanic and Asian minorities, largely due to sizeable recent 
immigration. See Massey and Denton (1987) and Frey and Farley (1996).  
5 See e.g. Heckman and Payner (1989), Donohue and Heckman (1991), and Neumark and Stock (2001). 
6 Altonji and Blank (1998), p. 3149.  
7 Several scholars, including Farley and Frey (1994), claim that actual levels of resistance against racially 
mixed living remain high, however. 
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brought about reversal of segregation trends in the 1970s and caused desegregation 
thereafter.  
 
In regard of the increasing earnings inequality during the last quarter of the 20th century, 
Juhn et al. (1991) argue that much of the increase can be explained by the general trend 
of increasing earnings inequality during this period and the placement of Black workers 
in the lower end of the earnings distribution. They also establish that part of the increase 
may be due to racial differences in unobservable school quality. Juhn et al. (1991) and 
Card and Lemieux (1996) find that changes in returns to skills had a strong negative 
effect on the Black-White earnings ratio in recent decades. Bound and Freeman (1992) 
argue that a large fraction of Black-White earnings gap increase can be explained by 
industrial shifts such as decline in durable manufacturing and regional shifts including 
changes in metropolitan location. In addition, they also argue that the increase in the 
supply of young Black college graduates and the resulting deterioration of their wages 
contributed to the overall increase in Black-White earnings inequality.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the concurrence of the three abovementioned 
phenomena is not coincidental and that there are fundamental causal relationships among 
them. In particular, I offer a novel explanation of the concurrence of desegregation and 
increasing earnings inequality, arguing that ICT advancement has two faces in the 
context of minority-majority social and economic interaction: it contributes to 
desegregation of minority individuals and drives a wedge between minority and majority 
earnings. Furthermore, I elucidate why no desegregation occurred in extraordinarily 
segregated areas and in the case of recent immigrants and offer an explanation why the 
reversal of the segregation trend occurred in the late 1970s.8 The arguments are based on 
the role of social interaction in human capital acquisition and the effects of ICT 
improvement on social interaction, which I discuss in the next section.  
 
                                                 
8 See Cutler et al. (1999) and Cutler et al. (2005). 
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5.2. The Social and Economic Environment 
 
Social interaction is the prime vehicle through which advancements of communication 
and information technologies, such as those pertaining to the ICT revolution, affect social 
organization and economic outcomes. A number of scholars, including Gaspar and 
Glaeser (1996), Lin (1999), Wellman et al. (1996, 2001), and Feldman (2002) argue that 
advancements of ICT significantly reduce the costs of exchanging and processing 
information and make it possible to exchange more complex information, thereby 
facilitating social interaction. Gaspar and Glaeser (1996) offer several pieces of evidence 
in support of the positive role of the telephone on social interaction. The positive effect of 
Internet use on social interaction is supported by empirical studies such as Uslaner 
(1999), Cole (2000), Hampton and Wellman (2000), and Robinson et al. (2000), who 
report that Internet users have higher levels of trust and larger social networks. 9 Based on 
this literature, I adopt the premise that ICT advancement significantly improves the 
efficiency of social networks and thereby increases the scope and intensity of social 
interaction.10  
 
While technological advancements due to the ICT revolution have facilitated social 
interaction, there are features of social organization that have constrained it. Segregation 
is a prime phenomenon of this kind in the context of minority-majority social interaction. 
It impedes and possibly precludes social interaction between individuals who are 
segregated and the rest of the society. Another phenomenon that hinders minority-
majority social interaction is social distance that encompasses socio-cultural differences 
between minority and majority individuals, as discussed by e.g. Poole (1927) and Lazear 
(1999). Difficulties to understand the language, habits, culture, and other characteristics 
                                                 
9 See also Kraut et al. (1998) and Nie and Erbring (2000), who report that the use of Internet may have 
detrimental effects on other forms of social interaction, especially for inexperienced and incompetent 
Internet users. 
10 As in the previous chapters, social network is understood to be a social structure between individual 
actors that facilitates social interaction among its members. 
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of the other social group reduce the efficiency of social interaction between socially 
distant minorities and majorities.11
 
That social interaction in social networks is an important vehicle of human capital 
acquisition was pointed out by e.g. Allen (1982), Lucas (1988), Ellison and Fudenberg 
(1993, 1995), and Bala and Goyal (1998).12 Conley and Udry (2002), Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995), and Munshi (2002) argue that social interaction facilitates learning, 
documenting that farmers learn about the best practices in social interaction with their 
peers and neighbors. A number of scholars, such as Glaeser et al. (2002), Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995), and Lazear (1999), maintain that social interaction in social 
networks typically involves positive externalities such that the aggregate resources of a 
network exceed the naïve sum of individual contributions. In line with this literature, I 
adopt the premise that social interaction is an important input in human capital 
acquisition that involves external network effects13 that positively depend on the size of 
social networks in which skills are acquired. 
 
There are several arguments that the character of environment in which human capital is 
acquired affects its type and, in particular, that segregated and integrated environments 
differ with respect to human capital that they support. First, ethnic exclusiveness of 
segregated social networks gives rise to skill specialization that reflect the purpose of 
segregated social networks, as compared to integrated social networks that prevail in 
integrated social networks. If, for example, an ethnic group develops segregated social 
networks to support their specialization in certain sectors of economy, such as ethnic 
restaurants or certain crafts,14 skills available in these social networks differ from those 
available in integrated social networks. Second, social interaction in segregated social 
                                                 
11 The main distinction between segregation and social distance is that while segregation is an endogenous 
feature of societal organization, social distance is the defining socio-cultural difference between minority 
and majority people. 
12 The literature on social embeddedness of human capital acquisition includes Rees and Schultz (1972), 
Loury (1977), Bourdieu (1986), and Coleman (1988, 1990). 
13 Network effects arise whenever benefits from a good or service, here the service of social network in 
skill acquisition process, increase in the number of individuals already owning that good or using that 
service. One consequence of a network effect is that the use of a network service by one individual 
indirectly benefits others who use it. This side effect in a transaction is known as network externality. 
14 Well documented is specialization of Gypsy communities in various crafts. See Fraser (1992). 
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networks is more prone to bear a specific cultural imprint than that in integrated social 
networks.15 Finally, to the extent that segregation prevents flow of ideas and innovations 
and their adoption, segregated social environment perpetuates and supports different 
skills than integrated one. Ethnic environment, in particular, has spillover effects on the 
human capital accumulation process and affects the type and quality of skills acquired.16 
Given these arguments, the type of human capital acquired in segregated social networks 
generally differs from that acquired in integrated social networks. Given this distinction, 
hereafter “segregated” and “integrated” specify notions, such as labor and wages, 
pertaining to the respective type of social network and its members. 
 
While segregation may result from external forces such as discrimination, in this chapter 
I study segregation as a function of the choice of minority people between segregated and 
integrated social networks. In particular, I focus on the role of an economic factor – 
earnings under segregation and integration – on individual decision to segregate 
(integrate). Given the premises developed above it follows that individual choice between 
segregated and integrated social networks involves two major aspects. First, it entails the 
wage tradeoff, since the choice between segregation and integration involves choosing 
between the two different types of human capital to acquire and thus between different 
wages per efficiency unit of labor supplied. Second, it involves the efficiency tradeoff, as 
the composition of members of a segregated social network is different from that of an 
integrated social network and thus, due to social distances and network effects, for any 
given agent the efficiencies of skill acquisition differ between segregated and integrated 
social networks. 
 
Corresponding to the wage and efficiency tradeoffs, two mechanisms govern the degree 
of segregation in the economy on the aggregate level. First, as the share of minority 
people who choose segregation increases, so does the relative supply of segregated labor. 
This increase has a negative effect on the relative wage for segregated labor through the 
textbook substitution mechanism. Second, through the efficiency mechanism, a larger 
                                                 
15 See Hofstede (1980), Sowell (1994), and Kraus and Hodge (1990). 
16 See Borjas (1994). 
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number of people in segregated social networks generate larger network effects in these 
networks. In particular, it improves their relative efficiency vis-à-vis integrated social 
networks, which suffer a decrease in their size and thus network effects. Under certain 
conditions, the substitution and efficiency effects give rise to an equilibrium degree of 
segregation in which for no integrated individual switching to segregation and no 
segregated individual switching to integration pays off, as segregated and integrated 
earnings are equal.  
 
The main proposition of this chapter is that advancement of information and 
communication technologies, such as that pertaining to the ICT revolution, stimulates 
desegregation of minority individuals and increases minority-majority earnings 
inequality. The reason why ICT advancement causes desegregation is that it intensifies 
social interaction and thus increases the weight of the efficiency aspect, which favors 
desegregation, in the abovementioned tradeoff. On the other hand, ICT improvement 
favors the majority, as their efficiency gains from the intensified social interaction are 
larger than those of minority individuals, whose small relative size and social distance to 
the relatively large number of majority individuals significantly constrain their benefits 
from the ICT-driven efficiency enhancement. 
 
The argument proceeds as follows. In the next section I develop a general equilibrium 
model and depict the equilibrium degree of segregation therein. In Section 3 I study the 
effects of the ICT revolution on equilibrium segregation and interethnic earnings 
inequality. In Section 4 I offer an explanation why the reversal of segregation trends 
coincided with the onset of the ICT revolution. Thereafter I summarize and discuss the 
model and conclude. 
 
5.3. The Model 
5.3.1. Demand 
To investigate the effects of the ICT revolution on minority-majority segregation and 
earnings inequality I study an economy populated by the continua of minority and 
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majority individuals with measures I and J and elements i and j, respectively. The size of 
the economy is conveniently normalized to unity such that 1=+ JI . All individuals are 
identical with respect to their preferences and endowments, group membership excepting. 
Individual preferences are represented by a standard utility function  defined on the 
domain of individual consumption of the consumption good, C
)(⋅u
k, where kœ{i, j}. Let  
denote the mass of minority individuals that choose segregation and (alone) constitute 
segregated social networks and  the mass of those that choose integration and interact 
with majority individuals in integrated social networks. Thus, 
segI
intI
III intseg =+ . 
 
Let the consumption good be produced by combining labor inputs of segregated and 
integrated minority agents,  and , respectively, and majority agents, , in a 
perfectly competitive industry according to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
aggregate production function  
seg,iH int,iH jH
( ) ( )( ) )/(/)(J jI int,i/)(I seg,i djHdiHdiHC intseg 110010 −−− ∫+∫+∫= ρρρρρρ   (5.1) 
with the elasticity parameter ρ > 1. As argued above, labor supplied by segregated 
minority individuals is an imperfect substitute for labor supplied by majority and 
integrated minority individuals. For expositional convenience, labor of integrated 
minority individuals is assumed to be perfectly substitutable with that of majority 
individuals.  
 
Applying the representative agent hypothesis group-wise and, given the infinitesimal 
measure of an individual, taking all prices as given on the individual level, production 
function (5.1) implies that individuals face the following demands for their labor: 
segsegCseg,i I/CWPH
ρρ −=        (5.2a)  
CWPHIJH intCint,iintj
ρρ −=+ ,       (5.2b) 
where PC is the price of composite consumption good C and segW  and  are the wages intW
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per efficiency unit of labor of segregated and integrated individuals, respectively.17 As a 
result of the homogeneity of degree one of the CES production function, the sector does 
not generate any profits in the equilibrium and one can derive that 
. ( ) )/(intsegC WWP ρρρ −−− += 1111
 
5.3.2. Supply 
On the supply side, taking the actions of other agents and wages as given, individuals aim 
to maximize their earnings by maximizing the amount of efficient labor they supply on 
the labor market. In particular, each individual is endowed with one unit of labor time 
that is, adopting a simplifying assumption, inelastically supplied on the labor market. 
However, individuals increase the efficiency of their labor by acquiring human capital in 
social interaction. The labor that they supply in the labor market measured in efficiency 
units, efficient labor, is then conceptualized to be the product of labor time and human 
capital.  
 
Minority individuals choose between segregated and integrated social networks to 
acquire human capital, while all majority individuals are, by assumption, members of 
integrated social networks.18 As discussed above, individuals benefit from social 
interaction with other individuals and these benefits increase in the number of people 
with whom the particular individual interacts. Furthermore, benefits from social 
interaction are constrained by segregation and social distance. By assumption, segregated 
minority individuals do not interact with integrated individuals and vice versa. 19 To 
capture these assumptions in social interaction, it is assumed that human capital is 
acquired and thus efficient labor20 is supplied as follows:  
                                                 
17 Note here that is the wage of integrated minority as well as majority, whose efficient labors are by 
assumption perfectly substitutable and thus earn the same unit wage. 
segW
18 In effect, two sets of social networks exist in the economy: segregated ones that involve exclusively 
minority people who choose to segregate and integrated ones where all majority people and those minority 
people that chose to integrate interact. 
19 This extreme assumption of zero social interaction between integrated and segregated social groups 
serves the purpose of exposition and has no bearing on the main results of this chapter.  
20 Because the endowed unit of time is inelastically supplied and efficient labor is the product of labor time 
and human capital, efficient labor is analytically equal to human capital.  
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11 ,       (5.3c) 
where the parameter 0≥δ  captures social distance between minority and majority 
individuals. In particular, benefits from social interaction with socially distant individuals 
are discounted by the social distance factor ( )δ+11 . Because 0≥δ , this factor ranges 
between zero and one. That marginal benefits from social interaction are nonincreasing in 
the number of interacting people is captured by the parameter γ , where 10 ≤< γ . 
Reasonably, if no social interaction takes place, individual efficient labor is equal to the 
endowed unit of labor time. 
 
Having delineated fundamental relationships of the economy, I now turn to solving for 
earnings of segregated and integrated minority individuals and majority individuals, 
which determine incentives for switching between segregation and integration. 
Normalizing  and using equations (5.2a-b) and (5.3a-c), we solve for wages for 
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where C is defined in equation (5.5).  
 
5.3.3. Equilibrium Segregation 
Having formulated the earnings functions of segregated and integrated minority 
individuals, I am now equipped to study distribution of minority individuals across the 
two types of social networks and, in particular, the equilibrium degree of segregation in 
the economy. Recalling that each individual takes the decisions of other agents as given, 
minority individuals compare earnings under segregation seg,iΩ  and under integration 
 when deciding what kind of social network to join. Because the costs of switching 
between social networks are not central to the argument, I assume that switching is 
frictionless.
int,iΩ
21 Under these conditions, segregation equilibrium is characterized by the 
following equilibrium conditions: 
IIif segint,iseg,i =Ω≥Ω        (5.7a) 
0=Ω≤Ω segint,iseg,i Iif        (5.7b) 
IIif segint,iseg,i <<Ω=Ω 0 .       (5.7c) 
The first two conditions apply to corner equilibria of full segregation (5.7a) and full 
integration (5.7b) and say that if all minority individuals choose to segregate (integrate), 
earnings under segregation (integration) must be at least as high as those under 
integration (segregation) for each and every minority individual. The last condition 
                                                 
21 Switching costs can easily be incorporated into the model; this would yield no further insight with 
respect to the main argument, however. 
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applies to the case in which some minority segregate and some integrate. Clearly, in such 
case the economy is in equilibrium if and only if switching does not pay off, that is, if 
earnings of segregated minority individuals are equal to those of integrated individuals. 
This is exactly what condition (5.7c) says. Defining ( ) int,iseg,isegI ΩΩ≡ω  and noting that 
, condition (5.7c) is equivalent to 0>Ωint ( ) 1=segIω . Upon substitution and 




























































Because  is the only endogenous variable in the arbitrage condition (AC), it fully 
determines the equilibrium value of , , and thus the equilibrium share of minority 






 To depict what kind of interior segregation equilibria can occur in this model, I 
investigate the properties of ( )segIω  as a function of . Denoting the ratio of human 
capitals of segregated and integrated minority individuals 
segI
( ) int,iseg,iseg HHIh ≡  and the 
ratio of segregated and integrated wages ( ) intsegseg WWIw ≡ , the function 
( ) ( ) ( )segsegseg IwIhI =ω  is governed by the properties of ( )segIw  and ( )segIh , which are 
driven by efficiency and substitution mechanisms, respectively.  
 
In particular, through the efficiency mechanism, ( )segIh  increases in the number of 


















      (5.8) 
that one obtains by plugging (5.3a) and (5.3b) in the definition of ( )segIh  above.  
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It has to be realized, however, that the efficiency mechanism does not necessarily favor 
integration. In particular, comparing the human capital acquisition technologies (5.3a) 
and (5.3b), let us state the integration efficiency condition (IEC) under which the 
efficiency of social interaction of minority individuals is higher in integrated social 
networks than in segregated ones, that is, int,iseg,i HH < :  
( ) ( )( ) γγγδ JIII segseg <−−+1 .       (IEC) 
This condition holds whenever the number of integrated individuals is sufficiently larger 
than the number of segregated ones and social distance is not too large, such that for 
minority individuals the network benefits generated in integrated social networks are 
higher than those in segregated social networks and integration involves relatively little 
inefficiency caused by social distance. While this condition depends on the actual degree 
of segregation , it holds for any  whenever segI segI ( ) 1−< γδ IJ . Furthermore, condition 
(IEC) is more likely to hold if the degree of segregation is relatively small. More 
specifically, it can easily be seen that there always exists  that satisfies condition 
(IEC) and, in particular, any 
segI
2IIseg <  does so. 
 
Concerning the substitution mechanism, ( )segIw  decreases in the number of segregated 
minority people, that is, ( ) 0<∂∂ segseg IIw . This is so because segregating minority 
individuals increase the supply of segregated human capital and decrease the supply of 
integrated human capital through two mechanisms. First, the direct effect of increasing 
segregation on numbers of suppliers of segregated and integrated labor is obvious. 
Second, there is an indirect effect through which segregation increases per capita supply 
of human capital of segregated individuals at the expense of integrated individuals 
through the efficiency mechanism. Given the imperfect elasticity of substitution of 
segregated and integrated human capitals in production, these supply changes depress 
segregated wage relative to integrated wage. This readily follows from  
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that is obtained by plugging (5.3a-c) and (5.4a-b) in the definition of ( )segIw . In 
particular, note that the nominator is decreasing and denominator increasing in . segI
 
Therefore, the efficiency and substitution mechanisms work in the opposite directions. It 
turns out that the elasticity of substitution between segregated and integrated human 
capitals ρ  is the key parameter that governs ( )segIω . In particular, while the efficiency 
mechanism is unaffected by ρ , as apparent form equation (5.8), the strength of the 
substitution mechanism is decreasing in this elasticity and is not present in the extreme 
case of perfect substitutability of segregated and integrated labor. This is evident from 
equation (5.9), where ρ  appears in the denominator of the exponent. It follows that ρ  
determines the relative strength of these two mechanisms and thus the properties of 
( )segIω .  
 
Figure 5.1 depicts stylized functions ( )segIw  and ( )segIh , reflecting their properties 
discussed above. The product of these two functions, relative earnings ( )segIω , is also 
depicted in the figure. The position of the ( )segIω  curve with respect to the 1=ω  line is 
crucial for the existence of equilibria, since in any interior equilibrium ( ) 1=esegIω . The 
slope of ( )segIω  determines the stability of interior equilibria. In particular, negative slope 
of ( )segIω  in the neighborhood of an interior equilibrium is necessary for its stability, 
since in such case any deviation from this equilibrium leads to switching of individuals 
that restores it. This is apparent from the figure, where arrows indicate the response of 
 in disequilibrium states. For example, given that segI ( )segIω  is decreasing in  and segI
( ) 1=esegIω  due to the arbitrage condition, if the deviation within such neighborhood is 
   Social Interaction and the Labor Market: Essays on Earnings Inequality, Labor Substitutability, and Segregation 114
such that , then earnings of integrated minority become larger than those of 
segregated minority, that is, 
e
segseg II >
( ) 1<segIω . If this is the case, however, minority individuals 
switch to integrated social networks, thereby increasing ( )segIω , until the initial 
equilibrium is restored. Similar argument explains stability for a deviation below . 
Given these properties of the earnings functions, I now establish the existence of a stable 

























 Proposition 1 
There always exists some finite 0>ρ  such that for any finite ρρ >  there exists 
a stable interior equilibrium ( )I,I eseg 0∈ . Any interior equilibrium satisfies 
condition (IEC). 
Proof in the Appendix. 
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In particular, no stable interior equilibrium may exist if segregated and integrated labors 
are perfect substitutes. The reason is that in such case  and thus intseg WW =
( ) ( )segseg IhI =ω , which is, as discussed above, monotonically increasing in . As a 
result, in any interior equilibrium, which must satisfy 
segI
( ) 1=segIω , any disturbance such 
that  ( ) drives esegseg II >
e
segseg II < ( )segIω  above (below) one, generating incentives for 
minority individuals to switch to segregation (integration). Due to monotonicity of 
( )segIω , a new equilibrium arises only after all minority individuals have switched to 
segregation (integration). On the other hand, if ρ  is very small, the substitution effect 
overrides the efficiency effect and segregation is the preferred choice for all minority 
individuals. In effect, ρ  has to be finite such that the substitution effect is operative but 
sufficiently large such that it is not excessively strong. That all interior equilibria must 
comply with the (IEC) condition is obvious from the fact that for  and a finite ( I,I eseg 0∈ )
ρ  it holds that ( ) 1>segIw .22 Because in any equilibrium ( ) 1=esegIω , it must be that 




There always exists some finite 0ˆ >ρ  such that for any finite ρρ ˆ<  it holds that 
 is a stable equilibrium. Full segregation is also a stable equilibrium 
whenever condition (IEC) does not hold for 
II seg =
II seg = , that is, ( ) 1−> γδ IJ . Full 
integration is never an equilibrium, formally, . 0>esegI
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
The results stated in Proposition 2 are intuitive. If ρ  is sufficiently small, segregated 
labor is not easily substitutable in production and thus, given the smaller number of 
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minority people, minority individuals receive relatively high wage, which drives them all 
to segregate. Next, if (IEC) does not hold, the efficiency of social interaction of minority 
individuals is lower in integrated social networks than in segregated ones, 
( ) 1>
=IIseg seg
Ih , and, because , under full segregation it also holds that IJ >
( ) 1>
=IIseg seg
Iw , it must be that ( ) 1>
=IIseg seg
Iω . That full integration is never an 
equilibrium follows from the very large incentives to segregate, and thus supply a very 
scarce type of labor, whenever the number of segregated individuals and thus the degree 
of segregation are very low. 
 





























To fix the ideas, if the elasticity of substitution between segregated and integrated human 
capitals is large enough, at least one stable interior equilibrium exists in the economy. If 
this elasticity is small enough or condition (IEC) does not hold under full segregation, 
there exists a stable equilibrium of full segregation. On the other hand, complete 
desegregation is never an equilibrium in this model. An interesting question is whether 
there can be multiple segregation equilibria in the economy. The answer is yes. 
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According to Proposition 1 there always exists an interior equilibrium for ρ  sufficiently 
large. But if condition (IEC) does not hold for II seg =  such that ( ) 1−> γδ IJ , then it is 
easy to see that ( ) 1>
=IIseg seg
Iω  for any ρ  and a full segregation equilibrium exists as 
well. Figure 5.2 illustrates these equilibria. 
 
5.4. The ICT Revolution 
5.4.1.  The Level of ICT and its Role in the Model  
Let us now turn to the effects of the ICT revolution on the economy. As mentioned 
above, advancement of information and communication technologies improves the 
efficiency of exchanging and processing information. I conceptualize the level of ICT as 
the likelihood χ , 10 ≤< χ , that ICT permits social interaction between two randomly 
chosen individuals who are not separated by segregation. Thus, this probability is a 
measure of the level of ICT. From the point of view of an individual it is exogenous. 
Advancement of ICT is operationalized as an increase in χ .23  It follows that, applying 
the law of large numbers and noting in (5.3a-c) that any chance to socially interact is 
valuable and thus taken, a segregated minority individual socially interacts with χsegI  
minority individuals who have chosen to segregate. Similarly, an integrated individual 
socially interacts with χintI  integrated minority individuals and χJ  majority 
individuals.24 Parameter χ  is accordingly built into equations (5.3a-c), which yields the 
following modifications of the arbitrage condition (AC):  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
( )



































































                                                 
23 It is assumed that ICT technologies symmetrically affect segregated and integrated social networks. This 
assumption serves the sake of exposition and has no influence on the main argument. 
24 One can now interpret ( )( )γδ
1
11 +  as the probability that two individuals with social distance δ  can 
socially interact. For the same reasons as in the case of χ , a majority individual interacts with 
( )( ) intIγδ
1
11 +  minority individuals and an integrated minority individual interacts with ( )( ) Jγδ
1
11 +  
majority individuals. Note that in Section 5.3 it is implicitly assumed that 1=χ .  
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It is worthwhile to note that introduction of χ  into the model does not alter the 
integration efficiency condition (IEC). The reason is that χ  affects segregated and 
integrated social networks symmetrically. 
 
5.4.1.1. Desegregation 








For any χ , 10 ≤< χ , and any given  such that condition (IEC) holds, there 
always exists some finite 
segI
0>ρ~  such that for any finite ρρ ~>  it holds that 
( ) 0, <∂∂ χχω segI . If condition (IEC) does not hold at a given , segI
( ) 0≥∂∂ χχω ,I seg . 
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3 states that if condition (IEC) holds and segregated and integrated efficient 
labors are good but imperfect substitutes, improvement in the level of ICT leads to a 
decrease of the ratio of segregated and integrated earnings and therefore generates 
incentives to desegregate. In particular, if for minority individuals integrated social 
networks are more efficient than segregated ones, that is, if condition (IEC) holds, ICT 
advancement increases the efficiency of integrated social networks more than that of 
segregated ones. A large enough elasticity of substitution ρ  secures that the resulting 
ICT-driven increase of individual supply of segregated relative to integrated labor is not 
reversed by the negative effect of this increase on the relative price of segregated labor at 
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Corollary 1a 
For any stable interior equilibrium  there always exists a finite esegI ρ
~  such that for 
any finite ρρ ~>  an increase in χ  instigates desegregation such that the 
equilibrium level of segregation  decreases.  esegI
Corollary 1b 





ω  and  









below one.  
Corollary 1c 
Whenever condition (IEC) is not satisfied it holds that ( ) 0, >∂∂ χχω segI  and 
therefore the degree of segregation remains unchanged in any corner equilibrium 
of full segregation. 
 
These corollaries describe the effects of ICT improvement on the degree of segregation in 
the economy. In particular, whenever the economy starts in an interior equilibrium and 
Black and White efficient labors are relatively well substitutable, ICT improvement 
brings about desegregation. If the economy starts in a corner equilibrium of full 
segregation, however, the (IEC) condition is not necessarily satisfied and thus ICT 
improvement may increase earnings in segregated as compared to integrated social 
networks, thereby perpetuating full segregation. Moreover, even if the (IEC) condition is 
satisfied in the corner equilibrium, ICT improvement instigates desegregation only with a 
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delay, as it first needs to close the gap between segregated and integrated earnings.25 As 
soon as this occurs, however, desegregation is extensive. 
 
Figure 5.3 illuminates the effects of ICT on the segregation equilibria. From the initial 
state A, an increase in χ  shifts the ( )segIω  curve down to B. Such shift causes 
desegregation to , if the economy starts in an interior equilibrium . If full 






shifts the ( )segIω  curve down to C and the interior equilibrium shifts from  to . 





( )segIω  schedule is so large as to 
cause desegregation from the full segregation equilibrium to the interior equilibrium .  CsegI
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Corollary 1b (i) 
 
 C: Extensive 
desegregation 





                                                 
25 Earnings gap ( ) 1>
=IIseg seg
Iω  is a sufficient condition for a stable equilibrium of full segregation. If 
( ) 0int <∂∂ =IIsegseg segIWW  and the condition (IE) holds, then  is a stable corner equilibrium even 




Iω . In such knife-edge case, ICT improvement instigates 
immediate desegregation from .  IIseg =
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The next proposition states further results of the effects of χ  on the economy: 
 
Proposition 4 
Whenever 0=χ , the only stable equilibrium is that of full segregation, . 
Whenever (IEC) holds, there always exists a finite 
II eseg =
0>ρ)  and ( 10,ˆ )∈χ  such that for 
any ρρ )> : 
(i) For any χχ ˆ<  full segregation is a stable equilibrium, 
(ii) For any χχ ˆ>  full segregation is not a stable equilibrium and there exists 
a stable interior segregation equilibrium, ( )10,I eseg ∈ . 
Proof in the Appendix. 
 
      Figure 5.4: The effects of χ  on the existence of interior and corner equilibria. 
 























Figure 5.4 depicts stylized patterns of ( )segIω  as determined by the level of ICT χ  and 
elucidates the results depicted in Proposition 4. If 0=χ , the only mechanism that drives 
the choice between segregation and integration is the choice between segregated and 
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integrated wages. Because minority is smaller than majority, segregated wage is higher 
than integrated, and the more so the fewer minority individuals segregate. Therefore, the 
curve A for 0=χ  is downward sloping and always above the line 1=ω . Clearly, the 
only equilibrium is that of full segregation.  Full segregation remains a stable equilibrium 
until χ  reaches χ̂ . After this point, for ( )1,χ̂χ ∈  depicted by curve B, full segregation is 
not an equilibrium and the economy desegregates towards an interior equilibrium . esegI
 
Proposition 4 thus offers an answer why the segregation of the period before the 1970s 
has been replaced by desegregation thereafter. If the level of ICT is relatively low, the 
efficiency benefits of integration are minor compared to the wage advantage minority 
individuals incur if they segregate. As soon as the threshold level of ICT χ̂  is attained, 
however, the efficiency benefits of integration outweigh this wage advantage and thereby 
trigger desegregation, which continues until equilibrium between the efficiency benefits 
of integration and the wage advantage of segregation is restored. 
 
5.4.1.2. Inter-Ethnic Earnings Inequality  
Besides affecting equilibrium degree of segregation in the economy, improvements in 
ICT affect interethnic earnings inequality as well. Primarily, they affect the relative 
efficiency of segregated and integrated social networks. Next, the resulting changes in 
supplies of efficient labors affect relative wages of segregated and integrated labors. 
Finally, given the changes in earnings, switching between segregated and integrated 
social networks occurs and further affects the efficiencies of human capital acquisition 
and wages. Assuming that wages respond relatively quickly, I denote the first two 
responses the short run effect and the response that involves switching between 
segregation and integration the long run effect. Propositions 5a and 5b state short run 
results:  
 
 Proposition 5a 
For any finite ρ  and a given [ ]I,I seg 0∈ , an increase in χ  leads to a larger 
increase in the earnings of majority individuals than integrated minority 
Two Faces of the ICT Revolution: Desegregation and Minority-Majority Earnings Inequality   123
individuals. That is, 
segseg I
int,iIj
χχ ∂Ω∂>∂Ω∂ .  
Proposition 5b 
For any interior equilibrium, there always exists some finite 0>ρ~  such that for 
any finite ρρ ~>  and any given [ ]I,I seg 0∈  an increase in χ  increases the 
earnings of majority individuals more than those of segregated minority 
individuals, that is, 
segseg I
seg,iIj
χχ ∂Ω∂>∂Ω∂ . 
Proofs in Appendix. 
 
From Proposition 5a we see that the ICT revolution increases earnings inequality between 
integrated minority and majority individuals in the short run. The reason is that the 
relatively small number of integrated minority individuals, as compared to the number of 
majority individuals, and the social distance between minority and majority individuals 
constrain the network benefits for integrated minority individuals. Because integrated 
minority and majority individuals earn the same wage, this efficiency effect fully 
determines the effects of ICT improvement on minority-majority inequality in integrated 
social networks. As depicted in Proposition 5b, earnings gap between segregated 
minority individuals and majority individuals increases as well, if the substitutability of 
segregated and integrated efficient labors is sufficiently high. Under that condition, the 
substitution mechanism does not offset the efficiency mechanism through which ICT 
improvement works in favor of majority individuals, similarly as in Proposition 3. 
Condition (IEC) is not necessary for these results, because minority is always less 
efficient than majority in human capital acquisition.  
 
Can, however, desegregation and increasing interethnic inequality coexist in the long run, 
after desegregation takes place and a new segregation equilibrium arises? Clearly, 
desegregation reduces the earnings gap between integrated minority individuals and 
majority individuals, as it improves the relative efficiency of the former in human capital 
acquisition.26 Because desegregation continues until earnings of segregated and 
                                                 
26 This follows straightforwardly from comparison of technologies (5.3b) and (5.3c). 
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integrated minority are equalized, desegregation reduces the earnings gap between 
segregated minority and majority as well. In effect, desegregation works against the 
aggravating effects of the ICT improvement on interethnic earnings inequality. The 
following proposition states that for sufficiently large IJ , the direct effect of ICT 




For any interior equilibrium, there always exists some 0>y  such that for all 
yIJ >  and  an improvement in the level of ICT ( ]10,I seg ∈ χ  causes 
desegregation and increases interethnic earnings inequality in the long run, that is, 
χχ ∂Ω∂>∂Ω∂ seg,ij  and χχ ∂Ω∂>∂Ω∂ int,ij .  
Proof in the Appendix.  
 
Thus, if the number of majority individuals is sufficiently larger than the number of 
minority individuals, ICT improvement increases the relative efficiency of majority 
individuals in skill acquisition so strongly that ICT-driven desegregation does not reverse 
the tendency of ICT improvement to increase minority-majority earnings inequality.27  
 
To summarize this section, in any interior equilibrium ICT improvement in the short run 
generates incentives to desegregate and increases interethnic earnings inequality. In the 
long run, minority people desegregate and thereby attenuate earnings inequality. If 
majority is sufficiently larger than minority, however, the direct effect of ICT 
improvement on inequality outweighs the indirect long-run effect and desegregation and 
increasing earnings inequality both occur in the long run.   
 
                                                 













JII  or 
. 0=intI
χχ∂
∂ intint II  can be interpreted as the elasticity of desegregation with respect to ICT advancement. 
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5.5. Discussion 
5.5.1.  Segregation and Earnings Inequality 
In this chapter I highlight the role of advancement of information and communication 
technologies, such as that pertaining to the ICT revolution, in shaping the incentives of 
minority people to desegregate and in determining interethnic earnings inequality. I argue 
that the ICT revolution under some conditions increases the incentives of minority to 
switch to integrated social networks by improving the efficiency of skill acquisition in 
these social networks relative to segregated ones. These conditions are the more likely to 
be satisfied the smaller the social distance, the larger the majority as compared to the 
minority, and/or the smaller the degree of segregation. If the economy is in an interior 
equilibrium where some minority people integrate and some segregate and if efficient 
labors of integrated and segregated people are relatively good substitutes, people react to 
these changed incentives by switching to integrated social networks, that is, 
desegregating. Desegregation continues until a new segregation equilibrium is restored 
through the substitution mechanism that depresses the relative wage of integrated 
individuals until earnings of segregated and integrated minority are equalized.  
 
In the case of complete segregation, however, minority individuals remain segregated 
even if ICT improvement enhances the efficiency of skill acquisition in integrated social 
networks relative to segregated ones until the advancement of ICT technologies is large 
enough to wipe out the initial efficiency advantage of living in segregated social 
networks. This finding is particularly interesting from the perspective of the findings of 
Cutler et al. (1999) that in regions with extraordinarily high degrees of segregation 
desegregation was limited.  
 
ICT improvement increases earnings inequality between integrated minority individuals 
and majority individuals. The reason is that the efficiency effect favors majority 
individuals, who are less hurt by social distance as they interact with a relatively small 
number of socially distant integrated minority individuals. In contrast, integrated minority 
individuals interact with a relatively large number of socially distant majority individuals. 
Similarly, ICT advancement favors majority individuals relative to segregated minority 
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individuals, whose social networks are limited in size. Earnings gap widens whenever 
labors of segregated and integrated individuals are relatively good substitutes, such that 
an increase in efficiency is not offset by the substitution mechanism that depresses the 
wage of integrated individuals. In the long run, desegregation works to attenuate the first 
order effects of ICT advancement on earnings inequality depicted above. Whenever the 
efficiency advantage of the majority is large enough, however, desegregation does not 
reverse the main mechanisms through which ICT advancement facilitates desegregation 
of minority individuals and increases minority-majority earnings inequality. 
 
5.5.2. The Reversal of the 1970s 
Based on the aforementioned arguments one can explain the history of segregation and 
Black-White earnings inequality over the last quarter of the 20th Century in the United 
States and the concurrence of desegregation and increasing interethnic inequality in 
particular. Proposition 4 sheds some light on the earlier periods of the 20th Century 
characterized by increasing segregation of the Black minority and offers an answer to the 
question what caused the segregation reversal in the 1970s. In particular, I argue that 
because information and communication technologies were embryonic in the early 
decades of the 20th century, minority individuals had no incentives to integrate for two 
reasons. First, upon integration they would be hurt by the increased competition of the 
larger number of majority individuals on the labor market through the substitution 
mechanism. Second, the social distance between them and the majority would 
disadvantage them in integrated social networks in terms of efficiency of skill 
acquisition. Any migration in that period, driven by these incentives to segregate, 
increased the aggregate level of segregation.  
 
The gradual advancement of ICT technologies and in particular their massive 
development since the 1970s, however, offers an explanation of the segregation reversal 
that occurred at the same time. The rapid increase of the use of communication over the 
telephone since the 1970s and especially the revolutionary development of the personal 
computer since the 1980s and mobile telephony and the Internet since the late 1980s, I 
argue, significantly increased the efficiency of social interaction in larger integrated 
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social networks, as compared to typically smaller segregated social networks. This 
improvement surpassed the threshold level of ICT below which segregation is superior to 
integration for minority individuals and stimulated the Black minority to increase their 
investment in integrated social networks to reap the benefits of the ICT advancement.  
 
5.5.3. The Left-Behinds 
While ICT advancement fosters desegregation, certain factors may inhibit or preclude 
ICT-driven desegregation. First, ICT advancement may not be enough to trigger 
desegregation in extraordinarily segregated social networks or neighborhoods. The reason 
is that there the ICT advancement may be insufficient to tip the efficiency tradeoff in 
favor of integration for an extended period of time, until certain threshold level of ICT is 
achieved (Proposition 4). Furthermore, ICT-advancement does not favor interaction in 
integrated social networks whenever social distance between minority and majority 
individuals is relatively large such that condition (IEC) does not hold, since then the 
minority does not benefit from interaction with majority individuals in integrated social 
networks. This may explain the high levels of segregation of recent immigrants, who are 
typically socially more distant to the majority individuals than incumbent minority 
individuals. 28
 
5.5.4. Social Interaction and the Neighborhood 
Given the dramatic development of ICT that annihilates geographical distances as 
concerns exchange of information, a valid question is whether advancement of ICT 
eventually makes the neighborhood obsolete. Indeed, there are scholars that suggest that 
advancement of ICT renders the location of an individual in geographical space 
immaterial.29  In this vein, Nie and Erbring (2000) argue that newer technologies of social 
interaction such as the Internet replace older ones, including face-to-face social 
interaction, which is by and large locally embedded. 
 
                                                 
28 See Cutler et al. (2005) 
29 See e.g. Toffler (1980), Naisbitt (1995), and Negroponte (1995). 
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In contrast, other scholars, including Gaspar and Glaeser (1996), Robinson et al. (2000), 
Hampton and Wellman (2000), and Katz et al. (2001), argue that newer and older 
technologies of social interaction are complementary. Gaspar and Glaeser (1996) provide 
a theoretical explanation how ICT advancement gives rise to more social interaction 
facilitated by both new and old technologies through lowering costs of creating and 
maintaining a relationship, offering several pieces of evidence to support their theory. 
Robinson et al. (2000) and Hampton and Wellman (2000) evidence that Internet users are 
no less active in using media or socializing offline than nonusers. Hampton and Wellman 
also find that Internet users are acquainted with three times as many of their neighbors 
than nonusers. Katz et al. (2001) report that Internet users visit friends more often and 
telephone them more frequently.  
 
Based on this evidence it can be argued that newer and older ICT technologies are 
complements in social interaction and that advancement of ICT does not make the 
neighborhood and face-to-face social interaction therein obsolete. In fact, the 
abovementioned evidence suggests that the importance of the neighborhood increases 
hand in hand with ICT advancement. Given this complementarity, ICT advancement does 
not break the link between social interaction and individual location. In particular, ICT 
advancement not only generates the patterns of (de-)segregation between integrated and 
segregated social networks discussed in previous sections, but these patterns are reflected 
in (de-)segregation between segregated and integrated neighborhoods, as evidenced by 




This chapter provides an account of the role of the ICT revolution in the history of 
desegregation and increasing interethnic earnings inequality in the 20th Century in the 
United States. It explains why ICT contributes to desegregation and how it fuels earnings 
inequality. It offers an answer why segregation reversal occurred after the 1970s, why 
extraordinarily segregated neighborhoods remained so, and why recent immigrants 
experienced high levels of segregation throughout the period. The importance of social 
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interaction in human capital acquisition, social distances, and relative group sizes on 
these developments are highlighted.  
 
Further theoretical studies should focus on the determination of the level of ICT and 
formalize the ICT revolution as an outcome of human effort. It would also be interesting 
to study the direction of ICT innovation in the multiethnic world where information and 
communication technologies are specific to ethnic groups. Finally, from the empirical 
perspective, we need further accounts of desegregation and interethnic earnings 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Let us first state and prove two lemmas: 
 
Lemma 1 
There exists some 0>ρ  such that for any ρρ >  it holds that ( ) 1<segIω  for some 
.  ( )II seg ,0∈
 
Proof: We know that there always exists ( )I,I seg 0∈  that satisfies condition (IEC), that 

















































 and recalling that , it 
is straightforward to see that 
segint II −= 1
( ) 0int <∂∂ ρWWseg  and ( ) 1int =∞→ WWLim segρ  for any given 
. Thus, 0>segI intWWseg  can be arbitrarily close to one for large enough ρ  and is closer 
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 and all ( I,I seg 0∈ ) ρρ > . This proves Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 2 
Denote  such  where 1segI ( II seg ,0∈ ) ( ) 11 <segIω . For any finite 0>ρ  there exists 
 such that 1segseg II < ( ) 1>segIω . 
 




 and ( ) 0int <∂∂ segseg IWW  for any ( )II seg ,0∈ . It follows that 




segseg II < int,iseg,i HH  is obviously positive (and finite) for any , this 
implies that 
[ II seg ,0∈ ]
( )segIω  is larger than 1 for some [ ]II seg ,0∈  and for some  in 
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Now, since ( )segIω  is continuous in  for any segI ( )II seg ,0∈  and continuous from the 
right at , Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that there exists some 0=segI 0>ρ  as defined in 
the proof of Lemma 1 such that for any ρρ >  there must be  where ( II seg ,0∈ )
( ) 1=segIω  and ( )segIω  has a negative slope. But these two conditions make it a stable 
equilibrium. Because it always holds that 1int >WWseg  and at an interior 
equilibrium ( ) 1=segIω , it must be that 1int,, <isegi HH , which is the (IEC) condition. à 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 































, II seg =  is an equilibrium and the segregated 
minority individuals have no incentives to deviate (integrate). Obviously, there exists 






























. And because the left hand side is decreasing 
in ρ , which is easy to see, for any ρρ ˆ<  it must be that ( ) 1>
=IIseg seg
Iω .  (A knife-edge 
possibility of a stable corner equilibrium is also that at the same time ( ) 1=
=IIseg seg
Iω  and 
( ) 0int <∂∂ =IIsegseg segIWW .) As concerns full integration, noting that ( ) ∞=→ ω0segILim , there 
are infinite returns to switching to segregated social network whenever 0=segI . 
Therefore,  is never equilibrium in the model. à 0=segI
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Denote  
( ) ( )
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and rewrite the arbitrage condition (AC’) as a function of χ  at a given : segI
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1
1
== χχχω ρ AB  
Then differentiate ( )χω  (holding  constant): segI



















which implies that ( ) 0<∂∂ χχω  is equivalent to: 
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 for any  that 
satisfies condition (IEC), thus in any interior equilibrium in particular. On the other hand, 




















finite for any positive χ . Moreover, ( )χA  and ( )χB  are both finite and positive. It 

















A~ , where ρ~  is well 







inequality (5A.1) cannot be satisfied, and thus ( ) 0>∂∂ χχω . à 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
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1 . Now realize that ( ) ( )ρχχω
1
0 IJII, seg === , which is obviously 

















, which is clearly 
decreasing in .  Therefore, if segI 0=χ , the only equilibrium is that of full segregation. 
Now realize that condition (IEC) for IIseg =  boils down to ( ) γγδ JI <+1 . For 1=χ , 






























































1  and (IEC) holds. Moreover, 









































χω  for any χ  whenever  
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112 . Now 
realize that both 1ρ  and 2ρ  are positive and well defined. Noting that 



































 is continuous in χ , for 21 ρρρρ ,Max≡>
)  
there must exist some ( )10,ˆ ∈χ  such that ( ) 1==IIsegχ̂ω  and  
(i) For any χχ ˆ<  full segregation is a stable equilibrium, 
(ii) For any χχ ˆ>  full segregation is not a stable equilibrium and, because 






 and ( )segIω  is continuous in , there exists a stable 
interior segregation equilibrium, 
segI
( )10,I eseg ∈ .  à 
 
Proof of Propositions 5a-b 
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∂ int,ij HH . Noting that 
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δ
χ JIH intint,i +
++=
1

































After some straightforward algebraic manipulation one can show that because  
and 
intIJ >
0>δ  it must be that χχ ∂∂>∂∂ int,ij HH  and thus χχ ∂Ω∂>∂Ω∂ int,ij . To 
compare 
χ∂
Ω∂ j  and 
χ∂
Ω∂ segi, , noting that segregated minority and majority do not receive 
the same wage, it is necessary to proceed as in the proof of Proposition 3 where the only 
change is that ( )χA  is redefined: ( ) ( )



















. All the rest of 






 and thus condition (IEC) is not necessary. This implies that 
χχ ∂Ω∂>∂Ω∂ int,ij  whenever ρ  is large enough such as in the proof of Proposition 3 
with ( )χA′  instead of ( )χA  and the respectively redefined ρ~ .  à 
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Proof of Proposition 6 




χ  in the long run, one obtains: 


































































JII , for any positive . If intI 0=intI , one can easily see from the 
derivatives above that χχ ∂∂>∂∂ int,ij HH , because 0>δ . Clearly, only desegregation 
( 0 ) can violate this condition, given that int >∂I 0>∂χ . Because ( ) χχω ∂∂  and 
( ) segseg II ∂∂ω  are non-zero and finite for any  and 0>segI 0>χ , which is obvious from 













seg  is finite as well. 
But then there for any  and ( I,I int 0∈ ) 10 ≤< χ  there exists 0>y  such that for any 













JII  is satisfied. As in the previous proof, 
χχ ∂∂>∂∂ int,ij HH implies χχ ∂Ω∂>∂Ω∂ int,ij . Because the arbitrage condition (AC) 
holds in the long run and thus segii ,int, Ω=Ω , χχ ∂Ω∂>∂Ω∂ int,ij  implies that 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
De interactie tussen etnische groepen, die onderling verschillen in taal, religie en andere 
sociaal-culturele opzichten, heeft met  enkele intrigerende kenmerken de aandacht van 
sociologen en economen getrokken. Dit proefschrift stelt twee paradoxale empirische 
verschijnselen centraal. Het eerste is wat ik de schaalpuzzel noem: minderheden 
verdienen in het algemeen een lager inkomen per hoofd dan gemiddeld in de bevolking, 
maar tevens stijgt de ongelijkheid naarmate de minderhedengroep een groter aandeel in 
de totale bevolking van een bepaalde regio uitmaakt. Het tweede empirische verschijnsel 
betreft segregatie en inkomensongelijkheid. Een belangrijke tendens in regio’s in de 
Verenigde Staten waar witte en zwarte bevolking samenleven, is de ommekeer in 
segregatietrends aan het einde van de jaren zeventig en desegregatie van de zwarte 
bevolking vanaf die tijd. In dezelfde periode is de inkomensongelijkheid tussen de twee 
groepen toegenomen. Dit lijkt paradoxaal, aangezien het voor de hand ligt te redeneren 
dat desegregatie hand in hand gaat met juist vermindering van inkomensongelijkheid. Het 
doel van dit proefschrift is de genoemde twee empirische puzzels te verklaren en zo het 
inzicht te vergroten in de complexiteit van sociale en economische interactie tussen 
minderheden en de rest van de bevolking.  
 
Het analytische deel van het proefschrift begint in hoofdstuk 2, waar ik een archetypisch 
model presenteer voor de interactie tussen een als minderheid te typeren bevolkingsgroep 
(‘minority’) en de – als eenheid te beschouwen – rest van de bevolking (‘majority’) bij 
het verwerven van vaardigheden (‘human capital’) en op de arbeidsmarkt. Dit model 
presenteert in gestileerde vorm de belangrijkste variabelen en argumenten die in dit 
proefschrift centraal staan. Bovendien stelt het mij in staat een eerste visie te geven op de 
rol van lokale effecten en sociale afstand in sociale interactie, met name de verbanden die 
deze teweegbrengen tussen sociale interactie, productiemiddelen en lonen.  
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Het belangrijkste inzicht in hoofdstuk 3 is dat imperfecte substitueerbaarheid tussen 
vaardigheden van verschillende bevolkingsgroepen een directe consequentie kan zijn van 
lokale spillover effecten in het proces waarin vaardigheden worden verworven en van 
sociale afstand bij sociale interactie. In dit hoofdstuk ga ik uit van een situatie waarin 
heterogene vaardigheden worden verworven in specifieke sociale netwerken. Ik laat zien 
dat lokale effecten en sociale afstand leiden tot systematische verschillen in de efficiëntie 
waarmee vaardigheden kunnen worden opgedaan. De opbrengsten van het investeren in 
te onderscheiden vaardigheden verschillen hierdoor tussen bevolkingsgroepen, wat de 
feitelijke keuze tussen deze vaardigheden beïnvloedt. Afhankelijk van het specifieke 
evenwicht dat tot stand komt, zullen verschillende bevolkingsgroepen terechtkomen in 
andere sociaal-culturele netwerken, waardoor minderheden andere vaardigheden 
opbouwen dan de rest van de bevolking. De verschillende vaardigheden worden ongelijk 
beloond op de arbeidsmarkt omdat ze imperfecte substituten zijn. Ik laat zien in 
hoofdstuk 3 dat het lokale spillovereffect en de resulterende arbeidsspecialisatie van 
etnische groepen de schaalpuzzel kan verklaren. Bovendien geeft dit hoofdstuk een 
mogelijke verklaring waarom sommige minderheden juist meer verdienen dan andere 
groepen, waarom minderhedengroepen relatief meer tijd besteden binnen de familie, en 
waarom integratie grotere ongelijkheid kan brengen voor minderheden.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4 valideert in empirische zin een essentiële aanname uit hoofdstuk 3. Ik 
beargumenteer daar, kort gezegd, dat het positief verband tussen minderheden (als 
percentage van de bevolking) en inkomensongelijkheid (gemeten als verhouding tussen 
het gemiddelde loon van de rijke bevolkingsgroep ten opzichte van dat van de 
minderhedengroep) tot stand komt op de arbeidsmarkt en voortvloeit uit de imperfecte 
substitueerbaarheid van vaardigheden die de verschillende bevolkingsgroepen hebben 
verworven. Het empirische hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt deze aanname van imperfecte 
substitueerbaarheid, gebruikmakend van data over de arbeidsmarkt in de Verenigde 
Staten. Ik baseer me allereerst op het model van de gegeneraliseerde Leontief 
productiefunctie, wat me toestaat kruislingse complementariteitselasticiteiten te schatten 
voor de arbeid van verschillende minderhedengroepen. Daarnaast schat ik een model van 
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concurrentie op de arbeidsmarkt waarin ik veronderstel dat substitutie tussen arbeid van 
verschillende bevolkingsgroepen gekenmerkt wordt door een constante substitutie-
elasticiteit. De analyse verwerpt de nul-hypothese dat arbeid van minderheden en van de 
rest van de bevolking perfecte substituten zijn op de arbeidsmarkt. Meer specifiek wijst 
de analyse uit dat de arbeid van minderheden complementair is aan de arbeid van de rest 
van de bevolking en omgekeerd, en dat de substitutie-elasticiteit tussen de verschillende 
soorten arbeid eindig is. Hiermee ondersteunt hoofdstuk 4 de theorie dat verschillende 
minderheden andere vaardigheden hebben verworven en andere soorten arbeid aanbieden 
dan de rest van de bevolking. Bovendien suggereren de bevindingen dat de arbeidsmarkt 
verantwoordelijk is voor de schaalpuzzel, namelijk het empirische fenomeen dat relatieve 
inkomensongelijkheid van minderheden stijgt met het percentage van minderheden in een 
regio. 
 
In hoofdstuk 5 concentreer ik me op twee elkaar schijnbaar tegensprekende 
ontwikkelingen in het leven van Amerikanen in het laatste kwart van de twintigste eeuw: 
(i) de segregatie van zwarten en (ii) de toenemende interetnische inkomensongelijkheid. 
Om de mechanismen achter deze ontwikkelingen te verklaren bestudeer ik in een 
analytisch model hoe individuen in de minderhedengroepen beslissen met wie een sociaal 
verband aan te gaan: gaan zij alleen met hun eigen groep om of ook met de andere groep? 
Daarna bestudeer ik binnen dit model de rol van verbeteringen in informatie- en 
communicatietechnologieën (ICT) op hun keuze en laat zien hoe deze verbeteringen de 
genoemde waargenomen empirische tendensen kunnen verklaren. In het bijzonder stel ik 
dat ICT-verbeteringen disproportioneel de efficiëntie verhogen van (i) sociale interactie 
in geïntegreerde netwerken en (ii) individuen die tot een grote groep behoren. Dit heeft 
tot gevolg dat ICT-verbeteringen desegregatie veroorzaken en tegelijkertijd de 
interetnische inkomensongelijkheid vergroten. Bovendien leid ik in dit laatste hoofdstuk 
af dat er een drempelniveau is voor de productiviteit van ICT dat de segregatiekeuze 
bepaalt. Is ICT productiever dan het drempelniveau, dan kiezen alle individuen van een 
minderheid ervoor in een gesegregeerde gemeenschap te leven; is ICT productiever dan 
het drempelniveau, dan kiezen sommige, maar niet alle, individuen voor segregatie. Ik 
beargumenteer dat de ommekeer in de tendens tot segregatie die plaatsvond aan het einde 
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van de jaren 70 van de twintigste eeuw een uiting kan zijn van het overschrijden van deze 
drempel. Tenslotte toon ik aan dat een substantiële verbetering in ICT nodig kan zijn 
voor het uitlokken van desegregatie in het geval een regio sterk is gesegregeerd en dat 
verbetering in ICT segregatie juist kan versterken als de minderhedengroep sterk afwijkt 
van de rest van de bevolking. Deze theoretische bevindingen geven een verklaring 
waarom in het algemeen geen desegregatie plaatsvond in gebieden die extreem sterk 
gesegregeerd waren en ook niet bij mensen die recent zijn geïmmigreerd en daarom 
minder aansluiting vinden bij de bevolking dan het geval is voor minderheden die zijn 
geboren in de regio waar zij wonen.  
 
De belangrijkste resultaten in het proefschrift kunnen als volgt worden samengevat. Ten 
eerste vinden we dat we verschillen in typen vaardigheden en hoeveelheid “human 
capital” die worden verworven door de verschillende bevolkingsgroepen, minderheden en 
de rest, kunnen modelleren door lokale spillover effecten en als gevolg van sociale 
afstand. Deze effecten kunnen een persistente uitwerking hebben op de wijze waarop 
minderheden hun plaats in de maatschappij krijgen. Zo lang als sociale afstand tussen 
minderheden en de rest van de bevolking blijft bestaan waardoor de minderheden als 
aparte sociaal-culturele groepen moeten worden beschouwd, zullen sociale en 
economische krachten deze verschillen en de consequenties ervan in stand houden, en zal 
inkomensongelijkheid blijvend positief gerelateerd zijn aan de relatieve omvang van de 
minderhedengroep.   
 
Ten tweede vinden we op grond van de analytische modellen belangrijke relatieve 
inkomenseffecten van integratie. Enerzijds zal de integratie van minderheden voor 
iedereen voordelig zijn: het wordt gemakkelijker vaardigheden te verwerven en ‘human 
capital’ op te bouwen omdat uitwisseling van ideeën gemakkelijker wordt. Anderzijds 
kan de inkomensongelijkheid door integratie toenemen, omdat minderheden nu op de 
arbeidsmarkt concurreren met een grotere groep. Bij segregatie concurreren leden van de 
minderhedengroep voornamelijk met de andere leden van diezelfde groep, en hun aantal 
is relatief klein ten opzichte van de totale bevolking. Bij integratie daarentegen 
verwerven minderheden vaardigheden die meer vergelijkbaar zijn met die van de rest van 
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de bevolking en concurreren ze voornamelijk met een relatief groot deel van de 
bevolking. Daarom zal integratie  weliswaar leiden tot meer ‘human capital’ maar ook tot 
een grotere blootstelling aan concurrentie op de arbeidsmarkt waardoor de lonen van 
minderheden per eenheid ‘human capital’ zullen dalen. In het geval dat integratie het 
relatieve loon van minderheden meer laat dalen dan het de relatieve hoeveelheid ‘human 
capital’ laat stijgen, dan zal integratie de inkomensongelijkheid van minderheden ten 
opzichte van de rest van de bevolking laten stijgen.  
 
Ten derde bevestigt het empirische onderzoek in hoofdstuk 4 de visie dat arbeid van 
minderhedengroepen als productiefactor imperfect substituteerbaar is met arbeid van de 
rest van de bevolking. Dit ondersteunt echter niet de vaak uitgesproken vrees dat werkers 
uit minderhedengroepen de banen van andere werkers verdringen. Het empirische 
onderzoek toont aan dat een multi-etnische beroepsbevolking voordelen brengt en dat de 
rest van de bevolking baat heeft bij de aanwezigheid van werkers uit 
minderhedengroepen.  
 
Ten vierde, tenslotte, maakt dit proefschrift enkele voordelen en kosten expliciet van de 
verbeteringen in informatie- en communicatietechnologie (ICT). In de modelmatige 
analyse leidt een ICT-verbetering tot efficiëntere verwerving van ‘human capital’, die 
iedereen bevoordeelt. Bovendien leidt het tot de-segregatie van minderheden, aangezien 
de voordelen van de efficiëntieverbeteringen vooral ten goede komen aan individuen die 
kiezen voor leven en leren in een geïntegreerde groep. Echter, ICT-verbeteringen werken 
niet symmetrisch uit op de efficiëntie van het verwerven van ‘human capital’: vooral 
grote groepen winnen, waardoor minderheden relatief weinig winnen en de relatieve 
inkomensongelijkheid toeneemt ondanks de verminderde segregatie.   
 
